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• 
By Letter of 12 September 1984, Mr Rudi ARNDT, chairman of the Socialist Group 
of the European Parliament, requested the President of the European Parliament 
to set up a Committee of Inquiry into the Rise of Fascism and Racism in Europe 
under Rule 95 of the Rules of Procedure. Following the President•s positive 
decision on the request for admissibility of 28 September 1984, the European 
Parliament ratified the membership of the Committee of Inquiry and its terms 
of reference on 24 October 1984 and the committee met for the first time on 
25 October 1984. 
At its meeting of 28-29 November 1984 the Committee of Inquiry appointed 
Mr EVRIGENIS rapporteur. 
The committee considered the plan of the draft report, preliminary outline at 
its meeting of 22-23 January 1985; it held three public hearings on 
30-31 January 1985, 25-26 February 1985 and 18-20 March 1985; it met on three 
occasions on 25-26 April 1985; 13-14 May 1985, 17-18 June 1985 to hear further 
contributions from various experts; it met subsequently on 25-26 September 
1985 and 18-19 November 1985 to discuss the draft report. 
At its meeting of 18 and 19 November 1985 the committee adopted the report in 
a roll-call vote by 13 votes in favour, with one abstention. 
' 
The following took part in the vote : Mr FORD, chairman; Mr PRAG and 
Mr CHAMBEIRON, vice-chairmen; Mr EVRIGENIS, rapporteur; Mrs d 1 ANCONA, 
Mr CASSIDY (deputizing for Mr Prout), Mrs FONTAINE, Mr HABSBURG, 
Mrs LARIVE-GROENENDAAL, Mr van der LEK, Mr ROTHLEY, Mr SELVA and 
Mrs VAN HEMELDONCK. 
The report was tabled on 22 November 1985. 
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1. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
1.1.1 The Establishment of the Committee 
1. By Letter of 12 September 1984, Mr Rudi ARNDT, Chairman of the Socialist 
Group of the European Parliament, informed the President of the European 
Parliament that more than 109 Members had signed the proposal to 
establish a Committee of Inquiry to examine the Rise of Fascism and 
Racism in Europe. The President agreed to implement the proposal as 
soon as possible pursuant to Rule 95 of the Rules of Procedure. The 
Letter was accompanied by the request, signed by 113 Members, specifying 
the terms of reference (see 1.1.3. below). 
2. This request and the Letter were discussed by the Bureau of the European 
Parliament at its meeting of 28 September 1984. After a wide-ranging 
exchange of views on the compatibility of the request with Rule 95(1.) 
of the Rules of Procedure, the President took the decision, in 
accordance with the interpretation given by the Committee on the Rules 
of Procedure to Rule 95(1.>, that the request met the criteria Laid down 
in the Rules of Procedure and that it was therefore admissible. The 
Bureau decided that the composition of the Committee of Inquiry should 
not exceed fifteen Members,. that the final report should be submitted to 
the House by 30 June 1985 (1), and asked the political groups to 
submit proposals for the allocation of seats and to forward the List of 
Members to serve on the Committee in time for the Bureau meeting on 
9 October 1984. 
3. The matter was raised again at the Bureau meeting of 9 October and 
subsequently at its meeting of 23 October at which the names of Members 
for the Committee of Inquiry had been submitted. The President 
announced in plenary on Wednesday, 24 October 1984 that the Bureau, in 
accordance with Rule 95(2.), had received proposals concerning the 
membership of the Committee of Inquiry into the Rise of Fascism and 
Racism in the Community and elsewhere in Europe. The List of candidates 
was included in Annex I to the minutes<2>. The President announced 
that if no objections were raised to this List before the approval of 
the minutes, the appointments would be considered ratified. No 
objections were so raised and the minutes were adopted on Thursday 
25 October 1984. The constituent meeting of the Committee then took 
place on Thursday, 25 October 1984. 
4. Rule 92 of the Rules of Procedure requires that nominations for 
committee membership ensure fair representation of Member States and of 
party views. The political groups followed this rule in making proposals 
to the enlarged Bureau, which were subsequently approved by Parliament. 
5. Four members were nominated from the Socialist Group (130 Members from 
all EC Member States but Ireland); four from the Group of the European 
People's Party (Christian-Democratic Group) with 110 Members from 
parties in all EC Member States but the UK); two member from the 
European Democratic Group (with 50 MEPs from the UK and Danish 
Conservative parties); one member from the Communist and Allies Group 
(representing the 43 members from parties in Italy, France, Greece and 
Denmark); one member from the Liberal and Democratic Group (31 members 
from parties in all EC Member States, except Germany and the UK); one 
from the Group of the European Democratic Alliance (29 members from 
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parties in France, Ireland and Scotland); one from the Rainbow Group: 
Federation of the Green-Alternative European Link, Agalev-Ecolo, the 
Danish People's Movement against Membership of the EC and the European 
Free Alliance of the EP (bringing together 19 members from parties in 
Germany, Denmark, Belgium and the Netherlands); and one from the Group 
of the European Right (16 members from the French National Front, the 
Italian MSI-DN, and the Greek EPEN). One observer from the non-attached 
members was also nominated. 
6. The following Members were appointed to the Committee: 
Mr Glyn FORD (elected Chairman), Mr Derek PRAG <elected First 
Vice-Chairman), Mr Robert CHAMBEIRON (elected Second Vice-Chairman), 
Mrs ANGLADE, Mrs CHARZAT, Mr DUCARME, Mr EVRIGENIS, Mrs FONTAINE, 
Mr HABSBURG, Mr van der LEK, Mr d'ORMESSON, Mr PROUT, Mr ROTHLEY, 
Mr SELVA, Mrs VAN HEMELDONCK. Mrs CHARZAT was replaced by Mrs FUILLET 
by Letter of 25 April 1985. 
Substitutes: Mrs d'ANCONA, Mr AVGERINOS, Mr CASINI, Mr de CAMARET, 
Mr CROUX, Mrs DURY, Mr GAWRONSKI, Mr MALAUD, Mr NEWTON DUNN, Mr PENDERS, 
Mr PRICE, Mr ROSSETTI, Mr SCHWALBA-HOTH, Mr STAUFFENBERG, Mr ZAGAR!. 
Observer: Mr ULBURGHS. 
1.1.2 Legal bases and interpretation of the mandate of the Committee of Inquiry 
7. A number of Members held reservations on the conformity in substance of 
the act setting up the Committee with Rule 95(1.) of the Rules of 
Procedure, in view of the scale and nature of the inquiry. These 
reservations were expressed at the meeting of 
28-29 November 1984 (PE 94.269/rev., p. 4). 
8. Mr LE PEN, Chairman of the Group of the European Right, wrote to the 
President of the European Parliament on 27 December 1984 questioning the 
procedural interpretation of Article 95 under which the Committee was 
established and asking that the Committee of Inquiry's work be suspended 
forthwith, that the Rules and Petitions Committee be seized of the 
matter, and in the absence of either of these, suggesting that 
application might be made to the European Court of Justice for a ruling 
that no Committee of Inquiry can be set up, whose aims do not clearly 
form part of the activities of the three European Communities (3). 
9. Mr LE PEN wrote to Mr FORD on 16 January 1985 in a similar vein, 
informing Mr FORD that the Group of the European Right would contest by 
all means the validity of this Committee, would no Longer attend the 
Committee, would deny the Committee any authority or standing, and would 
retain the right of taking any defamatory or prevaricatory allegation to 
court. Mr FORD wrote to the President on 18 January 1985 asking his 
advice on the Letter. By Letter of 22 January the President explained 
that he had to oversee the execution of the decision of the Bureau and 
the Parliament which had fixed the composition of the Committee of 
Inquiry under Article 95 of the Rules of Procedure. The Committee, he 
underlined, had to submit its report in the time set. 
10. On 1 April 1985 an application was Lodged at the Registry of the Court 
of Justice of the European Communities in Luxembourg by the Group of the 
European Right, represented by its Chairman, Mr LE PEN. The applicant 
sought an order setting aside the decision of the European Parliament 
and its President on the grounds that: 
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- the committee was not a committee of inquiry; 
- the subject matter of the inquiry did not fall within the sphere of 
activities of the Communities; 
- the aim of the action constituted a discrimination against a political 
group of MEPs. 
11. The European Parliament applied to the Court for a decision on a 
preliminary objection on 2 May 1985. The applicant lodged his 
submissions on these arguments on 4 June 1985. 
1.1.3 Terms of Reference 
12. The terms of reference of the Committee of Inquiry were those submitted 
by the 113 signatorie~. No changes were made to them by the President 
or the Bureau of the European Parliament in the discussion of the 
Committee of Inquiry's establishment. The Committee of Inquiry was 
requested to report urgently on: 
1. the growth and size of fascist, racialist and related groups within 
Europe, both inside and outside the Community; 
2. the inter-connection and Links between these groups; 
3. the relationship between their activities and racism in Member 
States; 
4. the relationship between the growth of fascism and racism and the 
worsening economic and social conditions, for example, poverty, 
unemployment, etc.; 
5. an examination of the machinery already used by Member States' 
Governments to respond to these organizations; 
6. ways of combating them. 
At meetings on 28-29 November and 17-18 December the Committee 
considered and finally adopted a three-page interpretative list of 
points for consideration by the experts, (PE 94.424/fin.), based on 
these terms of reference (see Annex 2). 
1.1.4 Working Procedures and Methods 
13. Given the brief time available and the Limited budget, the Committee 
decided to gather its information: 
14. 
- through ordinary public meetings in Brussels; 
- through public hearings in Brussels; 
- through encouraging written submissions; 
- and, if possible, through visits to particular areas. 
The Committee met in public nine times between 1 November 1984 and 
30 June 1985 at the European Parliament, 97-113 rue Belliard, Brussels. 
These meetings included exchanges of views with various representatives 
of Community organizations including the Commissioner responsible for 
Social Affairs, Mr Ivor Richard, on 18 December 1984, a representative 
of the Council of Ministers in April 1985 and representatives of the 
appropriate services of the Commission in December 1984 and April 1985. 
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15. The Committee decided at its earliest meetings that it would hold three 
public hearings in Brussels with experts on matters relevant to its 
terms of reference. These public hearings were held on 30-31 January, 
25-26 February and 18-20 March 1985 and allowed Members to talk with 
twenty-three eminent experts on matters of concern to the Committee's 
terms of reference. The hearings were well-attended by members of the 
general public. 
16. The Committee spoke with representatives of the European Trade Union 
Confederation and 'SOS Racisme' on 25-26 April 1985. At the meeting on 
13-14 May the Committee spoke with a number of representatives of 
organizations from the Brussels and Limburg areas concerning political 
refugees and migrant workers. It also talked with Mr Aldo ANIASI, 
Vice-President of the Italian Chamber of Deputies. 
17. The Committee approached a number of other experts for written 
submissions, and encouraged its Members to submit informal reports to 
the rapporteur to help him in the preparation of his report. Written 
submissions were made by certain of the experts who were invited to 
attend the hearings and further evidence was provided by individuals and 
organizations without specific invitation. Opinion poll and survey 
research data was sought from organizations across Europe, and from 
Eurobarometer. 
18. Various international organizations were contacted, and a number of 
non-governmental organizations, who had become aware of the Committee's 
work contacted the Committee. 
19. The large amount of material gathered was made available to the 
rapporteur of the Committee. Committee members were able to consult it. 
1.1.5 Documentation 
20. The services of the European Parliament provided initial documentation 
on the major themes of the Committee of Inquiry's work which were 
circulated to all Members in the early meetings <4>. Documentation 
from national parliaments was requested. Extensive documentation was 
forwarded from, in particular, the United Nations and its Centre for 
Human Rights and the Committee for the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination, the Council of Europe, its Parliamentary 
Assembly, the Committee of Ministers, the European Commission and Court 
of Human Rights, and the International Labour Office. The Institute of 
Jewish Affairs, London, opened its voluminous archives to the Committee. 
1.1.6 Written Evidence 
21. Many organizations and individuals submitted written evidence to the 
Committee of Inquiry. A list of those who did is annexed in part 3.B. 
1.1.7 Hearings and public meetings 
22. The Committee of Inquiry held three public hearings and heard: 
(a) At the first hearing on 30-31 January 1985 
Mrs Marie-Jose CHOMBART DE LAUWE, Centre nationale de La recherche 
scientifique (CNRS), Paris, France; 
Mrs Brigitte GALANDA, Dokumentationsarchiv des osterreichischen 
Widerstandes, Vienna, Austria; 
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Mrs Joke KNIESMEYER, Anne Frank Stichting, Amsterdam, Netherlands; 
Prof. Bhikhu PAREKH, University of Hull, United Kingdom; 
Mr Jean-Francois REVEL, journalist, Paris, France; 
Prof. Dr. Erwin K. SCHEUCH, University of Cologne, Germany. 
(b) At the second hearing on 25-26 February 1985 
Mrs Ann DUMMETT, Director, Runnymede Trust, London, United Kingdom; 
Mrs Philomena ESSED, Author 'Alledaags Racisme', Amsterdam, Netherlands; 
Professor Raoul GIRARDET, Institut d'Etudes Politiques, Paris, France; 
Professor Franz GRESS, Frankfurt University, Germany; 
Mr Mervyn KOHLER, Help the Aged, London, United Kingdom; 
Professor Olivier PASSELECQ, Institut d'Etudes Politiques, Paris, France; 
Mrs George PAU-LANGEVIN, Mouvement contre le racisme et pour l'amitie 
entre les peuples (MRAP), Paris, France; 
Mr Simon WIESENTHAL, Director, Judisches Dokumentationszentrum, Vienna, 
Austria. 
(c) At the third hearing on 18-20 March 1985 
Mr Andre GLUCKSMAN, author, Paris, France; 
Prof. Ernest MANDEL, Universite libre de Bruxelles, Belgium; 
Dr. Gunter MULLER, Bundestag, Bonn, Germany; 
Mr Michael MAY, Assistant Director, Institute of Jewish Affairs, London, 
United Kingdom; 
Prof. Marco REVELL!, Turin University, Turin, Italy; 
Prof. Stephen ROSE, Professor of Biology, Open University, 
Milton Keynes, United Kingdom; 
Mr Martin SAVITT, Board of Deputies of British Jews and World Jewish 
Congress-Europe, London, United Kingdom; 
Prof. Mikhail VOSLENSKY, Forschungsinstitut fur Sowjetische Gegenwart, 
Munich, Germany. 
Mr Oscar Luigi SCALFARO, Minister of the Interior of the Republic of 
Italy, agreed to participate as an expert in this hearing. 
(d) At the public meeting of 28-29 November 1984, the Committee heard: 
Mr George William O'BRIEN, Commission official; 
Mrs Daniela NAPOLI, Commission official. 
(e) At the public meeting of 17-18 December 1984, the Committee heard: 
Mr Ivor RICHARD, Commissioner responsible for Social Affairs, Commission 
of the EC, Brussels; 
(f) At the public meeting of 25-26 April 1985, the Committee heard: 
Mr Paolo ADOURNO and Mr Peter COLDRICK, European Trade Union 
Confederation, Brussels, Belgium; 
Mr Harlem DESIR, SOS-Racisme, Paris, France; 
Mrs Daniela NAPOLI, Commission official; 
Mr w. NICOLL, Director-General in the Secretariat of the Council of 
Ministers; 
Mr Yannick SAMSUN, SOS-Racisme, Belgium. 
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At the public meeting of 13-14 May 1985, the Committee heard: 
Mr Aldo ANIASI, Vice-President of the Chamber of Deputies of Italy. 
Mr Bruno ANGELO and Mrs Marie-Claire ROSIERS, Provinciale Dienst voor 
Onthaal van Gastarbeiders (Limburg), Belgium; 
Mr Jef CLEEMPUT, Caritas Catholica, Brussels, Belgium; 
Mr Bruno DUCOLI, Centre Socio-Culturel des Immigres de Bruxelles, 
Belgium; 
Mr Gaetan de MOFFARTS, Vlaamse Overleg Comite over Migratie (VOCOM), 
Brussels, Belgium; 
Prof. Andre NAYER, Universite libre de Bruxelles, representing the 
Mouvement contre Le racisme, l'antisemitisme et La xenophobie <MRAX), 
Brussels, Belgium; 
Mr Jacques ZWICK, Ligue des Familles, Brussels, Belgium 
1.1.8 Visits 
23. The European Parliament's budgetary situation was such that the 
Committee was unable to visit places outside the three places of work of 
the European Community. Members of the Socialist Group in the Committee 
organized conferences in London and Manchester, which Members of certain 
other groups attended. A number of organizations and groups representing 
minorities attended these meetings and some of them made submissions. 
Reports on the conferences and the submissions were forwarded to the 
rapporteur (see list Annex 3). 
1.2 ACKOWLEDGEMENTS 
24. The rapporteur wishes to thank all those who have contributed to the 
accomplishment of this task : the experts and the representatives of 
institutions and organizations who have testified before the Committee; 
the organizations and institutions who have provided ample 
documentation, and especially the Institute of Jewish Affairs of London, 
for putting at the Committee's disposal its archives and library which 
represent a unique source of material for this type of research; the 
members of the Secretariat of the Committee and the technical advisers 
who spared no effort to ensure the successful completion of the task; 
and last but not least, his colleagues in the Committee for their 
contribution to the discussions. 
1.3 IMPORTANCE OF THE INQUIRY. THE COMMUNITY CONCERN 
25. It would be hard to exaggerate the importance of this inquiry. Let us 
examine in turn each of the concepts constituting its subject. 
(a) In the pages which follow we shall be considering the concept of 
fascism but it can be said already at this point that the very title 
of our inquiry immediately brings to mind the reality of the 
totalitarian policy which dominated in Europe before and during the 
Last war. That being the outstanding feature of the concept, it is 
only natural that a democratic Europe, manifest in the Community and 
its parliamentary institution, should be particularly concerned over 
any possibility of the re-emergence of facist trends. It happens 
that the inquiry has been concluded in the year of the fortieth 
anniversary of that terrible and destructive event. This fact, 
beside its cautionary symbolism, has imbued our Committee's work 
with a special sense of historic responsibility. It has approached 
its task as the performance of the democratic duties of spreading 
knowledge and maintaining vigilance.<S) 
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(b) Europe will never forget the bloodshed and humiliation that were the 
expression of racism under the totalitarian regimes. And it is 
significant that Europe is now building its future on the basis of 
reconciliation and cooperation among its constituent nations. The 
Community approach means, by definition, the renouncement of 
nationalist rivalries. Even more obviously, it means the rejection 
of all racist tendencies within the European context. But, having 
thrown its doors wide open after the war to newcomers of a variety 
of ethnic origins who came here, individually or in groups, either 
to join in the work of reconstruction and development or seeking in 
its Lands refuge, freedom and justice, Europe today presents a much 
enriched ethnic and cultural picture. In a world tending 
increasingly towards a global village, the pluralism so 
characteristic of the community of European nations is gradually 
acquiring a new meaning. Like all great changes in history, this 
transformation is not without its problems and painful shocks. When 
the stresses of an economic and social crisis accompany the friction 
that inevitably results from the shaking down together of people 
differing in their ethnic origins, culture and religious beliefs 
which may, indeed, by their content, tradition or particular 
political orientation be directly opposed, there is always a danger 
that a climate of intolerance or xenophobia may arise and 
occasionally prove alarming in its manifestations. Conscious of its 
responsibility, Europe must face this challenge frankly and 
clear-sightedly, with the kind of political integrity and moral 
courage which have marked the best hours of its history. The 
European synthesis which is now underway can only be achieved in 
accordance with the principles of which historical Europe, now 
partially united within the Community, has always regarded itself as 
the inspirer, creator and guardian. The European Parliament, 
representing directly the political forces and trends in Europe 
today, must, in this field also, assume fully its responsibilities 
in the areas of information, discussion and action. It is in this 
spirit that our inquiry has been undertaken. 
1.4 SCOPE OF THE SUBJECT AND LIMITS OF THE INQUIRY 
26. <a> In view of the foregoing it will be seen that one of the 
difficulties inherent in the inquiry, and hence in the drafting of 
the present report, has been the scope of its subject. Its two 
conceptual poles - fascism and racism - are terms which it is not 
easy to define or circumscribe. Side by side with a multitude of 
various scientific definitions: political, historical, sociological, 
psychological or anthropological, there are often very different 
meanings given to them in the various political jargons, frequently 
coloured by implicit political inspirations. Thus the definitions 
derived from an analysis of political and social conditions and very 
often semantically warped by the propagandist nature of their use. 
Avoidance of the pitfalls inherent in the partisan manipulation of 
these terms has been one of the chief preoccupations of the 
rapporteur. 
(b) Another difficulty, this one ar1s1ng from the terms of the brief 
given to our Committee, resides in the interdependence between 
fascism and racism suggested by its wording. While such an 
interdependence is borne out to the extent shown in subsequent 
sections of the report, it is nevertheless true that if fascism were 
to be examined in its racist aspect and above all if racism were to 
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be analysed as an integral part, or a by-product, of certain types of 
organized fascism, this would Limit the scope of the inquiry and 
arbitrarily restrict the matter to be discussed. It became apparent 
to the committee in the course of its work that its terms of reference 
needed to be broadened and relaxed if the true dimensions of the 
phenomena concerned were to be assessed ~nd their causes evaluated in 
an objective manner. Thus, for example, it would not have been 
possible to bring out the widespread nature of xenophobic attitudes -
which is one of the more important conclusions of the inquiry - had 
the Committee adhered closely to the preconceptions suggested by the 
terms of reference. Similarly, had a fragmentary or dogmatic view of 
the subject been adopted, artificial and politically unjustifiable 
barriers would have arisen in the way of formulating a set of 
recommendations for possible action at Community, national and 
international Level. 
(c) Like all other political and social phenomena, fascism and racism 
are part of that multi-dimensional structure that constitutes 
society. It would be mistaken, in a parliamentary inquiry to try 
and isolate them for examination in artificially aseptic conditions 
appropriate to Laboratory research. It must always be remembered 
that we are dealing with human conduct and social behaviour which 
are part of the past and the present and which can only be 
perceived, conceived and assessed by reference to, and as part of, 
that history. Evidently, it was not the Committee's nor, more 
particularly, the rapporteur's task to try to write the political 
history of Europe. Knowing full well that it would be neither 
realistic nor appropriate to aim for an exhaustive study, either in 
terms of fact-finding or theoretical analysis, the rapporteur 
contented himself with an honest attempt to take into account, 
wherever possible, the historical and political context of the 
phenomena under consideration. He is all too conscious of the 
limitations of his achievement. 
(d) Not the Least of the difficulties was the question of the spatial 
extent of the inquiry. An attempt to describe and assess the 
situation in all the European countries was a task beyond our 
means. As a result there are variations of quantity and quality 
from country to country as regards the description of facts 
(Chapter 2) and of the mechanisms at work (Chapter 3). Some 
countries do not appear in this survey, while others have been 
treated in particular detail thanks to the availability of relevant 
information. These differences are due not only to the inquiry's 
excessive geographical breadth, but also to a number of other 
factors which the reader will find in the foreword to Chapter 2 of 
the report (see paragraph 48 below). 
(e) In accordance with the Rules of Procedure (see 2), the inquiry had 
to be completed in a relatively short time. The time available to 
the rapporteur, in particular, for preparing his draft report after 
the close of the inquiry stage was very limited compared with the 
enormous mass of information to be taken into account. This is one 
factor, among several, which undoubtedly will have affected 
adversely the quality of the present document. 
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(f) The rapporteur also wishes to put the following on record: having to 
analyse, for the purposes of the report, phenomena which Lie at the 
very base of present-day political and social conditions, the 
rapporteur was of necessity obliged to make reference to bodies, 
organizations and occasionally individuals active in national or 
European politics. While such references must inevitably, if only 
by implication, constitute some kind of political appreciation for 
the purposes of the inquiry, it should be clearly understood that 
the mention of a person or a body does not in itself constitute an 
appraisal or a judgement in their respect. Some readers may find 
these references too explicit, others, the contrary. The balance 
required by the duty of objectivity has not been easy to achieve and 
the rapporteur is well aware of this. He has, at any rate, tried at 
all times to ensure that the report should not fall into an 
accusatory mode which may be appropriate in contexts other than that 
of the findings of a Committee of Inquiry. 
(g) Finally, a word of explanation is due on the overall tenor of the 
report. As the rapporteur has been stressing since the first 
meeting of the Committee, a subject of such vast temporal and 
spatial dimensions which is also, to a Large extent, theoretical 
and, by its nature, Likely to be politically controversial, cannot 
be easily fitted into the terms of reference of a Committee of 
Inquiry as defined in Rule 95 of the Rules of Procedure. Our 
Committee's experience should serve in the future towards 
establishing an interpretation of this provision which will be 
closer both to its wording and its aim and make it more suitable as 
one of the means of investigation available to the European 
Parliament. Some comments on the system of committees of inquiry 
will be forwarded to the President of the European Parliament in the 
Light of the experiences of our Committee (see PE 101.760). 
Be that as it may, once it was set up, our Committee had to make the 
best of its task. The report completing its inquiries reflects, its 
author trusts, the aim of objectivity in the collection and assessment 
of information but also a desire to reach conclusions which, avoiding 
blandly inoffensive generalities, might nevertheless command a very 
broad consensus both within the Committee and in Parliament as a whole. 
This applies particularly to that part of the report which deals with 
recommendations for possible action at Community, national or 
international Level. It would be a source of particular satisfaction to 
the rapporteur if this work could demonstrate the existence of an area 
of understanding Lying beyond the political divisions which are natural 
and Legitimate in a democratic Europe. 
1.5 DEFINITIONS 
1.5.1. Fascism : Definitions 
27. The invited experts and the authors of written submissions have provided 
the Committee with a Large variety of definitions and paths to pursue. 
Some experts identified fascism with the ruling themes of movements of 
the extreme right : virulent nationalism, outright rejection of 
democracy and of the traditional political forces and trade unionism, 
xenophobia, racial superiority arbitrarily defined, anti-egalitarianism, 
the cult of the Leader, falsification of history, the glorification of 
certain dictatorships, these were the characteristics mentioned most 
often, and particularly by Mrs Galanda and Mrs Chombard de Lauwe. 
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28. There was widespread insistence that the phenomena under consideration 
must be placed in a historical perspective, some experts, even 
maintaining that the term 'fascism' should be confined to the movements 
active in inter-war Europe under that name (Mr Girardet, Mr Passelecq 
and Mr Gress). Another definition relied on the method of access to 
power and would, according to Mr Mandel, justify the drawing of 
analogies between different historical periods. Yet a third method of 
demarcation contemplated the objectives of fascism. Mr Savitt and 
Mr Revel considered that any organization aiming to subvert the 
democratic order should be labelled fascist. In the same spirit, 
Mr Voslensky warned against the over-refining of definitions since that 
carries the danger of camouflaging the perverse and noxious nature of 
anti-democratic organizations and systems. He, together with 
Mr Glucksman, therefore preferred to deal with the concept of 
totalitarianism rather than of fascism, along the lines laid down by 
Hannah Arendt and her successors. 
29. Research in history and political science displays a variety of 
interests and approaches as great as that with which the Committee found 
itself confronted. Nevertheless, from studies of authoritarian regimes 
in Western and Central Europe in the 1930s an 'idealized' model does 
emerge. According to J. Linz, fascism historically combines 
hyper-nationalism, anti-parliamentarism, anti-liberalism, 
anti-communism, populism, elements of capitalism and the aim of social 
integration to be effected through the single party, with representation 
of the corporatist type. It is characterized by a distinctive style and 
rhetoric (appealing to the emotions, evoking myths, glorifying action), 
activist cadres (recruited principally from the most alienated or the 
most upwardly or downwardly mobile social strata), and the resort to 
violence combined with participation in the electoral process <6>. 
Another author, adopting a more theoretical approach, has categorized as 
many as nine different definitions. Thus fascism can be contemplated as 
one of the following: a dictatorial and coercive agent of bourgeois 
capitalism; the product of moral and cultural break-down; the result of 
psycho-social neurosis; the outcome of the rise of previously 
unorganized masses; the result of the historic process of economic 
growth; a typical manifestation of 20th century totalitarianism; 
resistance to 'modernization'; the expression of a specific radicalism 
of the middle classes; a conceptual hoax - there being no such thing as 
'fascism in general' because of profound differences between the various 
movements bearing that name. This same author goes on to distinguish 
various versions of fascism: the prototypal Italian fascism, with its 
derivations in France, Great Britain, Belgium, the Netherlands, Hungary, 
Austria, Rumania and even Brazil; the national socialism of Germany, 
with its derivations in Scandinavia, Belgium and Hungary; the strongly 
Catholic Spanish phalangism; the Rumanian Legion and the Iron Guard, 
with mystical, semi-religious overtones; the Szalasi movement in 
Hungary; the abortive movements which tried to establish themselves in 
Eastern Europe by authoritarian or bureaucratic means<?>. 
30. In addition to the aspects already mentioned, the Committee also 
discussed four more specific questions during the course of its work 
with a view to obtaining an operational definition of the phenomena 
being studied: Who are the principal victims of fascist doctrines and 
movements? Is there any organic link between fascism and certain 
economic phenomena? What importance should be attached to the attitudes 
and doctrines of 'leader worship'? What are the similarities and 
differences between nazism and fascism? 
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31. Historically, fascist and nazi movements have chosen particular 
targets: Jews (see also paragraphs 26 and 34), gypsies, and also (as 
was pointed out in a document by Mr van der Lek and Mrs d'Ancona, 
members of the Committee<B>) homosexuals and individuals often 
considered to be on the fringe of society, weak or 'deviant'. 
Professor Rose and Mrs Essed have also drawn attention to the 
devaluation of women, whose social role is reduced simply to their 
'reproductive functions'. These social categories are always a 
particular object of animosity to contemporary fascist groups, as are 
foreign workers and refugees, traditional trade union and political 
movements and organizations whose purpose is to support the most 
deprived and neglected members of society. It is nonetheless the case 
that the most extremist of these groups are themselves Largely composed 
of those on the fringes of society. In short, whatever the particular 
fixations of one group or another, an essential component of fascism is 
discrimination between individuals and the denial of equal basic rights 
to all. 
32. The question of the relationship between fascism and economic structures 
was also raised in the course of the Committee's work. This question is 
by nature more related to the analysis of causes and will therefore be 
dealt with subsequently (paragraphs 218-220). But it is also relevant 
here if one argues, in Line with certain theories, that the conceptual 
basis of fascism Lies in its relationship with the economy. This is the 
theory put forward by Professor Mandel, who sees the advent of nazism as 
the result of the strategy adopted by German industries to maximise 
their profits and prevent the establishment of the type of State the 
trade unions were striving for<9>. This theory was discussed on 
several occasions by the Committee during the course of its work. It 
has appeared, in various forms, in the works of many writers<10>, 
dating back as far as 1935-1936<11>. We find it difficult to accept 
it as part of a working definition for several reasons: 
(a) The analysis of the facts on which this hypothesis is based is still 
Largely open to dispute. Increasing importance is now attached to 
the contribution of small businessmen and the middle classes to the 
advent of nazism rather than to any decisive influence on the part 
of big business<12>. 
(b) An 'economic' explanation of fascism would have to account for the 
differences in the Levels of development of the countries which 
succumb to its influence. Only 24% of the working population in 
Italy were employed in industry in 1921, as compared with 42% in 
Germany in 1925(13). 
(c) It would also have to account for the diversity and incompatibility 
of the economic policies of the different examples of fascism: the 
autarkical objectives of Germany as compared with Italy's 
willingness to use foreign markets; the difference in emphasis on 
either agricultural development or the role of the bureaucracy; 
differences in planning methods and corporatist representation; 
contrasting war economies; etc. 
(d) Last, and most important, it is difficult to situate this theory in 
the economic and social context of today. 
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The rapporteur considers that the economic foundations and consequences 
of fascism are uncertain and do not constitute Linear phenomena. While 
he does not wish to make any judgment on the validity of economic 
explanations of fascism, he cannot accept them as part of a working 
definition of the phenomena under consideration. 
33. Should Leader worship be included as a generic factor in the definition 
of fascism? Yes, in the case of fascism in the historical context, but 
not if one is talking about the present-day movements grouped under this 
name. In actual fact -and this is one of the features of our inquiry 
which will at Least appear to be confirmed in the sections dealing with 
the national situations - we have detected only the faintest echo of 
Leader worship in the groups studied. This is doubtless to be explained 
by the difference in social context in the 'thirties and today. In the 
former, Leader worship was a temptation even for democratic movements. 
Nowadays even the majority of extreme-right groups are more Likely to 
show an aggressively libertarian attitude, which partly explains the 
numerous internal schisms which develop. Does this mean that all kinds 
of 'group pathology' have disappeared? Certainly not. But what is 
sought from the group now, instead of the reassurance obtained from size 
and a personality cult, is a kind of mutual emotional support. 
34. The question of similarities and differences between nazism and fascism 
was also discussed in our Committee. Some speakers have stressed the 
importance of the Mussolini factor in the rise to power and the 
establishment of the Hitler regime, as well as the existence of some 
ideological sources and totalitarian longings common to both. Others, 
including Mr Wiesenthal, have underlined the difference in scale, 
especially as regards political assassinations, or, again, have pointed 
to the anti-semitic aspect of nazism as distinguishing the two 
regimes<14>. For the purposes of the present report, which is 
concerned with contemporary manifestations of the phenomenon in 
question, it has to be said that the ideological confusion 
characteristic of most extremist groups makes differentiation extremely 
difficult. Nevertheless, the evil fascination which nazism continues to 
exert with its symbolic paraphenalia calculated to excite paroxysms of 
violence, together with the dispersion of former nazis in many parts of 
the world, combine to impart to 'neo-nazism' a particular character as 
well as ensuring its much broader geographical spread. It should also 
be noted that nazi inspiration, disguised more or less in the form of 
references to the SA and to 'Strasserism•<15) lies at the heart of the 
specific thinking of the extreme right, an ideology which is equally 
condemnatory of the United States and the Soviet Union, is at the same 
time anti-communist, anti-atlanticist and anti-zionist. 'Strasserism' 
often serves to justify acts of terrorism, responsibility for which is 
difficult to determine precisely. 
35. Faced with such a variety of definitions, it was evidently not the 
Committee's task to solve theoretical problems and decide the finer 
points which properly belong to the domain of political science. Since 
the Committee's brief speaks of 'fascism', this must be understood as a 
generic term incorporating a number of interchangeable expressions used 
in this context, such as 'the extremism or the nationalism of the 
Right', 'neo-nazism' or 'neo-fascism•. The term 'fascism' must also be 
stripped of certain connotations conferred on it by its use as 'the idea 
of struggle', (Kampfbegriff) in the parlance of some sections of the 
Left. In view of the foregoing, your rapporteur considers that for the 
working purposes of this inquiry, the fundamental characteristic of 
WG(VS)/2441E/2464E - 17 - PE 97.547/fin. 
fascism is a nationalistic attitude essentially hostile to the 
principles of democracy, to the rule of Law and to the fundamental 
rights and freedoms as well as the irrational exhaltation of a 
particular community, in relation to which people outside it are 
systematically excluded and discriminated against. This attitude 
permeates the ideology, the thinking, the activity and the aims of its 
adherents<16>. It is this definition that will be the working 
hypothesis on which the content of this report is based. 
1.5.2 Racism : Definitions 
36. Unlike 'fascism', the term 'racism' has been defined in fairly similar 
ways by international organizations, in particular the UN and UNESCO. 
On four different occasions UNESCO asked experts to analyse the concepts 
of race and racial prejudice. The experts concluded that : 
'Neither in the field of hereditary potentialities concerning the 
overall intelligence and the capacity for cultural development, nor in 
that of physical traits, is there any justification for the concept of 
'inferior' and 'superior' races.•<17> 
Consequently : 
'racist theories can in no way pretend to have any scientific 
foundation.' 
According to UNESCO, racism consists of 'antisocial beliefs and acts 
which are based on the fallacy that discriminatory intergroup relations 
are justifiable on biological grounds•<18>. 
37. In the same way, the social aim of racism is 'to make existing 
differences appear inviolable as a means of permanently maintaining 
current relations between groups.' 
38. On the basis of the above, the UNESCO General Conference of 
27 November 1978 adopted the Declaration on 'Race and Racial 
Prejudice.' In Article 2 of the Declaration the principles of racism 
are thus described and evaluated: 
'Any theory which involves the claim that racial or ethnic groups are 
inherently superior or inferior, thus implying that some would be 
entitled to dominate or eliminate others, presumed to be inferior, or 
which bases value judgments on racial differentiation, has no scientific 
foundation and is contrary to the moral and ethical principles of 
humanity. 
Racism includes racist ideologies, prejudiced attitudes, discriminatory 
behaviour, structural arrangements and institutionalized practices 
resulting in racial inequality as well as the fallacious notion that 
discriminatory relations between groups are morally and scientifically 
justifiable; ••• ' 
39. It should finally be added that Article 1 of the International 
Convention on the Elimination of ALL Forms of Racial Discrimination for 
the purposes of the Convention adds to discrimination on the grounds of 
race or colour, discrimination on the grounds of 'birth',' national 
origins' and 'ethnic origins'. 
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40. To these our experts added some further considerations: Mrs Essed and 
Mrs Kniesmeyer underlined the importance and the widespread nature of 
day-to-day manifestations of racism, of xenophobia and of more or Less 
overt discriminatory attitudes. Professor Rose described the claims of 
'scientific' racism and the false conclusions it draws from the results 
of biological, ethnological or psychological research. 
Professor Girardet spoke of the strong and continuing tradition of 
•social Darwinism•. Mr Wiesenthal, Mr Savitt and Mr May described some 
of the forms taken by anti-semitism today. Many speakers referred to 
examples of national Legislations having a racially discriminatory 
effect. Overall, racism has been described and perceived in three 
distinct though complementary manners: as a universal and spontaneous 
reaction of mistrust or hostility towards foreign groups; as a cultural 
phenomenon, the specific manifestations of which are determined by 
prejudices and habits of thought inherited from the past; and, finally, 
as the justification for aggressive or dominant behaviour. In addition, 
Professor Parekh stressed the importance which institutionalized forms 
of discrimination could have, even if they could not be described as 
'State racism• in the strongest sense. 
41. Among further considerations, the question of •scientific' racism was 
raised several times, in particular by Professor Rose. The use of 
Language and certain of the techniques of science to 'prove• that 
certain people or groups of people are innately superior to others is 
scientifically and epistemologically fraudulent for several reasons: 
42. 
- because it is often based simply on manipulation of the facts as 
selected, presented or even invented<19>; 
- because it is based on a precondition: the arbitrary definition of the 
'superiority' being considered (cf the case of intelligence 
tests)<ZO>; 
-because human development merges and qualitatively transforms the 
inextricable social and biological factors. In the words of Pascal: 
'What is this nature which is prone to be effaced? habit is a second 
nature, which destroys the first. But what is nature? why is habit 
not natural? I very much fear that this nature is itself but a first 
habit, just as habit is a second nature<21>.• 
Apart from its conceptual and practical fraudulence, •scientific' racism 
shows a reductive determinism in implying that the fate of each 
individual, being the result of irresistible mechanisms, is already 
sealed. Albert Jacquard observes: 'the important thing is to build. The 
person that I shall be is not present in my genes ( ••• ), the statue of 
Moses was not in the block of marble which Michelangelo one day brought 
into his workshop<22>.• 
It has been observed, moreover, that the manner in which racism operates 
in Europe has been determined in more than one way by its colonial past. 
Colonization strongly influenced European perceptions of the world 
outside, the processes of discovery and contacts through which it 
occurred inevitably affecting the images and ideas conveyed. Our 
attitudes are still predominantly Euro-centric notwithstanding the 
vicissitudes of history. Secondly, in several instances decolonization 
created conflictual relations, traces of which can still be found. 
Lastly, migrational trends have been closely bound up with relations 
with the former colonies and for this reason the colonial past as too, 
indeed, the existence of certain special bilateral links inside and 
outside European territory have determined the structure of ethnic 
relations in Europe today. 
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43. Our experts have generally pointed to intolerance and discriminatory 
attitudes which usually precede or accompany any explicit display of 
racism. Intolerance and discrimination are the distinct characteristic 
of a 'closed society•, i.e. a society which turns in on itself and in 
principle rejects individuals, values and modes of behaviour originating 
in different environments, or which manifests towards such individuals 
and their culture, contempt for both their background and their personal 
dignity. This is a factor which must be kept in sight in any analysis 
that seeks to achieve understanding of the real situation in present-day 
European society. Adoption of a too narrow definition of racism brings 
with it the danger of arbitrarily restricting the case material for an 
analysis of inter-community relations. A reverse danger of reducing the 
sharpness of the picture would evidently arise if a too broad definition 
of racism were adopted. If the term is applied too indiscriminately, it 
would both weaken the cause we seek to defend and undermine the value of 
our analysis. The honouring and observance of its own traditions and 
the assertion of its natural and Legitimate rights are not sufficient 
grounds for the suspicion of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia 
to attach to any social group<23). 
44. Bearing in mind the facts and situations referred to during the 
Committee's proceedings, yet not wishing to depart too markedly from the 
definition accepted by the international bodies, your rapporteur will 
consider as racism the following types of phenomena from this point of 
view : 
the ideologies thus designated in the proceedings of the UN and UNESCO 
referred to above <24); 
-racist regimes, exemplified most abominably by the Nazi regime, but 
also by the apartheid system in South Africa, where the resulting 
suffering and bloodshed have again recently been condemned by the 
entire international community, as well as racial persecution on a 
mass scale by certain regimes in Africa and Asia; 
- groups and organizations which spread the doctrines or champion the 
regimes referred to above or adopt their ideology; 
institutionalized racial discrimination, direct or indirect, explicit 
or implicit, traces of which may be found in the European countries; 
-day-to-day cases of discrimination on racial, ethnic or religious 
grounds (expression of prejudiced opinions, discriminatory conduct or, 
in its most serious form, racial violence) whether or not these are 
within the Law. 
1.6 THE LINK BETWEEN FASCISM AND RACISM 
45. It cannot be denied that, historically, the vast majority of fascist 
movements, whatever their specific traits, have been characterized by 
racism and, more particularly, by anti-semitism. But the Link is not an 
organic one: it was after the victory of nazism in Germany that fascism 
and anti-semitism tended to merge everywhere in Europe - an 
identification which at first was overlooked by many fascist parties, 
including the Italians. At the same time there were, at the end of the 
19th century in Germany, Austria and the Balkans, anti-semitic parties 
which were not fascist. In that period in France a Large part of the 
political spectrum was marked by anti-semitism (an anti-semitism more 
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Likely to be associated with the anti-capitalism of the reactionary or 
working classes than with any religious motivation)<25). Thus, 
racism, and especially anti-semitism, extends far beyond historical 
fascism, while the Latter by no means always comprises racism in its 
original constituents. 
46. However, to a Large extent, these two historical tendencies tend to 
overlap. Almost all the extremist movements of the Right today contain a 
racist element and explicitly racist ideologies invariably tend towards 
authoritarianism. 
47. Some further points should be noted: 
(a) Regimes which practise racism as a state policy are likely to slide 
into authoritarian forms of government. One example of this can be 
seen in the measures adopted by the government of South Africa and 
condemned by the whole international community<26>. 
(b) In terms of social systems, the totalitarian regimes have a strong 
tendency to offer scapegoats to artificially aroused public 
condemnation: racism, the exclusion of certain groups, can thus 
fulfil a stabilizing function for the regime. Such 'functional' 
racism promoted by totalitarian regimes can perform many functions: 
it can be used to exploit the traditional animosities of a people; 
it can provide a model of 'abnormality' and thus legitimation for 
its opposite, presented as a 'normal'; it can be used as an 
instrument of government by exploiting the fear of being made an 
'example'. 
(c) At the level of the individual, racist attitudes are very Likely to 
be closely associated with authoritarian and non-democratic 
tendencies. It is not possible to be a 'true racist' and be at the 
same time a true democrat. 
(d) But it would be wrong to believe that the association of racist and 
extremist tendencies is an inflexible rule subject to no exceptions 
or nuances. The political reality is much more complex than that. 
Less extreme forms of racist attitudes or racially-conditioned 
behaviour need not entail authoritarian tendencies. They may occur 
within political organizations or social strata which could not be 
accused of fascism or even authoritarianism. It would be even more 
mistaken to attribute the widespread xenophobia revealed by public 
opinion polls in European countries with a high proportion of 
immigrants to any underlying anti-democratic attitudes or Lack of 
attachment to the democratic and liberal order. Nevertheless, the 
persistence and gradual acceptance of broadly xenophobic attitudes 
seriously threaten to undermine loyalty to the democratic culture of 
European societies and may even result in its being openly 
challenged. 
2. THE SITUATION AND ITS CAUSES 
2.1 FOREWORD 
48. Reference has been made above (para. 26) to the constraints placed upon 
the inquiry both by the nature and the definition of its theme and by 
the conditions in which the Committee and its rapporteur were obliged to 
work. Before presenting in the paragraphs that follow (52-166) the 
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43. Our experts have generally pointed to intolerance and discriminatory 
attitudes which usually precede or accompany any explicit display of 
racism. Intolerance and discrimination are the distinct characteristic 
of a 'closed society', i.e. a society which turns in on itself and in 
principle rejects individuals, values and modes of behaviour originating 
in different environments, or which manifests towards such individuals 
and their culture, contempt for both their background and their personal 
dignity. This is a factor which must be kept in sight in any analysis 
that seeks to achieve understanding of the real situation in present-day 
European society. Adoption of a too narrow definition of racism brings 
with it the danger of arbitrarily restricting the case material for an 
analysis of inter-community relations. A reverse danger of reducing the 
sharpness of the picture would evidently arise if a too broad definition 
of racism were adopted. If the term is applied too indiscriminately, it 
would both weaken the cause we seek to defend and undermine the value of 
our analysis. The honouring and observance of its own traditions and 
the assertion of its natural and Legitimate rights are not sufficient 
grounds for the suspicion of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia 
to attach to any social group<23). 
44. Bearing in mind the facts and situations referred to during the 
Committee's proceedings, yet not wishing to depart too markedly from the 
definition accepted by the international bodies, your rapporteur will 
consider as racism the following types of phenomena from this point of 
view : 
the ideologies thus designated in the proceedings of the UN and UNESCO 
referred to above (24); 
racist regimes, exemplified most abominably by the Nazi regime, but 
also by the apartheid system in South Africa, where the resulting 
suffering and bloodshed have again recently been condemned by the 
entire international community, as well as racial persecution on a 
mass scale by certain regimes in Africa and Asia; 
- groups and organizations which spread the doctrines or champion the 
regimes referred to above or adopt their ideology; 
- institutionalized racial discrimination, direct or indirect, explicit 
or implicit, traces of which may be found in the European countries; 
-day-to-day cases of discrimination on racial, ethnic or religious 
grounds (expression of prejudiced opinions, discriminatory conduct or, 
in its most serious form, racial violence) whether or not these are 
within the Law. 
1.6 THE LINK BETWEEN FASCISM AND RACISM 
45. It cannot be denied that, historically, the vast majority of fascist 
movements, whatever their specific traits, have been characterized by 
racism and, more particularly, by anti-semitism. But the Link is not an 
organic one: it was after the victory of nazism in Germany that fascism 
and anti-semitism tended to merge everywhere in Europe - an 
identification which at first was overlooked by many fascist parties, 
including the Italians. At the same time there were, at the end of the 
19th century in Germany, Austria and the Balkans, anti-semitic parties 
which were not fascist. In that period in France a Large part of the 
political spectrum was marked by anti-semitism (an anti-semitism more 
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likely to be associated with the anti-capitalism of the reactionary or 
working classes than with any religious motivation)C25>. Thus, 
racism, and especially anti-semitism, extends far beyond historical 
fascism, while the latter by no means always comprises racism in its 
original constituents. 
46. However, to a large extent, these two historical tendencies tend to 
overlap. Almost all the extremist movements of the Right today contain a 
racist element and explicitly racist ideologies invariably tend towards 
authoritarianism. 
47. Some further points should be noted: 
(a) Regimes which practise racism as a state policy are likely to slide 
into authoritarian forms of government. One example of this can be 
seen in the measures adopted by the government of South Africa and 
condemned by the whole international communityC26>. 
(b) In terms of social systems, the totalitarian regimes have a strong 
tendency to offer scapegoats to artificially aroused public 
condemnation: racism, the exclusion of certain groups, can thus 
fulfil a stabilizing function for the regime. Such 'functional' 
racism promoted by totalitarian regimes can perform many functions: 
it can be used to exploit the traditional animosities of a people; 
it can provide a model of 'abnormality' and thus legitimation for 
its opposite, presented as a 'normal'; it can be used as an 
instrument of government by exploiting the fear of being made an 
'example'. 
(c) At the level of the individual, racist attitudes are very likely to 
be closely associated with authoritarian and non-democratic 
tendencies. It is not possible to be a 'true racist' and be at the 
same time a true democrat. 
(d) But it would be wrong to believe that the association of racist and 
extremist tendencies is an inflexible rule subject to no exceptions 
or nuances. The political reality is much more complex than that. 
Less extreme forms of racist attitudes or racially-conditioned 
behaviour need not entail authoritarian tendencies. They may occur 
within political organizations or social strata which could not be 
accused of fascism or even authoritarianism. It would be even more 
mistaken to attribute the widespread xenophobia revealed by public 
opinion polls in European countries with a high proportion of 
immigrants to any underlying anti-democratic attitudes or lack of 
attachment to the democratic and liberal order. Nevertheless, the 
persistence and gradual acceptance of broadly xenophobic attitudes 
seriously threaten to undermine loyalty to the democratic culture of 
European societies and may even result in its being openly 
challenged. 
2. THE SITUATION AND ITS CAUSES 
2.1 FOREWORD 
48. Reference has been made above (para. 26) to the constraints placed upon 
the inquiry both by the nature and the definition of its theme and by 
the conditions in which the Committee and its rapporteur were obliged to 
work. Before presenting in the paragraphs that follow (52-166) the 
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account we have been able to draw up of the situation and its causes we 
should Like to inform the reader of the conditions in which the material 
contained in this part of the report was collected and processed. 
(a) Information on fascism and racism in present-day European society 
constitutes an enormous mass of data of every kind, difficult to 
apprehend and handle. It would have been unrealistic to try and 
List exhaustively the groups and organizations of this kind, 
describe their origins and history and place them in the context of 
national and European politics. To take but one example, the annual 
national report on extremism and espionnage which is published in 
the Federal Republic of Germany under the title of 
Verfassungsschutzbericht devotes several dozen pages to the 
activities of the extreme right in that country<27>. On the other 
hand, much of the information required is not easily obtainable and 
in some cases quite inaccessible because systematic documentation is 
not produced. The Committee, its secretariat and the rapporteur 
have spared no effort in gathering all the data of the existence of 
which they were informed, but in its working up and presentation it 
proved necessary to make a selection in the end. The rapporteur has 
done his best to present a picture which, while it is summary and 
necessarily incomplete, does not, he trusts, distort the facts. 
(b) The position is similar as regards the Literature on the subject, 
which is vast, multi-Lingual and constantly growing. In addition, 
in the daily and periodical press there are regular columns devoted 
to extremism and particularly racism and xenophobia. We have done 
our utmost to do justice to this wealth of information. 
(c) The Committee did not dispose of sufficient resources to accomplish 
its task (see para. 25 above). It was not able to work 'on the 
ground', i.e. to seek out first-hand information directly at the 
source. In this respect a committee of inquiry of the European 
Parliament has far fewer institutional powers and much reduced 
possibilities of action compared with a corresponding committee of a 
national parliament. 
49. It cannot summon witnesses to testify before it; it cannot demand access 
to documents or other evidence. 
50. These matters will no doubt have to be reviewed in the context of 
re-inforcement of Parliament's institutional powers. At present a 
committee of inquiry of the European Parliament has no powers to call 
for evidence it might wish to examine, it can merely ask for it<28>. 
51. It should also be remembered that to a Large extent the Committee could 
not seek information directly at its sources because of the very nature 
of these. Clearly, neither the Committee nor the rapporteur could 
communicate directly with persons supposed to belong to fascist or 
racist bodies. 
2.2. THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 
2.2.1 Federal Republic of Germany 
52. German society, as we know, has been profoundly marked by the experience 
of national socialism. Vestiges of the movement have managed to survive 
the efforts made as soon as war was over to de-nazify the new German 
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state and make it into a Liberal parliamentary democracy founded on the 
primacy of the Law and respect for fundamental rights. Throughout the 
existence of the Federal Republic of Germany, from its foundation until 
the present day, there is evidence of a current of right-wing extremism, 
characterized in general terms by the following: 
(a) At the ideological level: by the rejection of the principles of 
parliamentary representative democracy, by an intransigent 
nationalism which exalts the interests of the 'national community' 
<'Volksgemeinschaft') and is hostile to the idea of reconciliation 
of nations; by racist and particularly anti-semitic tendencies; by 
contempt for fundamental rights and freedoms; and by consistent 
efforts to rehabilitate the Nazi regime. 
(b) At the organizational Level: by the establishment of Large numbers 
of militant groups; by the commission of acts of violence; by the 
creation of paramilitary bodies; by the distribution of extremist, 
racist and xenophobic publications; and, in the case of some of 
these bodies, by the creation of mass organizations, with 
participation in the electoral process. 
53. Within the confines of this report it would not be possible to give a 
historical review of the attempts which have been made in the Federal 
Republic of Germany to give political expression to right-wing 
tendencies. The rapporteur can only refer the reader to the wealth of 
literature existing on this subject<29) as well as to the oral and 
written submissions made to the Committee<30>. Our aim will be to 
present a brief overall view of the situation, mainly on the basis of 
the two latest 'Reports on the Protection of the Constitution' 
((Verfassungsschutzberiche, VSBerichte), 1983 and 1984<31), the recent 
publications b~ F. Gress and H.-G. Jaschke<32) and P. Dudek and 
H.-G. Jaschke<33) and the written and oral submissions by the experts 
invited by the Committee<34). 
54. Groups and organizations of the extreme right 
Census for 1981 to 1984(35): 
Type of 
organization 
Neo-nazi 
organizations 
National-
democratic 
organizations 
National-
liberal 
organizations 
Others 
1981 
Organizations/ 
Members 
18 1 250 
7 7 350 
4 10 400 
44 3 300 
1982 
Organizations/ 
Members 
21 1 050 
7 6 500 
3 10 400 
43 2 800 
1983 
Organizations/ 
Members 
16 1 130 
9 6 700 
3 11 400 
41 2 600 
1984 
Organizations 
Member 
34 1 150 
7 6 700 
3 12 400 
45 3 200 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------TOTAL 73 22 300 74 20 750 68 21 830 89 23 450 
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55. Publishing and distribution enterprises of the extreme right not 
af~i[,atea to any organ1zat1on 
1981 1982 1983 1984 
Book-publishers 15 14 11 10 
Publishers of journals 27 19 17 20 
and monographs 
Distributors 17 17 17 17 
-------------------------------TOTAL 59 50 45 47 
56. Periodicals of the extreme right 
In 1984 87 periodicals appeared (in 1983: 82, in 1982: 89) with a total 
annual printing number of 8 457 000 copies (in 1983: 8 028 00Q)C36). 
57. Neo-nazi organizations 
(i) According to the VSBericht for 1984 the increase in the number of 
neo-nazi organizations, from 16 to 31 between 1983 and 1984, is 
explained by the banning in 1983 of the ANS/NA (Aktionsfront 
Nationaler Sozialisten/Aktivisten, the National-Socialist/ 
National Activist Front)C37>. Many members of that 
organization, which was headed by Michael Kuhnen, formed new 
bodies whose membership varies between 5 and 25. The 
organization which was dissolved had 270 members grouped in Local 
'comrades' associations' ('Kamaradschaften') which Later became 
'reading circles' ('Leserkreise') for the purpose of maintaining 
activity among the members of the banned organization and of 
preaching its message. In 1985 Michael Kuhnen and his associate 
Heinz Marx were sentenced to imprisonment (3 years and 4 months 
and 2 years and 6 months respectively) and deprived of their 
civic rights (for 5 and 3 years respectively)C38). 
(ii) The FAP (Freiheitliche Deutsche Arbeiterpartei, the German 
Liberal Workers' Party)C39) has been used as the cover 
organization for the activities of the ANS/NA after the Latter 
was banned. In 1983 it put up candidates in the regional 
elections in Baden-Wurtemberg and in communal elections in that 
Land and in North-Rhine-Westphalia, without any appreciable' 
success. The North-Rhine Westphalia section has set up a 
'committee for the preparation of festivities on the occasion of 
Adolf Hitler's centenary' (KAH) in 1989. 
(iii) Members of the now-banned ANS/NA cooperate closely with the HNG 
(Hilfsorganisation fur nationale politische Gefangene und deren 
Angehorige e.v, the Organization for help to national political 
prisoners and their families (registered))C40>. This 
cooperation gave rise to a judicial investigation against some 
members of the Bureau of this organization which, under cover of 
social work, carries out indoctrination. The HNG cooperates with 
sister organizations in France, Belgium and the United States of 
America<41). 
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(iv) The NSDAP-AO (Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei -
Auslands- und Aufbauorganisation, The German National-Socialist 
Workers' Party- Foreign and Development Section)<42) runs a 
distribution network for neo-nazi propaganda material which is 
sent out from the well-known centre in Lincoln, Nebraska in the 
United States, headed by Gary Rex Lauck. Some of the NSDAP/AO 
Local organizations, for instance that in Reutlingen, have been 
very active in distributing propagan9a material, including 
stickers bearing the swastika and neo-nazi slogans. 
(v) Among other neo-nazi organizations, mention should be made of the 
NF (Nationalistische Front, Nationalist Front), the BBI 
(Burger-und Bauerinitiative, Citizens' and Peasants' Initiative, 
directed by Th. Christophersen who in 1983 was expelled from 
Belgium, arrested at the German frontier and on 14 August 1984 
received a suspended sentence of eight months imprisonment for 
insulting the state and the honour of deceased persons) and the 
OBI (Deutsche Burgerinitiative, Led at first by M. Reuder and, 
after his imprisonment for 13 years for his membership in the 
terrorist organization 'Deutsche Aktionsgruppen', by his wife 
G. Roeder)(43>. The NPD (Nationaldemokratische Partei 
Oeutschlands, the National Democratic Party of Germany) and its 
affiliated organizations. 
58. Founded in 1964, this organization is the direct successor of the DRP 
(Deutsche Reichspartie), the German Party of the Reich<44>. Though 
only marginally, it still figures on the German political arena and 
fights elections from time to time. Its political message centres on 
the following themes: consistent defamation of democratic political 
parties and Leaders, xenophobia, nationalistic self-reliance, strong 
hostility towards the European Community<45). 
59. At the last federal parliamentary elections (1983) the NPD obtained 
91,095 (0.23%) votes (in 1980: 68,096 = 0.18%). After a violently 
anti-Community campaign it was unexpectedly successful in the 1984 
European elections, obtaining 198,633 (0.8%) votes. This was not 
enough to give the party a member in the European Parliament but, 
having crossed the 0.5% threshold it was entitled to have its electoral 
expenses reimbursed from public funds<46>. This trend was confirmed 
in the elections to the Saar Landtag on 10 March 1985 when the NPD 
obtained 0.7% of the vote. In 1984 the effective membership of the NPD 
was 6 100 ( a slight increase on the 6 000 of 1983). 
60. There are two organizations affiliated to the NPD: the JN (Junge 
Nationaldemokraten, Young National Democrats, membership in 1984: 550, 
in 1983: 500) and the NHB (Nationaldemokratischer Hochschulbund, the 
National-Democratic University Association) with a very small 
membership. 
61. To evaluate the present position of the NPD, it is necessary to Look 
back over its progress in past years: at the federal parliamentary 
elections of 1969 it failed to reach the 5% threshold (necessary for a 
party to be represented in the Bundestag), obtaining only 4.3% of the 
vote. Its membership in 1965 was 13 700 (in 1966: 25 000, in 1969: 
28 000, in 1982: 5 900)<47>. Membership of the JN was 1 100 in 1970 
(in 1976: 1 800, in 1980: 1 000). 
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62. It is significant that Dudek and Jaschke in the title of their chapter 
on the NPD speak of its 'rise and faLL•(48), but the most recent 
election results point to a consolidation, not to say enlargement, of 
its electoral support compared with what was, admittedly, the Low point 
in its fortunes. 
63. 
64. 
65. 
The 'national-Liberal' Right 
Among right-wing extremist groups designated as 'national-Liberal', the 
VSBerichte quotes the organizations and activities masterminded by the 
Munich publisher Dr Gerhard Frey. These comprise a parent organization 
known as the DVU (Deutsche Volksunion, the Union of the German people) 
which numbers, according to its spokesmen, 14 000 members<49) and is 
at the centre of a number of satellite 'action communities' 
(Aktionsgemeinschaften)CSO>. In November 1984 the sixth of these 
'communities' was created under the name of 'Schutzbund fur Leben und 
Umwelt' (Association for the protection of Life and the environment). 
According to its statute its objectives are: opposition to the misuse 
of abortion, vigorous protection of the environment and the protection 
of the citizen against criminal activities. Membership of one of the 
'action communities' automatically confers membership of the Dvu<51>. 
The activities of this conglomerate are visible mostly in its exploits 
in the press. Dr Frey, who is the owner of the firm Druckschriften-
und Zeitungsverlag, GmbH (DSZ-Verlag, Printing and Press Publishing 
House, a Limited company) publishes, among others, two weeklies, the 
Deutsche National-Zeitun~ (DNZ, 'The German National News', 
circulation: 100 000)<52 and the Deutscher Anzeiger (DA, 'The German 
Advertising Journal', similar circulation). Dr Frey's wife, who owns 
the publishing house Freiheitlicher Zeitungsverlag, GmbH (FZ-Verlag, 
The Liberal Press Publishers, a Limited company) puts on sale, along 
with her publications, gold and silver commemorative medals including 
two (1981, 1984), dedicated to Rudolf Hess. In recent years Dr Frey 
has set up and awarded various prizes. Among the winners are the 
'revisionist' historian David Irving (53) and the family of 
Luis Amplatz, a native of South Tyrol who was sentenced in Italy to a 
Long term of imprisonment for bomb attacks and was murdered in 1964 in 
mysterious circumstances<54>. Dr Frey's newspapers are constantly 
appealing to their readers to contribute generousl~ to the struggle for 
the 'cause of the Right'. Dr Frey's salesmanship<55) has been the 
subject of comment in other extreme-right circles<56). 
The recurring themes in the newspapers referred to above are the 
rehabilitation of the Third Reich<s7>, xenophobia and anti-semitism 
under the guise of anti-zionism<58). 
Other extreme-right groupings 
66. On the 45 'other' groupings shown in the table above (para. 43), the 
following data are provided by the VSBericht for 1984: total membership 
approximately 3 200 (in 1983: 2 600). They include 12 (in 1983: 10, in 
1982: 11> youth and student organizations with a membership of about 
1 200 (in 1983: 1 000). While the Leadership is provided by committed 
right-wing extremists, among rank and file members there are many young 
people attracted by the comradeship or the spirit of adventure, by 
their Love of nature or keenness on sport<59>. Since 1982 these 
groups have also tried to infiltrate certain socially emarginated 
groups of young people (skinheads6 riotous football fans) by adopting their Lifestyle and sub-culture<6 >. The most important of such 
WGCVS)/2441E/2464E 
- 26 - PE 97.547/fin. 
groups seems to be the Wiking Jugend whose neo-nazi tendencies were 
clearly revealed in 1984 when it welcomed in its ranks many members of 
the recently banned ANS/NA(61>. There are also a number of 'cultural 
groups•<62>. 
67. Publishing houses 
The number of extreme-right wing press publishing houses which are not 
dependent on organizations or parties rose in 1984 from 17 to 20. The 
main publications of these enterprises are the Deutsche Wochenzeitung 
CDWZ, 'The German Weekly', circulation: 15 000), the monthly Neues 
Europa ('New Europe', circulation: 10 000>, the Deutsche Monatshefte 
('German Monthly Review', circulation: 6 000) and the fortnightly 
Mensch und Mass ('Man and Measure', circulation: over 1 000). A 
distribution network offers to the public, as well as books and other 
printed matter, records, cassettes and films of speeches and events of 
the Nazi period<63>. 
International Links 
68. The German groups cooperate with organizations abroad, notably in 
France, Belgium, Austria, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Ireland, 
Spain and the United States<64>. The recent electoral successes of 
the National Front in France were greeted by the German extreme right 
as foreshadowing an imminent change on the European political scene. 
The chairman of the National Front has dismissed the possibility of 
cooperation with rightist extremists in the Federal Republic of 
Germany<65>. The paramilitary organization Wehrsportgruppe Hoffmann 
(WGH, the Hoffmann Defence Sports Group), banned in 1980, had 
cooperated with the PLO and AL Fatah. The group's leader 
K.-H. Hoffmann is currently facing charges of complicity in the murder 
of the Jewish publishers. Lewin and his companion, F. Poschke, who 
were killed in 1980 in Erlangen allegedly by former WGH member 
w. Behrends who died in 1981 in Lebanon in obscure circumstances<66). 
Acts of violence 
69. Right-wing extremists are known or thought to have committed 11 
terrorist acts in 1984 (in 1983: 11). In the same year 1 137 breaches 
of the law were attributed to the extreme right <in 1983: 2 169, in 
1982: 2 475). Quantities of arms and ammunition have been discovered 
in circumstances implicating militants of the extreme right<67). 
Acts of violence have also been committed by foreign extremist 
groups<68>. 
Veteran organizations 
70. Reunions of Waffen-SS veterans are held regularly in the Federal 
Republic, either openly or under other names<69>. According to 
information supplied by Mr Schwalba-Hoth, a member of the Committee of 
Inquiry, tax relief facilities available to charities are being 
exploited by certain veteran groups. Motions calling on the FRG 
Government to ban such meetings have been tabled by Members of the 
European Parliament<70>. 
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General remarks 
71. A Long-term retrospective analysis of the situation in the Federal 
Republic of Germany indicates an undoubted decrease in the extreme 
right's human resources. Falling from 76 000 in 1954, the membership 
stabilized at around 20 000 in the mid-sixties<71) and the economic 
and social crisis of subsequent years does not seem to have affected 
this downward trend. The extreme right's ventures into the electoral 
field show a record of diminishing success. Within the movement there 
is considerable mobility<72>, as seen in many supporters' membership 
in several organizations and, above all, in the frequent changing of 
the groups' political Labels due to both personal and ideological 
quarrels, but also to tactical readjustments to the changing political 
environment and to institutional pressures exercised through the 
banning of some organizations and judicial penalties imposed on some of 
their Leaders. One can also observe a certain amount of 
radicalization<73) in the style and methods of action: a return to a 
'German socialism' of the Strasser type<74), as well as more regular 
and more organized recourse to verbal and physical violence and to 
terrorism, which often seeks allies abroad, not necessarily proclaiming 
the same ideology. 
72. While political observers Largely accept the above facts, there is no 
unanimity as to the political importance of the rightist phenomenon. 
Some consider that, despite the modest statistics, the extreme right 
still represents a threat to German democracy<7S>. Others, on the 
contrary, believe that the danger is exaggerated<76) and that the 
broad democratic masses of the electorate are well protected against 
extremist Leanings that take their inspiration from a repugnant and 
painful past, by an efficient institutional structure and an alert 
civic conscience. The question was again hotly debated recently when a 
survey conducted by SINus<77) suggested that there were by no means 
negligible sections of the population which appeared to be aware of and 
open, or even sympathetic, to the ideas of the extreme right<78>. 
Admittedly, some aspects of the premises of this inquiry and therefore 
many of its findings have been hotly disputed<79>. But even if their 
importance is reduced, these findings give food for thought. 
73. At any rate, as Long as right-wing extremism remains part of Germany's 
politics, even if a minor part, as indeed is the case in other European 
countries, its historical roots justify the special attention it 
attracts and explain, to some extent, the tendency to exaggerate its 
importance. Nevertheless the rapporteur can only endorse the 
conclusion of Dudek and Jaschke that 'in the middle term organized 
German right-wing extremism has no chances in electoral politics' and 
that 'it is not and never has been a problem as regards political power 
but only an anti-democratic ferment in the political culture, the 
effects of which cannot be discerned from election results 
alone•<BO>. There remains, of course, the question of defining what 
attitude is to be adopted towards this phenomenon. 
74. Side by side with racist indoctrination and racial violence practised 
by the extreme-right groups a wave of xenophobia has been sweeping the 
Federal Republic of Germany: this is directed mainly against immigrant 
workers and more particularly against Turks - the most numerous 
group<81) not forgetting immigrants from Asian and other countries. 
Professor Scheuch<82) thinks this is not so much a racial conflict as 
the result of a cultural confrontation and of the difficulties in 
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assimilation experienced by certain categories of immigrants and more 
particularly those under the influence of Islamic fundamentalism. It 
is, however, a situation which can lead to increased support for 
parties and organizations propounding social intolerance. 
2.2.2 Belgium 
75. While of marginal political importance, right-wing extremism in Belgium 
nevertheless has a multiplicity of groups, circles and publications. 
In Wallonia, its main historical antecedents are the Action francaise 
and Leon Degrelle's Rexism <continued after the war by the Mouvement 
Social Belge) which have since been rejuvenated by the theories of the 
French New Right. The groups which are active in Wallonia include: 
Nouvel Ordre Europeen, Nouvelle Sparte, Delta, Euro Droite, REX, Grece, 
Front National, Forces Nouvelles, Zwarte Order - Ordre Noir <ZOON), 
Consortium Europeen, "3A" Diffusion, Front de La jeunesse and Westland 
New Post (WNP). During the Last decade the most active and violent of 
these was the Front de La Jeunesse, which was finally disbanded in 
May 1981 as a paramilitary organization. Thereafter some of its 
members helped to found 'Westland New Post'. The activities of this 
group, its claims to be a secret organization, its possible collusion 
with some career soldiers~ drew attention to it; it is not known 
whether it still exists<8~>. 
76. In Flanders some Flemish-speaking nationalist movements have espoused 
extreme right-wing ideas. They include : Were Di, Delta, and De 
Vlaamse Militanten Orde (VMO) - Odal. The last mentioned is the most 
important. The Odal Group emerged after the VMO had been condemned on 
25 May 1983 as a private militia. VMO-Odal is the most active and 
violent group in post-war neo-nazi circles<84>. Until June 1985 it 
was led by Bert Eriksson; at present it is led by Jef Eggermont. Under 
Eriksson's leadership the VMO organized camps where the participants, 
in uniform, trained in the use of arms. The Odal group is at present 
closely linked to the Vlaams Blok. They act as a 'crowd control' 
service for this political party and provide helpers to put up 
anti-immigration posters. The propaganda of these groups is 
disseminated by such periodicals as Alarm, Delta-Pers, Storm, Rebel, 
Dietsland-Europe, Berkenkruis, Taboe, Bormsberichten, Revolte, Viking, 
Branding, Signaal, l'Accent, Nieuwe Gudrun and Une Belgique a 
neuf<85>. 
77. Some extremist groups do not shrink from violence; such activity 
attracted public attention with the murder, in a Brussels suburb, of a 
Moroccan killed by a 21-year old militant of the Front de LaJeunesse 
who shortly before had been taking part in his organization's shooting 
practice. In consequence, the Front de La Jeunesse was banned on 
14 May 1981 as a paramilitary organization. In January 1981 107 VMO 
militants appeared before the Tribunal of Antwerp for breach of the law 
of 24 July 1934 on private militias. However in 1982 a Belgian court 
of appeal lifted the ban on the VMO which has since allied itself with 
the Vlaams Blok. This latter comprises a number of various tendencies 
which are often in internal conflict. 
78. The question of immigrants in Belgium, and more particularly in 
Brussels, was debated at Length in the Committee. The growth of 
xenophobic attitudes in daily contact is particularly irksome<86>, 
but the Committee gave special attention to Brussels because it is a 
good example of the difficulties encountered by immigrants in many 
Community cities<87>. 
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79. First of all, as Mr Gaetan de Moffarts of the Vlaams Overleg Comite 
over Migratie (VOCOM) and Mr Andre Nayer of the Mouvement contre le 
Racisme, l'Antisemitisme et La Xenophobie <MRAX) have pointed out, 
there are specific problems in regard to conditions of reception and 
residence permits. These conditions were the subject of a general law 
adopted unanimously with one abstention on 15 December 1980 in the 
Parliament. Another law, the 'Moreaux Law•, on racism and xenophobia, 
was adopted on 30 July 1981 and is designed to curb certain actions of 
a racist or xenophobic nature. On 28 June 1984, on the initiative of 
Mr Jean Gol, the Minister of Justice, a law concerning some aspects of 
the status of foreigners and laying down rules of Belgian nationality 
was adopted. This law (which elsewhere renders the rules governing 
Belgian nationality more flexible) restricts the numbers of relatives 
allowed to join an immigrant household in Belgium and give those 
Communes which so wish the chance, on certain conditions, to refuse 
foreigners the right to register there. Six Brussels communes have 
asked to be able to use this provision and are now able to do so. Since 
that date a 'Commission d'Etudes de l'Immigration• has been set up. 
80. Many problems also concern relations with the administrations: language 
difficulties, delays in issuing residents permits, the large number of 
documents required and the exorbitant taxes on documents issued by the 
administration (the taxes can be as much as FB 5 000)(88). 
81. The question of social benefits to which immigrants are not entitled, 
and in particular legal aid, was also discussed. Mr Jef Cleemput, 
representing Caritas Catholoca pointed out that eligibility for the 
minimum subsistence allowance is acquired only after 5 years' residence 
in Belgium or as a political refugee (but the Organic Law of 
8 July 1976 does guarantee the right to assistance). 
82. Another serious problem is that of lodging. Immigrant families are not 
accepted in the private sector and are accommodated only with 
difficulty in social housing (because of the fear of creating ghettos, 
of the fear that immigrants are unreliable rent payers, the 
unsuitability of such accommodation for the immigrant family 
structure). Among male immigrant workers, 70% are unskilled. Of the 
52 000 unemployed in Brussels, 12 800 are foreigners. The 
representatives of the Confederation Europeenne des Syndicats have also 
drawn the Committee's attention to the dangerous and arduous nature of 
the tasks usually assigned to foreign workers. 
83. The important question of education will be dealt with below. The 
representative of the Ligue des Familles raised the point that 
immigrants have the right to family counselling, sexual education and 
family planning. 
84. The case of Brussels will thus have enabled the Committee to appreciate 
not only the reality of xenophobic attitudes but also, and above all, 
the objective constraints which determine the immigrant condition. The 
testimony of the experts has shown the extent of the difficulties 
facing immigrants, the complexity of the problems of education and 
integration, but also, as the case of Limbourg has proved, the fact 
that a voluntary long-term policy is able to produce results. 
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2.2.3 Denmark 
85. There is very Little right-wing extremism in Denmark. A Danish nazi 
party does exist, but it is quite insignificant. It is headed by 
Paul Heinrich Riis-Knudsen who is also secretary-general of the World 
Union of National Socialists. His appointment to a university post 
aroused numerous protests. 
86. There has, on the other hand, been an increase in xenophobia. It seems 
to have been mainly provoked by the recent Liberalization of entry 
conditions for political refugees which resulted in the arrival of some 
5 000 of these, mostly Iranians, in one year (in the preceding 25 years 
Denmark had only received 18 000 political refugees and only a part of 
these remained in the country). The fact that these refugees are 
grouped in accommodation centres located in small towns has given rise 
to social tensions. On 26 and 27 July 1985 in Kalundborg, some 200 
youngsters swarmed on an Iranian centre and fighting broke out first 
with its residents and then with the police. 
87. Mogens Glistrup, the founder of a populist party which in fact does not 
seem to follow him entirely on this matter, gave expression to some 
underlying xenophobic feelings which provoked controversy in the entire 
country<89). 
88. Finally, the attacks perpetrated in Copenhagen at the end of July 
against a synagogue and the offices of an airline have aroused a real 
concern in Denmark which has so far had no experience of terrorism. 
This disquiet has been fed by fresh anti-semitic attacks in September, 
all the more so since it is not known who was responsible for them and 
they could as well be of national as of international origin. 
2.2.4 France 
89. The extreme right in France is a particularly well-established 
tradition, though the tendencies within it are for the most part in 
conflict and despite the fact that the disgrace of the Vichy regime has 
been a lasting and insurmountable taboo (although Vichy neither 
consisted exclusively of the extreme right nor represented its 
totality). 
There is little agreement on the specificity of French fascism. While 
it is true that Georges Valois had set up his 'Faisceaux• as early as 
1925, neither Action Francaise nor the Croix-de-Feu and most of the 
'ligues• are to be identified with Mussolini's fascism. Some 
historians therefore deny the existence of a specifically French 
fascism<90) while others maintain that despite the weakness of its 
political expression1 a deep-rooted and permanent fascist ideology persists in France<91). 
90. As Mrs Chombart de Lauwe pointed out, two phenomena were to be observed 
after the end of the second world war: the emergence of a populist 
current with an anti-parliamentarian ideology which was to find 
organized expression in 1956 in the Poujadist movement, and a violent 
activism which was to be crystallized around the Organization of the 
Secret Army (OAS) after the failure of the Algiers putsch. To this 
latter current belongs the Occident (dissolved in 1968), the Ordre 
Nouveau (set up in 1969), student movements Like the Groupe Union 
Defense (GUO), or the FANE, a neo-nazi organization Led by 
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Marc Frederiksen<92 >. The violent nature of these groups is real 
enough but their impact should not be over-estimated. A report of the 
French Senate states: 'Since the end of the OAS extreme right-wing 
terrorism in France has been very insignificant < ••• ) its two principal 
targets are: the North Africans. and more particularly Algerians, and 
France's Jewish community•<93) 
91. From the same report we have, for the spring of 1984, the following 
figures: 
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92. Recent violence of the extremist right seems to have reached its peak 
in 1980: in that year over 60 'actions' were claimed by groups such as 
FANE, OCCIDENT Chretien, Commandos Delta, Front de La Jeunesse, Honneur 
de La Police, Groupe d'intervention Nationaliste, Commando Mario Tuti, 
etc. These included damage to property and assaults on persons and 
attacks on stores and bookshops <94>. As regards specifically 
anti-semitic outrages, LICRA for 1980 listed 235 incidents and attacks, 
of which 75 were particularly serious (the corresponding figures for 
1975 are 53 and 17). Mr Revel has, however, observed that at that time 
there was a tendency to ascribe to the extreme right outrages of which 
Palestinian extremists were subsequently suspected. At any rate since 
that time organized forms of extreme-right violence seem to be waning. 
93. The 'New Right' is of a different nature. It came into its own after 
1968 and aimed to distance itself from the activist methods of the 
traditional extreme-right. The New Right wants to be regarded 
essentially as a cultural and ideological movement along the Lines of 
'European nationalism'. As Professor Girardet has noted, it came into 
its own after 1968 and, even in its delinquent forms, it formed part of 
the great anti-consumerist and romantic movement of that period. 
Mr Revel came to the same conclusions from his reading of articles in 
Elements on the subjects of money, democracy or East-West relations. 
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Among movements representing this ideology, that referred to most often 
in our Committee's work was undoubtedly the Groupement de Recherche et 
d'Etude pour La Civilisation Europeenne (GRECE). In 1969 it 
established the review Nouvelle Ecole, the main driving force behind 
which is Alain de Benoist. GRECE also publishes the magazine 
Elements. Copernic is the movement's publishing house. The contents 
of the New Right's publications centre on evocations of the 
Indo-European race, of paganism, of the natural Laws of nominalism, of 
the misdeeds of humanist universalism. The Nouvelle Ecole review 
appears dedicated to resurrecting and developing an entire political 
mythology, offering a vision of the world tending towards the 
totalitarian. Its pages are crammed with photographs and reproductions 
provided with elaborate captions. There is much emphasis on the 
creation of cult figures: collective heroes (the Vikings, the 
Indo-Europeans and 'pagans' in general), prophetic writers (Mishima, 
Montherlant), artists (Wagner above all), thinkers (Sorel, Heisenberg, 
Van der Bruck, Gobineau, Pareto) or even ••• gods (Apollo, typically). 
There is constant reference to the sciences. Many commentators have 
condemned the movement's misrepresentation of the results of genetics, 
anthropology, micro- and astro-physics<95>. A majority of the extreme 
right feels at home with this ideology. 
94. The Committee discussed on several occasions the nature of 
Mr J.M. LE PEN's Front National and its rise. The election of 10 of 
the movement's candidates to the European Parliament (on 16 June 1984 
it obtained 10.95% of the vote) obviously caused a considerable stir. 
The rapporteur would Like here to quote the opinion of Mr Glucksman who 
said that those who talked so much about Mr Le Pen were perhaps showing 
that they had nothing else to say. Some of our experts, Mrs Chombart 
de Lauwe in particular, were much preoccupied by the question of the 
origins of the Front National, which was set up in 1972 by Mr Le Pen, 
Pierre Bousquet of the Militant<96), Alain Robert of the Ordre 
Nouveau, Francois Brigneau, former OAS member and chief editor of 
Minute, Roger Holeindre, secretary-general of the Mouvement 
nationaliste du progres, and Francois Duprat, joint organizer with 
Alain Renault of the Cahiers Europeens, who was killed on 18 March 1978 
by a bomb placed in his car. Mr May referred also to the daily Present 
whose founder, Mr Romain Marie, is an MEP. Present frequently attacks 
Mrs Simone Veil and Mr Robert Badinter who in its issue of 23 June 1983 
is described as 'a bohemian with blood-stained lips•<97>. Several of 
our experts therefore see in the Front National an attempt to bring 
together different nationalist extreme-right movements. 
Other experts have pointed out that the main issue was where to place 
the Front National within the spectrum of French political ideologies: 
Professors Revel, Girardet and Passelecq have warned against facile 
analogies with the 1930s, the two latter considering the Front National 
to be the heir of the ideals of Charles Maurras and the Legitimist 
right crossed with elements of Poujadism. Mr Le Pen personally 
evidently conforms to the description since he insists that he is part 
of a 'Long chain•<98>, a typically maurrasian expression. His 
oft-repeated statement: 'I prefer my daughters to my cousins, my 
cousins to my neighbours and my neighbours to strangers•<99) fits the 
definition. On the other hand, he exploits primitive xenophobic 
feelings when, for example, commenting on Bernard Stasi's book 
L'immigration, une chance pour La France, he says: 'Bernard Stasi is a 
Frenchman of recent date•CIOO>. 
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95. As Mrs Chombart de Lauwe has pointed out, the existence of links among 
extremist groups is obvious from a mere glance at publications such as 
Notre Europe (organ of the FANE) which regularly reports the activities 
of foreign neo-nazi groups. <FANE, incidentally, had counted among its 
ranks the neo-nazi Michael Kuhnen who has recently been sentenced by a 
court<101)). For all that, it would be wrong to represent France as 
the centre of some 'black international'. The recent arrest, for 
burglary, of Michel Faci, former secretary-general of FANE and, 
presumably, one of the main intermediaries in the neo-nazi groups' 
international contacts, illustrates the 'cottage industry' nature of 
the movement<102>. 
96. The question which seemed much more important to most of our experts 
and members of the Committee, was that of a possible growth of 
xenophobic feeling in France. It should be noted, first of all, that 
French political history records innumerable movements of the strictly 
nationalist kind which, incidentally, traditionally transcend party 
politics<103>. 
97. Nevertheless, xenophobia exhibits ebbs and flows which cannot all be 
put down to political tradition. Several invited experts, and 
particularly Mrs Chombart de Lauwe, have spoken of 'cycles•. Their 
amplitude, in the short term at Least, seems to be rather small. Faced 
with the statement 'there are too many immigrant workers•, 54.6% of 
Frenchmen expressed agreement in 1977, 56.9% in 1978, 58.5% in 1981, 
60% in 1982, 50.6% in 1983 and 57.9% in 1984<104). However haphazard 
may be the results of surveys conducted by means of direct questions on 
a subject such as this, the emerging trend seems to indicate a slight 
increase in xenophobic feeling. 
98. The awareness of xenophobia is now greater than before, especially 
amongst those who are its victims: according to an MRAP poll of 
March 1984, 45% of immigrants think that racism is on the increase 
today; the same percentage of respondents consider that the French are 
on the whole •rather racist'; 30% claim to have been verbally abased in 
public places, 6% to have been pushed about and 7% to have been 
physically attacked. Xenophobic behaviour, however, is only of very 
minor importance amongst the disadvantages of which immigrants 
complain: housing conditions (53%) and working conditions (44%) affect 
them much more. Lastly, 66% of those questioned said that they were 
quite satisfied or very satisfied with Living in France and 52% wanted 
to remain in the country<10S>. Apart from the usual reservations on 
the accuracy of such surveys, it can Legitimately be asked whether the 
picture has not changed in the Last 18 months when the number of 
violent incidents seems to have increased. They have, of course, 
always been quite frequent. The public was shocked in October 1982 by 
the killing of a young Arab, Abdemmbi Guemiah in a Nanterre transit 
centre, at the hands of a fellow resident from a nearby hut. There was 
a widespread outcry at the truly senseless murder of two Turks by a 
22-year old unemployed youth in Chateaubriant in Loire Atlantique in 
November 1984. The proliferation of such cases inspired the 
organization, successively, of the March of the 'Beurs• 
(second-generation immigrant youth), of Operation 'Convergences• and of 
'SOS-Racism• with its famous slogan 'Touche pas a mon pote• <'Don't 
touch my mate•). Unfortunately, this did not diminish the number of 
incidents. There were several in March and April 1985: on 6 March, 
three high-school students, one of them armed with a shot pistol, 
attacked two young Maghrebians at Neuville-sur-Saone, 15 kilometres 
from Lyon<106>. On the same day, at Vaux-en-Velin, a college 
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student, Bardek Sarka, died in circumstances which have never been 
cleared up. On 23 March in Menton, a 28-year-old Moroccan was killed 
and a young man from Martinique was wounded by two Frenchmen 'who 
didn't Like Arabs'. There are also reports of racist vandalism which 
seems to come in waves. The most recent crime was the murder of a 
23-year-old Algerian on 28 September in Lyon by members of a private 
vigilante group which openly derives its support from racist 
feelings<107>. 
It is as if a taboo had been Lifted, says Mr Thea Klein, chairman of 
the Conseil representatif des institutions juives de France (CRIF): 'I 
do not think that people who had no such feelings before, are now 
becoming anti-semitic, but today some feelings come to the surface more 
easily. Once attitudes of discrimination, contempt or even hate come 
to be adopted towards one section of the population, other sections are 
threatened. In this respect there is solidarity between us Jews and 
the Arab immigrants<108>. We shall be examining below the causes of 
the Lifting of the 'taboo': here we shall only mention the generation 
effect (40 years have passed since the fall of the various fascisms) 
and changed social attitudes to violence. Even the parliamentary 
political parties have sometimes fallen prey to the temptation of 
oversimplification<109). 
100. It would be to misconceive the nature of xenophobia if we failed to 
point out that it is directed in the first place against the Maghreb 
workers. This is all the more worrying because the proportion of 
immigrants of Arab origin is constantly rising both within the 
immigrant population and in the population of France as a whole<110). 
1954 1982 
Foreign natives of the continent of 
- Asia 2.5 8.0 
- Africa 13.5 43.5 
- Europe 84.0 48.5 
in the total population 4.1 6.8 
101. In popular perception, Little distinction is made between the 
1.5 million immigrants from the Maghreb, the families of Algerians 
granted French nationality under the Evian agreements<97) and the 
second generation, the children of the Maghreb immigrants who are 
French by birth. Altogether, the Maghreb community in France is 
estimated at nearly 3 million people. It is this community which is 
the main target of xenophobia and racism, owing to the conjunction of a 
number of factors: the arrival of the second generation on the Labour 
market just as jobs were becoming scarce (whereas the earlier immigrant 
waves were coming into the country at a time of Labour scarcity); the 
fact that their acculturation coincided with a period of crisis in the 
educational system; the accumulated misunderstandings dating back to 
the Algerian war; a distorted and unfavourable view of Islam in public 
perception. The problems which the Maghreb community encounters are 
not of a generalized and abstract kind, but are in every case related 
to the specific conditions of a particular urban community with its own 
traditions of immigration, its industrial structure, 1ts power 
structure and association network, its town-planning peculiarities, its 
specific social, religious and political patterns. Andre Diligent, the 
mayor of Roubaix and a former Member of the European Parliament, has 
kindly submitted to the Committee a document summarizing the specific 
problems arising in his town. 
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102. 'Any particular immigrant wave has 'made it' when it has managed to 
produce within itself an elite and a middle class, in other words when 
its members and their descendants come to be represented throughout the 
social structure of the town ( ••• >. Each newly arrived immigrant has 
to contend with a preconceived social 'image' which is not a flattering 
one < ••• ). Thus the Belgians were labelled 'butter pots', disliked 
and despised, because, as a popular song had it, they didn't want to 
spend their money in France and even brought their butter with them, 
because they were supposed to be dirty and even smelly and so on. Thus 
also the 'wops', the 'pollaks' (all supposed to be dirty and drunken), 
the 'dagos', the 'wogs' etc. This xenophobia precedes each new wave of 
assimilation: are we to call it racism? At all events, this denial, 
this rejection of the stranger's native identity is undoubtedly 
generated by an acute but repressed awareness of one's own difference 
of birth'(112>. This analysis seems to apply not only to Roubaix but 
for the whole of France when it is remembered that one Frenchman out of 
three is the descendant of immigrants who came to the country within 
the last hundred years. On this interpretation, then, we are simply 
witnessing a crisis of assimilation which must reach a peak before it 
is extinguished. Already the success of initiatives like SOS-Racism, 
the integration it has been able to achieve around new interests (music 
and adventure), the rise of second-generation 'Beur' writers and 
film-makers, all seem to point to a new cultural synthesis now taking 
place. There remains the question of the religious distinctness of the 
new immigrants (Islam). It was tackled by several members of the 
Committee and some of the invited experts, but it has also been 
analysed by writers as diverse as Bernard Stasi, Alain Griotteray and 
Eric Roussel although they do not all arrive at the same 
conclusions<113>. 
103. The 'specificity of Islam' has been hotly debated in France and 
deserves some consideration in these pages. Those who are concerned 
about the supposedly 'unbridgeable chasm' between Islam and our own 
societies would do well to ponder the following lines by that great 
expert, Michael Barry: 'Appearances to the contrary, Islam is not an 
exotic culture and it is not even a religion of the East- the true 
East of India and China. It has the same two roots as medieval 
Christianity: semitic Scriptures and Greek philosophy. It developed in 
the former southern provinces of the Roman Empire. Its theology is 
constructed according to Aristotelian logic. Its mystique is a 
continuation of the neo~platonic speculations of Byzantium. ( ••• ) 
Greek philosophy cannot even be considered as a 'borrowing' by Muslim 
thinking, it is rather its antecedent: in the times of Alexander the 
centres of Hellenic thought moved to Antioch and Alexandria whose 
inhabitants were converted to Islam a few centuries later and began to 
speak Arabic instead of Greek. < ••• > We in the West should never 
forget the Greek element in Islam so that we can relate it to our own 
culture. That is not to deny its incontestable originality, but, on 
the contrarx1 it helps to put it in perspective and to appreciate its 
importance•<l14>. It would indeed be a major benefit for our own 
societies if out of the encounter with Islamic culture there arose a 
new awareness of our own roots! 
104. The same author also notes, however: 'But when we emphasize the 
Hellenic associations of Muslim thought we also recognize the pathetic 
fruitlessness of the struggle of Islamic fundamentalism to tear itself 
away from the West and try to ignore the inescapable fact that it is 
part of that same West•<115>. He goes on to say that, given the 
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similarity of the cultures ar1s1ng from religions which go back to 
Abraham, AY.atollah Khomeyni's role is similar to that of 
Savonarola<116>. In this connection it would be absurd to deny the 
effect of the ideology spread by teachers who come from the immigrants' 
countries of origin. Mr Zwick, of the Ligue des Familles in Brussels, 
spoke to the Committee of the importance of cooperation with immigrant 
community Leaders and religious heads and of the difficulties which 
arose when some of these denied such cooperation<117>. But this 
should in no way be an excuse - if anything, the contrary - for the 
perpetuation of mutual ignorance and misunderstanding. It it mutual 
ignorance between different cultures that inevitably Leads to conflict 
between them. 
2.2.5 Greece 
105. It will be readily appreciated that the recent history of Greece, 
marked as it was by two dictatorships (that of 4 August, 1936-1941 and 
the military regime of 21 April, 1967-1974>, a civil war <1947-1949) 
and their Long-Lasting and damaging effects, has been the subject of 
many but often contradictory political analyses. It can nevertheless 
be stated that right-wing extremism, and much Less fascism or nazism, 
have never taken root in the country's politics. It is, in fact, 
significant that Greece which at that time was ruled by a nationalist 
dictatorship not devoid of a certain amount of symbolism of a fascist 
type, was, alone among the countries of Europe, exposed in 1940 and 
1941 to aggression from both fascist Italy and nazi Germany. The wa.r 
and the resistance movement to which it gave rise served to consolidate 
the democratic and Liberal traditions of the Greek people and to 
confirm its fundamentally hostile attitude towards the totalitarian 
doctrines and practices of inter-war Europe<118>. 
106. The above, however, does not make Greece an exception to the rule which 
applies to all European democracies, that there is always a small 
minority vulnerable to extremist political indoctrination. As 
elsewhere, therefore, so in Greece there are a number of groupings on 
the extreme right of varying and fluctuating importance<119). They 
have for the most part very Limited membership and profess an 
uncompromising nationalism which is at the same time anti-communist, 
anti-capitalist and anti-Liberal with overtones of nostalgia for former 
dictatorships. References to nazism or fascism appear occasionally in 
their ideologies which sometimes display racist aspects, primarily in 
the form of glorification of the superiority of the 'Hellenic race' but 
sometimes also in the shape of aggressive anti-semitism. 
Two organizations are most typical of this tendency: 
(a) the K4A (the Party of 4 August) whose name refers to the 
dictatorship of 4 August 1936. Founded in 1965 and refounded in 
1974, this party bases its programme on principles drawn from the 
doctrine of national socialism<120>. Its role on the political 
stage has been insignificant and at present its activities seem to 
be in abeyance. Some of its young members have reorganized 
themselves in the FEP (fititiki Ethniki Protoporeia, Students 
National Vanguard) which has been active in the universities since 
1984. 
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(b) the ENEK (United Nationalist Movement) established in 1979 which 
proclaims the primacy of the nation, the creation of a civilization 
based on the concept of race, the value of strength and of a 
'heroic' view of Life and denounces the corruption of the 
established political system. ENEK took part in the European 
elections in 1984 and for the country overall obtained 0.09% of the 
vote. It did not put up candidates in the national elections of 
1985. 
107. Currently the most important movement of the nationalist orientation is 
the EPEN (National Political Union> which is represented in the 
European Parliament by one member (Mr Ch. Dimitriadis) who has joined 
the Group of the European Right. It was set up at the beginning of 
1984 and according to its programme it wants to clean up the 
parliamentary system, to establish an economy based on private 
initiative and a balanced social policy and is opposed to 
totalitarianism. At the same time, however, it makes no secret of its 
ideological and political Links with the military dictatorship of 
1967-1974 and its priority aims are the rehabilitation of that regime 
and the freeing of its protagonists who are currently serving Long 
prison sentences. The movement's Leaders advertise their special 
relationship with the former dictator G. Papadopoulos whose secretly 
recorded message was played at the meeting of the party's founding 
members<121>. In the 1984 European elections EPEN obtained 2.29% of 
the vote. Because it is represented in the European Parliament it 
enjoys a certain amount of publicity which, however, has not sufficed 
to consolidate its electoral performance: in the national elections of 
1985 it only obtained 0.59% of the votes cast which was not enough to 
give it representation in the national parliament. 
108. The activities of the movements of the extreme right are currently 
represented primarily by the publication of books and periodicals. No 
information is available on the circulation of these publications but 
in any event it must be very small. 
Some of these movements and some individuals notorious for their 
militancy on the extreme right have been implicated in a number of 
violent acts, for instance bomb attacks on book shops, especially those 
selling political Literature of the Left. But the great majority of 
terrorist acts committed in Greece since 1975, including a number of 
murders, have been claimed by, or attributed to, Leftist terrorist 
organizations. 
109. No permanent cooperation seems to exist between Greek extreme-right 
groupings and similar organizations abroad. Immediately after the fall 
of the military dictatorship in 1974 some contacts between Greek 
militants and the Italian Ordine Nuovo were reported<122) but there 
is nothing to indicate that such Links have subsequently been 
maintained. 
110. As far as race relations are concerned, the small number of immigrants 
presents no challenge to individual and social attitudes. A Large 
colony of African students frequenting Greek higher educational 
establishments has Long existed and has been harmoniously absorbed both 
into university Life and into Greek society in general. The native 
population's attitude towards ethnic or religious minorities is 
tolerant and xenophilic and generally free of racial prejudice. It can 
also be said that the Large Jewish community - established in the 
country since times immemorial but to a Large extent exterminated in 
Nazi concentration camps (123) - has generally not suffered from 
anti-semitic attitudes<124>. 
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2.2.6 Ireland 
111. No mention was made before the Committee of the existence of 
extreme-right movements in Ireland<125>. Because, historically, 
Ireland has been a country of emigration, attitudes towards foreigners 
are not comparable with those in other North European countries. 
Besides, out of the 232 400 foreigners Living in Ireland in 1981, 
187 000 came from the United Kingdom (at the same time 470 000 Irish 
citizens were Living in the United Kingdom)<126). 
112. However, according to an opinion poll of February 1981, 24% of the 
Irish considered that people of a different race or colour should Live 
in separate districts and 12% admitted that they were racially 
prejudiced (as against 30% of British respondents, according to a 
survey published three years earlier<127)). 
113. Finally, it should be noted that Ireland is the only Community country 
which has not ratified the Convention on the Elimination of ALL Forms 
of Racial Discrimination<128). 
2.2.7 Italy 
114. Italian right-wing extremism bears the imprint of the Mussolini regime 
and its ideology - the archetype of fascism. The Law No. 645 of 
20 June 1952, 'implementing provisions of the VIIth transitional and 
final provision (first paragraph of the Constitution)' forbids the 
reconstitution under any form whatsoever of the disbanded Fascist 
Party. The Movimento Soziale Italiano (MSI), established in 1946, 
looks back to the former regime. Mr Giorgio Almirante who has headed 
the MSI since its foundation was Minister of Justice of the Salo 
Republic. According to Professor Revelli, one of the experts invited 
by the Committee, the MSI is an 'anti-system' party, with a violently 
anti-egalitarian, hierarchic, elitist ideology which is fundamentally 
opposed to the Italian constitutional model. The MSI is represented 
both in the Italian Parliament and in the European Parliament, for 
which it obtained 6.5% of the vote in 1984 (5.4% in 1979) and where it 
has five members. The movement has its youth organization (Fronte 
della Gioventu). A number of small fascist and extremist groups have 
been set up by militants who broke with the MSI. 
115. Both Mr Aniasi, Vice-President of the Italian Chamber of Deputies, and 
Professor Revelli have pointed to the persistence in some sections of 
Italian post-war society of a conspiratorial tradition: there was an 
attempted 'coup' in 1964 in which General Giovanni de Lorenzo was 
involved, another one headed by Valerio Borghese in 1970, yet another 
in January 1974, and there was the affair in October 1974 in which 
General Miceli head of the secret service (SID) was 
implicated<129). This tradition goes a Long way to explain the 
phenomenon of the 'P2' Lodge which was discussed on several occasions 
in the Committee. It turns out (as the parliamentary committee of 
inquiry chaired by the Christian-Democratic deputy Tina Anselmi 
established) that Licio Gelli, the grand-master of the Lodge, was 
involved in the 1970 plot referred to above. While it is generally 
agreed that there was collusion between 'Propaganda Due' and right-wing 
subversives, as the minister, Mr Scalfaro stated before the Committee, 
the rule of Law demands that proper procedures be followed before the 
establishment of incontrovertible facts could give rise to Legal 
process. 
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116. Indeed, all our experts were concerned about the difficulty of bringing 
matters to the stage of legal proceedings; they referred to the five 
most notorious outrages widely attributed to extreme-right wing 
terrorists: the attack at Piazza Fontana in Milan on 12 December 1969 
(17 killed, 88 injured), that at Piazza della Loggia in Brescia on 
28 May 1974 <8 killed, 94 injured); the attack on the •stalicus• train 
on the Bologna-Florence line on 2 August 1974 (12 killed, 104 injured), 
the attack on the Bologna railway station on 2 August 1980 (85 killed, 
200 injured) and the attack on the Naples-Milan express on 
23 December 1984 (15 killed and 100 injured). Whereas Professor Revel 
had warned the Committee against hasty attribution of responsibility 
for terrorist attacks (as in the case of those in the rue des Rosiers 
and in the rue Copernic or of the arms theft in Foix in November 1981 
in France), there seems to be little doubt that the above outrages and 
very many others were the work of 'black' terrorists. This was stated, 
in the case of the Italian train tragedy, by the Anselmi committee. 
The desire to emulate the exploits of the Red Brigades which had such 
wide publicity and a strategy of creating a state of tension in the 
country which has been pursued since about 1974(130) have resulted in 
a wave of indiscriminate and particularly murderous terrorist acts. In 
addition, assassinations of members of the judiciary (for instance the 
judges Occorsio and Amato), of policemen (for instance Ranco Straullu 
and Ciriaco di Roma) and of militants regarded as potential traitors 
(for example Ermanno Buzzi and Luca Perucci) have further increased the 
difficulty of the investigations. Moreover, the outcome of judicial 
proceedings do not always match the seriousness of the charges. The 
proceedings in respect of the attack at Piazza Fontana in Milan, which 
ended in the trial before the Bari Court of Appeal, failed to identify 
the criminals. While Professor Revelli was concerned about the 
shortcomings and the possible criminal involvement of the state 
security apparatus, Mr Scalfaro tried to present the question in the 
larger context of the difficulties of extradition, of the due process 
which must be observed in all legal action and of the interrelations 
between various terrorist movements. Nevertheless, as a citizen, he 
said, he was troubled to find that two security chiefs were members of 
the P2 lodge. 
117. Several movements came in for particularly frequent mention in the oral 
and written evidence submitted to the Committee: the Ordine Nuovo set 
up in 1956 by a splinter group of the MSI takes its inspiration from 
the theories of Julius Evola, one of the gurus of the Italian extreme 
right. There is a record of international contacts with France, 
Germany, Belgium, as well as with Greece, Spain and Portugal before the 
restoration of democracy in these countries. Disbanded in 1974 by the 
Tribunal of Rome<131), the Ordine Nuovo went underground. 
Responsibility for the attacks on the 'Italicus• train and in Brescia 
is attributed to the Ordine Nero, a group within this movement. 
Earlier, in 1960 Stefano Delle Chiaie had established the Avanguardia 
Nazionale, subsequently dissolved in 1976, which was involved in the 
assassination of Vittorio Occorsio (10 July 1976). Delle Chiaie is 
said to have been seen in Spain, where he ran a restaurant 
'El Apuntamiento• -haven for like-minded people- Portugal, Argentina, 
Chile, Paraguay and Bolivia and his name has been associated with 
traffic in heroin and with Klaus Barbie's work in Bolivia. 
Delle Chiaie's international contacts, including those with 
Guerin-Serac, a veteran of the French Secret Army Organizatin (OAS) and 
the right-wing propaganda organization Aginterpress, led them to be 
dubbed the Black Orchestra<132). Terza Posizione and the Nucleii 
Armati Rivoluzionari (NAR) which appeared about 1976-1977 seemed to 
represent a new development in the ideology and strategy of terrorism, 
comprising an anti-American and anti-zionist aspect. The NAR were 
implicated in the Bologna attack of August 1980. Most of their 
members( including the leader, Giusva Fioravanti, are now in 
prison<·l33>. 
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118. Professor Revelli spoke of the dynamic rise of a 'New Right', which is 
essentially opposed to the 'mercenary society' and in its radically 
anti-egalitarian ideology claims to draw on the sciences of social 
biology, genetics and ecology. This resurgence of 'scientific' racism 
dovetails with the Italian traditional 'European nationalism' which 
assigns to 'Roman• Europe a superiority over all the other historic 
configurations. According to Mr Scalfaro, whatever the phraseology and 
the masks assumed, it is the resurgence of every form of violence that 
should concern us most. It is a violence directed against human 
rights, as they are enshrined in the Italian Constitution and as they 
are understood in all our countries. The ease with which 'black' and 
'red' terrorism, organized crime, drug traffickers and common criminals 
can cooperate, and the extent of that cooperation call for a special 
vigilance. The ease of that cooperation is illustrated by the variety 
of international contacts established by the Italian extreme right. 
Reference has already been made to the Greece of the Colonels, the 
Latin-American dictatorships, the narcotics networks. To this should 
be added the controversy opened by the failed attempt on the Pope's 
Life, the reported presence of Italian terrorists in Madrid and in 
Barcelona, to which Mr Aniasi referred<134), and the question, raised 
by Mr Scalfaro, of Italy's special place at the centre of the 
Mediterranean area together with the role played by the government of 
Libya<135). 
119. In July 1985 public op1n1on was shocked by the racist murder of a 
schoolboy whose mother was a Somali, which was committed by two 
fellow-pupils. Notwithstanding this recent isolated event, Italy is 
certainly one of the countries of Europe with the Lowest number of 
racialist incidents<136). 
2.2.8 Luxembourg 
120. No reference was made to Luxembourg in the Committee. It should 
however be noted that in November 1984 death threats marked with the 
swastika were sent to newspapers and to politicians, including the 
chairman of the Luxembourg Communist Party, Mr Rene Urbany<137). The 
sect Nouvelle Acropole has recently made its appearance in Luxembourg, 
organizing talks and meetings. COn the ideology of this organization, 
see para. 162 below and the relevant footnote (138)). In April 1985 
Luxembourg's Chamber of Deputies adopted a resolution on the prevention 
of all forms of racism and xenophobia and on promoting the integration 
of immigrants, who form a greater proportion of the population than in 
the other Community countries, into Luxembourg society. 
2.2.9 The Netherlands 
121. A number of more or Less overtly pro-nazi or racist organizations have 
appeared since the war on the Netherlands political scene. The 
following survey, inevitably brief and no doubt incomplete, Lists the 
most important developments in this area<139). 
122. Among the first attempts to give an organized political form to such 
nazi sympathies as survived the war and the occupation must be counted 
the establishment in 1953 of the NESB (Nationaal Europese Soziale 
Beweging, the National European Social Movement) which was banned in 
1955 when it announced that it intended to take part in the general 
elections. The central theme of its campaign was opposition to the 
influx of Indonesians, the majority of whom were veterans of the Dutch 
army, the NESB representing their presence as a threat to the 'European 
national community•<140>. 
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123. Former NESB members went on in 1956 to join the NOU <Nedelandse 
Oppositie Unie, the Dutch Opposition Union) which had participated in 
the general elections of 1956 under the slogan of a 'racially pure' 
Europe. The disclosure that its Leader, Paul van Tienen had been a 
former SS man seems to have sealed the fate of the organization. It 
collected only about 20 000 votes, insufficient to obtain a 
parliamentary seat, and eventually disappeared from the political 
scene<141>. 
124. In 1958 former NUO activists set up the Boerenpartij (the Peasants' 
Party) which, campaigning on more or Less poujadist Lines, principally 
against immigration and the tax system, managed to acquire public 
support and win 7 mandates to a 150-seat parliament<142>. In the 
1970s the Boerenpartij gradually Lost electoral support and has 
virtually disappeared from the political arena. 
125. Another openly pro-nazi group was set up in 1975 under the name of 
Nederlandse Volksunie (NVU, Union of the Dutch People). Ideologically 
controlled by enthusiasts of the Hitler regime it extolled that 
regime's ideas and political·solutions and questioned the truth of the 
extermination of millions of Jews in concentration camps. Its 
membership has remained extremely small, 150 at most according to an 
estimate, and it does not seem to have gained any significant 
following<143). 
126. 1.t was this failure, according to Mrs Kniesmeyer<144>, which Led to 
the creation of yet another party, the Centrum Partij with the 
participation of some former NVU members. In this party's programme 
pride of place was given to the question of immigration which was now 
presented in new terms. According to the programme, the Netherlands 
should not become a host country and it should encourage the voluntary 
departure of immigrants. Although its membership is barely over 1 000, 
the Centrum Partij by using arguments which in the current situation do 
not fall on deaf ears - proclaiming for instance, that the presence of 
half a million immigrants aggravates the unemployment problem, 
contributes to a higher crime rate, endangers the 'national ecological 
system• and threatens to 'Libanize' Dutch society- it has been able to 
achieve a certain measure of electoral support, especially amongst the 
urban working classes and has managed to obtain a seat in 
parliament<145>. 
127. According to Mrs Kniesmeyer, however, it would be wrong to attribute 
this party's influence solely to the popularity of its views on 
immigration among some sectors of the electorate. A considerable 
number of its members and supporters seem to be exercising a protest 
vote, though it is not clear in what sense and for what purpose. 
Lastly, in 1984 a number of activists and rank-and-file members Left 
this party to form yet another grouping, the Centrum Democraten which 
seems to propound similar views in the matter of immigration<146>. 
128. Despite the electoral insignificance of these groups which embody 
pro-nazi or racist trends in their programmes, their political impact 
on Dutch public opinion may be relatively more extensive. 
Mr Van Donselaar, Mr Smeets and Mr Van WeezeL<147) referred to a 
survey carried out in 1981-1982 among secondary school pupils which 
deserves consideration: 1.5% of the students questioned said they were 
prepared to vote for a pro-racist party, 8% expressed sympathy for the 
extreme right and 35% declared they were in favour of an unmistakably 
authoritarian ideology. 
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129. As might be expected, contacts between Dutch right-wing extremists and 
similar groups abroad are Long-established and numerous. Naturally, 
they are strongest with German and Flemish organizations. It does not 
seem, however that these Links amount to organized political cooperation<1~8>. Notably, reference was made before the Committee 
to a meeting held ten years ago between the Nederlands Volksunie and 
the MSI which ended with an agreement to differ when the Dutch side 
raised the question of repatriating Italian immigrants<149). 
130. Indirect evidence for xenophobia might be sought in such favourable 
response as the theories of racist political organizations found in 
Dutch society. That, however, would be to ignore the fact that much 
wider social strata, which would not openly subscribe to these 
theories, with their associated message of extremism or 
authoritarianism, nevertheless in their daily behaviour slide into 
attitudes of intolerance or occasionally even hostility towards ethnic 
minorities and especially the Blacks. 'Everyday racism• (alledags 
racisme as Mrs Essed aptly describes it<150)) seems to be much more 
widespread, being the expression of a particular social situation. It 
can be discerned - though with difficulty because of its Latent and 
Less aggressive nature - in almost every aspect of inter-personal and 
social relations. To combat this type of behavioural xenophobia a 
strategy is needed both at the institutional Level and in terms of a 
change in the ideological climate<151>. 
2.1.10 United Kingdom 
131. A number of factors particular to the UK help to determine the fascist 
and racist phenomena in the country: colonial Links have encouraged 
sizeable immigration to the UK, continuing during and.after the change 
from Empire to Commonwealth. These Links have influenced public 
perceptions of various ethnic minorities Living in the country. The 
UK's electoral system gives extremist groups Little chance of being 
represented, and increases thereby the radical character of their 
extremism, already exacerbated by the marginality of their views given 
the vigour and continuity of British democracy. The early industrial 
revolution and the traditions it brought to several regions of the 
country helped to shape an urban society which is sometimes vulnerable, 
especially in times of crisis, to the diffusion of violent behaviour 
initiated by small minorities in these areas. 
132. While the situation in Northern Ireland presents aspects which might 
appear relevant to this report, it has not been addressed here. This is 
for two reasons: first, the conflict has many features unconnected with 
the subject of our report. Second, the Northern Ireland problem was 
examined in great detail in the HAAGERUP Report (Doc. 1-1526/83) 
adopted by the last parliament on 19 March 1984, by an overwhelming 
majority<152). 
133. The Large size and the diversity of ethnic minorities in the UK are due 
not only to the country's Links with its former colonies, but also to 
the, by European standards, relatively Liberal immigration policies 
pursued by succeeding Conservative and Labour Governments and the 
originally wide definition of citizenship of the UK. Because of these 
factors, the UK has defined its race relations policy, expressed mainly 
in successive Race· Relatioris Acts<1S3>. The means of monitoring race 
relations are extensive and open to public scrutiny and the democratic 
institutions seem more ready to raise and discuss such matters than in 
many other European countries. Further the UK had a generous tradition 
of granting asylum to the victims of political persecution, derived 
from a practice that applied on a relatively Large scale during the 
1930's. 
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Extremist groups 
134. Historically the extremism of the right has been associated more with 
immigration matters than socio-economic changes, such as in 
unemployment. Taylor dates the birth of the extreme right in Britain to 
1902 when the British Brothers League (BBL) was formed<154). In its 
first years the BBL acted as a pressure group for the reduction or 
stopping of immigration from Eastern Europe. Its support was centred in 
East London. The 1904 Aliens Act<155), which restricted somewhat 
access of political refugees to Britain removed part of the BBL's 
rationale and it then became more marginal, nationalistic, anti-semitic 
and conspiratorial until finally being organized as a paramilitary 
racial/nationalist movement. It failed to survive the First World 
War<156>. 
135. Since then, the extreme right in Britain has been notable for its 
considerable diversity, the internecine arguments within it, the small 
size of its following and its lack of electoral or popular support. 
Even at its height, under the charismatic leadership of 
Sir Oswald Mosley in the 1930s, the British Union of Fascists (BUF) 
probably had no more than 40 000 members<157) and its electoral 
results after the passage of the Public Order Act in 1936 showed no 
more than 20% support in local elections in parts of its East London 
stronghold and much lower elsewhere<158>. Other fascist organizations 
were also formed before the Second World War, but their activities were 
curtailed when many of their leaders were interned in 1940. 
Surprisingly, the reestablishment of extreme right groups followed 
closely the War's end. Many separate organizations sprang up, with few 
members and little support, coalescing and splintering. 
136. One issue that inspired their activities during the 1950s, and allowed 
them to exploit the traditional British islander's insularity, was 
increasing immigration, particularly of Asians and West Indians from 
the 'New Commonwealth'. Things came to a head at the Nottingham and 
Notting Hill •race riots• in August and September 1958. The Mosleyite 
Union Movement, the National Labour Party of John Bean and 
Andrew Fountaine, and the White Defence League formed by disenchanted 
former leaders of the League of Empire Loyalists grouped the extreme 
right activists at this time, and it was from these or their offshoots 
or similar organisations, such as the Racial Preservation Society, the 
British National Party <with its paramilitary elite corps Spearhead>, 
and subsequently (in 1968) the Greater Britain Movement (under 
John Tyndall and with its publication Spearhead), and the national 
Socialist Movement, which became the British Movement in 1968 when in 
order to comply with the Race Relations Act of the time the words 
'National Socialist• were dropped from its title, that the National 
Front grew in 1967. This last organisation was most frequently cited by 
the experts at the hearings and in the written submissions that the 
committee received as the leading extreme right-wing organisation of 
the 1970s and early 1980s. Beginning in 1967 with about 2 000 
members<159) it grew till at its most popular in the period 1975-77 , 
it claimed about 20 000 members and attracted 230 000 votes at the 1977 
local elections, having won 16.2% of the vote at the West Bromwich 
by-election in 1976 and 18% in the local elections in Leicester that 
same year; former National Front members won two seats in Blackburn 
that year. Internal divisions and leadership struggles led to splits 
and its electoral popularity slumped to 0.6% in 1979 and, presenting 
fewer candidates, 0.1% in the 1983 general elections, while its 
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membership fell to about 2 000. In 1983 it was Least unsuccessful in 
inner East London seats, gaining 3.7% of the vote in Newham 
South<160>. The National Front publishes a number of newssheets and 
tracts including Bulldog (prosecuted successfully in 1981 for 
incitement to racial hatred), the New Nation, National Front News, and 
Rising. 
Publications and documents provided by the experts, in particular by 
Mr Martin Savitt, illustrate the virulence of its racist themes and its 
praise of violence (its use for example of •race war•), and suggests 
that the young militants were recruited more particularly from the 
inner cities. The •ideology• of the National Front owes much to the 
•terza posizione• of the Nuclei Armati Rivoluzionari of Italy, also 
defined as •strasserism•<161>. 
137. The British Movement (of Colin Jordan, Michael McLaughlin becoming its 
Chairman in 1975) was considered by some as the second Largest extreme 
right-wing movement in Britain after the National Front - it has a 
paramilitary wing Leaderguard and publications including anti-semitic 
British Patriot and, Later, British Tidings. Other extreme-right groups 
mentioned by the experts or appearing in other submissions include the 
British Democratic Party (National Front breakaway Led by 
Anthony Read Herbert); Column 88, formed in 1970 by remnants of the 
National Socialist Movement who objected to the dropping of National 
Socialist from its name, and •engaged in the building up of an armed 
cadre on the extreme right, in weapon trafficking and the accumulation 
of an arms arsenaL•<162); the League of St. George, formed in 1974 by 
former members of the Sir Oswald Mosley Union Movement and counting 
amongst its membership adherents of other British extreme-right groups: 
it acts as a Lynch-pin between British, other European and American 
extreme right groups and publishes the League (now National) Review; 
the National Party, Led by John Kingsley Read and made up of former NF 
members committed to 1 humane repatriation or resettlement abroad of all 
coloured and racially incompatible immigrants•<163); the New National 
Front with other former NF members including John Tyndall; the 
Constitutional Movement, an NF offshoot identified with Paul Kavanagh 
and Andrew Fountaine and advocating a more populist policy to increase 
electoral appeal, the National Action Party, Led by Eddy Morrison then 
Kevin Randall, and though tiny in number, active in London, engaging in 
attacks and violence; SS Wotan, a terrorist group of the right; and 
finally the British League of Rights, affiliated to the World 
Anti-Communist League<164), whose patron Air Vice-marshall (rtd.) 
Donald Bennett gained 6% of the vote in the Cotswolds Constituency in 
the 1979 European elections as a United Anti-Common Market candidate. 
138. These groups have anti-semitism and racism and adherence to the 
conspiracy doctrine in common. Though extremist groups are small in 
number and unable to command significant electoral support, some not 
even attempting to win it, experts counselled vigilance against the 
rising trend of violence and racial harassment stimulated and at times 
instigated more generally by extremist groups. The general political 
climate determined by the major political parties can influence the 
growth or decline of these extremist groups, in so far as certain ideas 
espoused by major parties find echoes among the extremists and vice 
versa. One of the earlier examples of this was Enoch Powell 1 s race 
relations and immigration speech in April 1968 which treated the themes 
of popular resentment of immigration and repatriation sympathetically 
in view of what he considered to be a sadly predictable racial war if 
coloured immigration were to continue. His sacking from his shadow 
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ministerial position did not prevent a resurgence of NF electoral 
support<165). The other side of this coin is entryism- a matter 
evoked by several experts. In a BBC •world Tonight' programme on 
5 August 1982 a confidential Greater London Young Conservative study on 
extreme right-wing infiltration of the Conservative Party was 
discussed. The report was presented to the Conservative Party chairman 
in January 1984 and indicated that extreme right-wing groups such as 
Tory Action, WISE, the Swinton Circle and David Irving's Focus Policy 
Group had infiltrated the party. The rise of the New Right in Britain 
and elsewhere provoked comment from a number of experts. The Salisbury 
Review and the Peterhouse (Cambridge) group were described variously as 
anti-egalitarian, authoritarian, and at times nationalist 
intellectuals, sympathetic to the extreme right wing. 'Entryism• by 
Trotskyite groups into the Labour Party was also raised by Mr Savitt 
and Mr May in so far as certain of these groups had developed 
specifically anti-semitic views. Mr Kohler noted that NF success 
during 1976-79 was primarily in Labour-held constituency strongholds, 
which he attributes to a protest rather than racist vote. The SOP also 
has its critics in this respect<166). 
International Links 
139. Two aspects on international Links were described by experts, the 
ambiguous role played by certain Arab embassies and Palestinian groups 
in relation to right-wing extremist groups and collusion between the 
NAR of Italy and the NF, the League of St. George and others<167), 
and between German and Belgian neo-nazi groups and the British 
Democratic Party<168) and Column 88(169). David Irving of Focus 
Policy Group admits to attending meetings of the nazi Deutsche 
Volksunion, and has Links through his private secretary with the wanted 
Italian NAR terrorist Roberto Fiore<170), a Link mentioned also by 
Professor Revelli and Mr Aniasi and by Mr Scalfaro who also referred to 
the problems of extradition. 
Anti-semitism and racial discrimination 
140. Anti-semitism in Europe is a Limited phenomenon confined to a small 
minority. Mr Savitt suggested that on average 15 anti-semitic 
incidents occurred each month in Great Britain. Besides telephone 
calls and violence to pupils or students, synagogues and cemeteries are 
particular targets for such incidents. Mr May cites international 
comparisons in a survey of anti-semitit incidents in several European 
countries<171>. 
141. Publications of revisionist Literature, such as The hoax of the 
Twentieth Century (Arthur Butz) or Did six million really die? 
(Richard Harwood, apparent alias for Richard Verrall) are also of 
concern<172>. But perhaps more of concern than the existence of 
marginal groups are the systematic efforts to exploit particular 
manifestations of social inequality, mistrust, xenophobia and sometimes 
violence. The 1984 report of the Commission for Racial Equality cited 
the most recent Policy Studies Institute (PSI) study demonstrating 
that, though there had been some improvements, •serious inequalities, 
to which discrimination on racial grounds has contributed, persist in 
employment, housing, education and other services•. These findings 
have been corroborated in the Swann Committee Report Education for 
all. Commenting on a recent report of the PSI, the Economist described 
the current state of race relations in Britain as 'black days•<173>. 
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Racial attacks and violence 
142. Dr LAYTON-HENRY began his written evidence on racial attacks by 
reminding the Committee that: 'violence against the person and against 
personal dwelling houses are generally considered to be among the most 
serious of crimes ••• Unprovoked racially motivated violence, 
harassment and intimidation must be seen as amongst the most serious 
manifestations of racism and racial prejudice'. And in Britain in 
October 1985 these words have special relevance, after the riots and 
deaths in Birmingham Handsworth, in London (Brixton, Peckham and 
Tottenham) and Liverpool (Toxteth), and in the violence and deaths in 
individual incidents in East London and elsewhere. Before the Home 
Office's own study of the incidence of racial attacks in 1981, various 
organisations had prepared reports or dossiers, the most notable of 
which were the Bethnal Green and Stepney Trades Council 'Blood on the 
Streets' (1978), the all-party Joint Committee Against Racialism's 
dossier of over 1 000 racial attacks all over the UK, and Dr KHAN's 
report as General Secretary of the Union of Pakistan's Organisations, 
the Last two in 1981. The Home Office report in 1981 noted<174) : 
'The views expressed by ethnic minority representatives about racial 
attacks reflected a general feeling of fear and apprehension for the 
future. ( ••• ) In all places we visited we were given accounts of 
racial violence, abuse and harassment. ( ••• ) In many places we were 
told that the Asian families were too frightened to Leave their homes 
at night or to visit the main shopping centre in town at weekends when 
gangs of young skinheads regularly congregate. ( ••• ) The absolute 
number of racial attacks appears to have increased.' 
143. In his submission, Dr LAYTON-HENRY concluded that 'there can be no 
doubt that racial attacks, violence and harassment are widespread in 
all areas of England where Asians and Blacks have settled. The 
situation is most serious in London, particularly in the East End of 
London ••• There is certainly considerable under-reporting and 
under-recording of these incidents ••• many victims feel the police are 
unsympathetic to these types of complaints ••• The role of the police 
(in countering such attacks) is crucial'. 
144. Outbreaks of violence having racial characteristics seem to occur 
rather frequently and, though Limited to certain areas, create 
nevertheless a climate of malaise. They support a subculture of 
machoism and vandalism, facilitate the aggressivity of groups of 
skinheads and hooligans and, most of all1 allow such situations to be 
exploited by the groups mentioned above<l75). The difficulties met 
by the police in controlling such phenomena, the mistrust felt by 
ethnic minorities towards the police, the prejudice shown by some in 
the police force itself(176>, are factors encouraging recourse to 
violence. Minor incidents which are inappropriately treated can Lead 
to major confrontations. Recent riots in Birmingham Handsworth, 
Brixton, Peckham and Tottenham (September/October 1985) give tragic 
confirmation to that. Lord SCARMAN's perspicacious re~ort on the 
Brixton disorders in 1981 addresses these problems<177>. Several 
commentators consider that the Last years have seen an increase in 
racial attacks, including murders, in certain parts of the country, the 
East End of London being notable among them. The Home Secretary 
Douglas HURD announced after a meeting of the High Commissioners of 
India and Bangladesh and the Pakistan Ambassador on 25 September 1985 
that one of the urgent priorities of the London Metropolitan Police 
Commissioner was action to curb racial attacks. 
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145. While not condoning in any way such violent incidents, Dr LAYTON-HENRY 
attributes them to the chauvinistic culture which is particularly 
strong in long-established areas of native English working class 
settlement where frustrations and resentment are now particularly high 
owing to unemployment and economic dislocation. For the ethnic 
minorities particularly severely affected by unemployment and subject 
to this chauvinism, the pressures become at times explosive. 
146. The Handsworth, Brixton and Tottenham riots in 1985 could be said to 
have begun in similar circumstances (an incident involving the police>; 
besides the police, certain interests became the target of violence. 
Perhaps significantly, properties of certain authorities or 
organisations were relatively untouched. Without attempting to analyse 
this in detail or recommending solutions, the Economic and Social 
Research Council's recent report on the Inner Cities amongst others 
could point to possible ways of arresting inner city blight. Despite 
the application by the police of many of Lord SCARMAN 1 s 
recommendations, the gulf of suspicion and mistrust between some 
minorities and the police remains unbridged. 
147. Violence in sport, in particular at football matches, is one of the 
disturbing developments which the Committee felt it should Look at 
under the terms of its inquiry. Simon Wiesenthal had drawn attention 
to the issue in the February 1985 hearing. The tragic events of 
29 May 1985 at Heysel stadium in Brussels hastened the submission of 
Mrs Larive-Groenendaal's interim report in July 1985 and were the 
subject of two emergency resolutions adopted in June 1985(178>. The 
chairman and rapporteur of our committee were able to contact the 
Belgian parliamentary committee who, under the chairmanship of 
Mr R. Collignon, conducted an inquiry into the tragedy. The chairman 
of our committee received evidence from Liverpool Football Club, from 
Searchlight and from other sources that supporters of the British 
Movement and of the Italian extremist organizations Ordine Nuovo were 
present and active at the match. 
148. Football crowd violence, the causes of which are complex, is difficult 
to stamp out and creates conditions which provide fertile ground for 
the activities of extremist gangs and other categories of alienated 
individuals (hooligans, skinheads). Such gangs attempt to recruit 
followers from the mass of young spectators while maintaining a climate 
of violence by goading militant football fans. On the other hand, a 
political veneer, Limited on the whole to the use of insignia and nazi 
or fascist Language, allows the authors of acts of violence to work 
themselves up into a frenzy and stand out characteristically in a crowd 
which although politically amorphous is potentially explosive<179>. 
149. In the conclusions to its report the Belgian parliamentary committee 
does not refer to the possible involvement of extremist groups, 
although some speakers in the hearings raised this point<180>. 
However, the interim report by the judge, Mr Popplewell, who was 
responsible for the inquiry into the events in Bradford and Birmingham 
<11 May 1985>, refers to evidence submitted to him which indicated that 
'political activists• were involved in these incidents (handing out of 
National Front Leaflets, spectators wearing nazi insignia). 
Mr Popplewell believes that some young football fans who take part in 
racist demonstrations during matches have a very vague knowledge of the 
politics of groups such as the National Front or the British Movement 
and he adds that he intends to examine this aspect of the situation 
more closely<181>. 
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150. In February 1981 the UK Football Association pledged itself to 
investigate the growing number of allegations that racialist groups 
were recruiting members from among young terrace fans. The NF had 
begun Leafletting campaigns outside football stadia in 1978 and its 
newspaper Bulldog had run a column 'on the Football Front' since 1980. 
Williams et al. in Hooligans Abroad<182) document the activities of 
NF, British Movement and British National Party fans during the World 
Cup in Spain, at matches in Denmark and elsewhere. 
Racial discrimination 
151. Certain of the experts claimed that 'state racism' or institutionalized 
racism existed in Britain. These claims stimulated a debate in 
committee, particularly during the hearings of Professor Parekh and 
Mr Kohler. The former cited five matters deserving attention: 
(1) definitions of citizenship of a country; (2) women migrants not 
being allowed to bring in their husbands or fiances from their country 
of origin; (3) dependents of citizens settled in Britain not being 
allowed to enter Britain in the way they ought; (4) the considerable 
increase in deportations from Britain; and (5) the maintenance of 
repatriation as a policy option in Britain. Each of these is due, in 
Professor Parekh's views, to state or government practics and, he 
added, 'if the state presents a racist profile to the community, then 
it tends to give Legitimacy to racist attacks'. Repatriation is a 
policy option of no major political party in the UK, but has been 
propounded by marginal extremist groups. After the recent Brixton 
incidents, Mr Enoch Powell raised the repatriation option. The Prime 
Minister, Mrs Thatcher subsequently formally rejected its consideration 
as an option<183>. Several experts were of the opinion that 
discrimination was built into the structure of certain Laws, or 
administrative practices, but interpretation of non-discriminatory 
rules could also be discriminatory. Cases were drawn to the 
committee's attention of the virtual absence of Black 
magistrates<184), the paucity of Black policemen<185) and Black 
senior trade union officials. Stephen Rose claimed anyway that 
migrants throughout Europe suffered similar discrimination : 'the 
ethnic minorities groups in Europe are dumped in the worst schools, 
worst housing, the most socially deprived areas and they are denied 
fundamental citizen's rights ••• •<186). Martin Savitt cited the case 
of the harassment and non-recognition of a Jewish Students• Society by 
the Sunderland Polytechnic Students Union's refusal to ratify the 
society's proposed constitution on the grounds that it was against the 
Union's policy since it had passed a resolution stating that 'Zionism 
is racism' along the lines of the similar and much contested UN general 
assembly resolution. This was an example of 'the opportunities ••• 
seized by both the fascist right and the fascist left to discredit 
Jewish communities•, in Mr Savitt's view. Experts differed on the rate 
of improvement in this situation on the ground that the Laws on racial 
equality, passed since 1965, did not fully carry the message of 
government commitment against inequality because the message of the 
rejection of the immigrant in the immigration laws has been much 
louder. Anyway, the objective observer would recognise that succeeding 
governments efforts to establish an institutional framework for racial 
equality has been tenacious and constructive. Most experts, in fact, 
accepted that institutions and machinery introduced in the United 
Kingdom in the field of race relations, while giving room for 
improvement<187), did not require radical change. 
WG(VS)/2441E/2464E - 49 - PE 97.547/fin. 
152. Public attitudes towards ethnic minorities and immigration have not 
been measured very regularly in Europe, though Britain is rather better 
observed than many other countries. Michael Billig has studied 
xenophobic views among 15-16 year-olds in the West Midlands, and finds 
between 1980 and 1984 a doubling in sympathy expressed for the National 
Front a sympathy explicitly related to the threat of 
unemployment<188). The Social and Community Planning Research 1984 
study suggested, 'a widespread public belief that Britain is far from 
an equal opportunity society. Race and class prejudice and 
discrimination are seen to exist in Large measures and are regarded as 
important obstacles to advancement. Around 90% of the population 
believe there is prejudice against Asians and Blacks ••• Around a 
third of the total sample described themselves as prejudiced against 
people of other races ••• Over 40% of the population believe that race 
prejudice will increase during the 1980s and a further third that it 
will remain at its present level ••• •<189>. 
153. The incidence of racism might appear at first glance higher in the UK 
than in many other countries of Western Europe. The willingness to 
conduct open public debate on racial relations at all political and 
social levels may give sometimes a disproportionate impression of the 
growth of problems relating to that field. On the other hand, the 
response to those problems through general government policy seems to 
be more far-reaching and coherent in the United Kingdom than perhaps in 
other countries. 
2.2.11 Spain 
154. Many observers were surprised by the ease with which Spain was able to 
leave behind Franco's, corporatist and authoritarian regime. Memories 
of the lacerations of the civil war had obscured the central fact that, 
socially and politically, Spain shared all the essential 
characteristics of its democratic neighbours. 
155. All the polls carried out from 1974 - 1975 onwards indicated the 
popular desire for a peaceful transition, a revulsion from the 
representative organs of the old regime, but also against extremist 
movements in generat<190). 
156. There was an equally clear expression of a resolve to defend democracy 
-an important difference from the situation under the Second Republic, 
with most citizens accepting republicanism but few being prepared to 
fight in its cause at Least in the first half of the 'thirties. 
157. The passage has not been without tremors due to a number of attempted 
coups, the most celebrated of which remains that of 23 February 1981 
headed by Lieutenant-Colonel Tejero. Another plot was foiled in 
October 1982. Despite some alarmist prognoses<192>, a military 
putsch seems quite impossible today. 
158. At the electoral Level, the end of the Franco era was sealed in the 
1982 elections. For the 1979 elections, the Fuerza Nueva, set up in 
1976 by Mr Blas Pinar, then a member of the Franco regime's parliament, 
joined forces with the Falange under the name of 'National Union•. 
They jointly obtained 2% of the vote. It is interesting that the 
National Union's Least-bad returns (Castille, Santander, Valladolid) 
were in what in 1936 had been 'strongholds' of the Falange (which then 
obtained less than 1% of the vote)<193). This does not mean, however, 
that the extreme right cannot count on a Large number of young and 
active militants or rally gatherings of thousands on certain 
occasions. There are also from time to time court cases concerning 
arms casches or arson at the offices of political parties or trade 
unions<194). 
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159. Recently the creation of a new party of the extreme right, Juntas 
Espanola, chaired by Mr Antonio Izquierdo, publisher of the daily 
EL Alcazar, has been reported. 
160. A digression is perhaps justified on the fact that many former 
ministers and political figures of the Franco period are active in 
present-day Spanish politics. 
Examples are Mr Fraga Iribarne, chairman of the conservative party 
Alianza Popular, Mr Suarez, former prime minister and chairman of the 
Centro Democratico y Social, and the new foreign minister, 
Mr Francisco Fernando Ordonez. While this raises some eyebrows in the 
rest of Europe, the democratic Legitimacy of their presence is never 
questioned in Spain. There does seem to be Little basis for gauging 
Spain's democratic development by the rise and fall in popularity of 
such politicians<195>. 
161. As regards the Spanish extreme right's international Links, 
Mrs Chombert de Lauwe drew attention to the role of the CEDADE (Circulo 
Espanol de Amigos de Europa). It was founded in the FRG in August 1965 
under the aegis of a Wagnerien association by a number of Leading 
military and professional personalities of the Hitler and Mussolini 
regimes. Subsequently it expanded rapidly in Spain, its headquarters 
and Largest branch being in Madrid. It is said to serve as a cover for 
other organizations with explicitly nazi titles, its structure is 
supposed to comprise three tiers and its membership to be about 2 500. 
It propounds 'pan-Europeanism• and anti-semitism<196) and is said to 
have outposts in Latin America and to maintain relations with 'hard' 
extremist groups throughout Europe<197>. 
162. Note should also be taken of the activities of the New Acropolis sect 
which is said to be active in 27 provinces of Spain where its 
membership is said to be about 1 000. The daily Tiempo has exposed the 
fact that New Acropolis, through its various branches, receives 
subsidies from the Madrid community<198). The sect, whose leader in 
Spain is a woman of Argentine nationality, was founded in Peru and has 
its international headquarters in Brussels; it is said to be active in 
17 European and 17 Latin-American countries. Under cover of 
philosophical speculation it promotes a neo-nazi ideology<199>. 
163. Special mention must be made of the Basque problem. It is widely 
acknowledged that the principal threat to Spanish democracy resides in 
the terrorist activities of the military wing of ETA, but also, to a 
lesser extent, in the counter-terrorism of GAL ('Grupos Antiterroristas 
de Liberacion'). GAL's 'black' terrorism against militants of ETA or 
of GRAPO seeking sanctuary on French territory has resulted, between 
July 1978 and March 1985, in the death of 27 persons<200>. Another 
attack at the end of September, in Bayonne, killed four other Basque 
refugees. Responsibility for this was also imputed to GAL. Judging by 
the identity of a number of persons recently arrested it would appear 
that GAL had Largely drawn its membership from the world of petty 
gangsters<201). 
164. As regards terrorist activities originating with ETA a number of 
experts consider it historically a product of carlist 
fundamentalism<202) coupled with a theory of 'pure blood' which draws 
its inspiration from Gobineau (Caro Baroja speaks of 'democratic 
racism•)(203>. in the case that concerns us here, racism goes 
hand-in-hand with violence and rejection of racism is undoubtedly the 
best antidote to such violence. 
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165. Lastly, an aura of racism seems to persist in attitudes towards gipsy 
communities. For example, gipsy children at the Severo Ochoa High 
School in Madrid have had to ask for police protection<204>. 
2.2.12 Portugal 
166. The present situation in Portugal has hardly been mentioned either 
before the Committee or in documents submitted to it. An analysis of 
the development of democracy in Portugal following the Salazar 
dictatorship would far outstrip the Committee's brief. The electoral 
vote of the extreme right is quite negligible. The least insignificant 
of the groupings is Ordem Nova, created in 1980 by Gilbert Santos e 
Castro, a former commando leader in Angola. The group proclaims 
revolutionary fascism and hyper-nationalism. It is said to be closely 
linked to Fuerza Nueva in Spain. Now disbanded, it is said to continue 
its activities underground, providing translations of CEDAQE 
publications for distribution in Brazil. A tiny neo-nazi group called 
Mocidades Patriotica is said to have made its appearance and to have 
sent representatives to some international gatherings. 
2.3 OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 
2.3.1 Austria 
167. According to B. Galanda underlying Austrian right-wing extremism is the 
peculiar concept of the 'German people' (Deutsches Volk). This concept 
whose Logical consequence is to deny the existence of a properly 
Austrian nation, is used, among other things, to justify the German 
'Anschluss' of Austria in 1938 and German nazi presence and activity in 
Austria from 1938 to 1945(205>. 
168. There are currently in Austria at Least five extreme-right groupings of 
varying importance<206) An example of a radical organization of 
neo-nazi hue is the AUS <Auslander- Halt - Bewegung, the Movement for 
the Expulsion of Foreigners) whose activist core consists mainly of 
members of Kameradschaft Babenberg, an organization disbanded in 1980 
by the authorities for anti-state neo-nazi propaganda. With an 
aggressively racist platform, often enlivened by forbidden 
national-socialist songs, AUS Looks for recruits mainly among young 
people, in schools and on football stadiums, telling them that the 
country's economic and social difficulties are due to the presence of 
some categories of immigrants. Its following among the public at 
Large, and particularly among the electorate is, in any case, very 
small. When, in the 1981 elections to the First Chamber (Nationalrat), 
it contested the Vienna constituency, the movement obtained only 0.4% 
of the vote<207). 
169. Two other groups of moderate importance seem to be closely linked to 
the AUS. The first of these is the NDP (Nationaldemokratische Partei, 
the National Democratic Party), set up in 1966 as the result of a split 
in the Freiheitliche Partei Oesterreichs<208). 
170. The NDP has contested several Local and regional elections but has 
never attained enough votes to get a seat. It should, however, be 
noted that the party's Leader, N. Burger, stood in 1980 for the 
presidency of the Federation and obtained 140 000 votes {3.2%) which 
was an outrage to democratic public opinion in the country<209). 
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171. The other group is the ANR (Aktion Neue Rechte, the New Right Action), 
which has been active since 1974 in Austrian higher educational 
establishments and which obtained one seat in the Last elections to the 
national student representative body. Two student organizations have 
appealed to the Austrian Constitutional Court contending that 
participation in these elections by organizations with neo-nazi 
Leanings was unconstitutionaL<210>. 
172. It can be said that the organized extreme right is isolated within 
Austrian society. Those right-wing extremist groupings which have 
officially registered as political parties have no following among 
electorate<211). 
the 
173. The country's two main parties, the Socialist Party (Socialistische 
Partei) and the Peo~Le's Party (Volkspartie) take an unambiguously 
anti-fascist stand<212>. This, to some extent, is Less true of the 
Austrian Liberal Party (Freiheitliche Partei Oesterreichs) where, side 
by side with a Liberal wing, which seems to dominate the party at 
present, there are clearly discernible nationalist trends inspired by 
the ideology of a pan-Germanic national and cultural community<213). 
This perhaps provides the background to the recent event when a member 
of this party, the Austrian defence minister, Mr F. Frischenschlager, 
went out personally to meet the war criminal Walter Reder, who had been 
serving a Long prison sentence and had been pardoned by the Italian 
authorities. The incident aroused angry protest in Austria, as indeed 
throughout Europe, and it has been condemned by virtually the entire 
body of public opinion in the country<214>. A critical Letter 
expressing the feelings of Members of the European Parliament has been 
sent to the Austrian Government on a proposal from Mr D. Ducarme, a 
member of the Committee<215). 
174. Contacts between Austrian extreme right groups and corresponding 
organizations in the Federal Republic of Germany can be said to be a 
matter of tradition<216>. It will also be noted that developments in 
that part of the German political spectrum are mirrored, often with 
some delay, on the Austrian political scene. Neo-nazi propaganda 
material from the Federal Republic is distributed in Austria. 
175. There is also particularly close cooperation between Austrian 
extreme-right groupings and similar organizations in Spain and the 
United States. It is also in Austria that many international neo-nazi 
gatherings have taken place, for instance reunions of former SS members 
or seminars for members of foreign organizations. However, it should 
be noted that the British revisionist historian David Irving who was 
invited by right-wing extremists to give a series of Lectures at the 
end of Last year was immediately expelled from Austria by the 
authorities<217). 
176. While organized right-wing extremism can be said to be on the wane, 
xenophobic attitudes are rather widespread. They Lack formal 
articulation but are aimed at immigrant workers, although the numbers 
of these are diminishing. They are blamed for unemployment, which 
incidentally is not bad in Austria, and, more generally, for economic 
and social difficulties. It is these vague feelings that racist bodies 
try to exploit<218). 
WG(VS)/2441E/2464E 
- 53 - PE 97.547/fin. 
177. A certain amount of anti-semitism persists in Austria although the Jews 
account for no more than 0.1% of the population. This •anti-semitism 
without Jews• represents a latent intellectual and psychological 
attitude which seems to be pro~ressively disappearing, particularly 
among the younger generation and among the better-educated classes, 
under the influence of a democratic civic education and of an 
enlightened political and historical debate<219>. 
2.3.2 Norway 
178. The murder in 1981 of two neo-nazi sympathizers brought to Light the 
existence of two rival groups, one of which was said to be linked with 
the Hoffmann group in the Federal Republic of Germany<220>. In 
May 1984 threats sent to two dozen schools in the capital led the 
police to provide protection, particularly to immigrant children, 
during the national day celebrations. Other sporadic evidence of 
extremist right-wing activity includes the painting of nazi symbols on 
the walls of the Oslo cemetery in 1985. 
2.3.3. Sweden 
179. Extremist right-wing groupings have a very small following in Sweden. 
One of the most serious manifestations of their activities has 
undoubtedly been the appearance of blasphemous anti-semitic documents 
which were distributed throughout Europe and in North America (Jewish 
Information, Arab News, Bible Research). Their publisher, Dietlieb 
Cluwer-Felderer, a member of the Institute for Historical Review (based 
in the USA) <see footnote 53) was sentenced on 20 December 1982 to ten 
months' imprisonment. Incidents of organized vandalism followed his 
triaL<221>. There is in Sweden a national socialist party (Nordiska 
Rikspartiet or Nasjonalt Rikspartiet) established in 1956 and Led by 
Gorun Assar Oredson, <which organized two demonstrations before the 
last elections) and a •national democratic' party with which a small 
anti-immigration movement (BSS) started in 1979 seems to be Linked. 
180. Lastly, it should be noted that following a number of racial clashes in 
Stockholm in August 1982 in which many skinheads took part, the Swedish 
Government introduced a special educational programme to combat 
xenophobia. 
2.3.4. Switzerland 
181. The presence of large numbers of foreigners (14.5% of the total 
population) in Switzerland has been an issue at a number of referenda 
since 1970. In 1970, 1974, 1977 and 1981 the electorate rejected 
proposals to reduce the foreign population resident in Switzerland or 
to reduce further the special status of seasonal workers. In June 1982 
the Swiss electorate rejected by a narrow majority a proposal to relax 
the regulations applying to foreign workers in Switzerland - contrary 
to the recommendations of all major political parties, and overturning 
a law passed by the Swiss Parliament in 1981. The initiators of many of 
these actions have been two political parties, Nationale Aktion gegen 
Uberfremdung von Volk und Heimat, (National Action against 
Foreignization of the People and Homeland) -a nationalistic protest 
founded in 1961 -and the Republikanische Bewegung (Republican 
Movement) - led by Dr James Schwarzenbach, who formerly led National 
Action, which appeals to the ancient Swiss tradition of 
'republicanism•, that is opposing foreign influence and interference in 
Swiss affairs, which was formed in 1970. Both these parties have been 
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represented in the Swiss Parliament since 1969, jointly winning 3.4% of 
the votes gained in the 1983 elections, with 5 of the 200 seats in the 
National Council. This result was an improvement from 1979 when they 
won 2.0% of the votes and 3 seats, the Low point of their 
support<222>. 
182. The Nouvel Ordre Europeen (NOE or sometimes Nouvel Ordre Social) one of 
the transnational neo-nazi organisations, has its seat in 
Lausanne<223>. The committee received extensive notes on the 
activities of the Grey Wolves in Switzerland (see 2.3.5. below). 
183. Interesting studies carried out in 1980 - 1981 have shown that in 
Switzerland, as in many other European countries, a Latent 
anti-semitism persists (a very strong prejudice in the case of 5 - 6% 
of the population, a significant prejudice in 21- 22%)(224>. The 
report drawn up by Mr Krieps for the Council of Europe records the 
major public debate which followed the showing of 'Holocaust' and the 
threats and attacks against Jewish property which then took 
place<225). 
2.3.5. Turkey 
184. Turkish right-wing extremism was raised by experts mainly with 
reference to the activities of the Grey Wolves in Germany, Switzerland 
and Italy, in particular. But this group is only one of at Least eight 
extreme right-wing movements in Turkey, over 25 extreme Left-wing 
movements and over 20 Islamic fundamentalist, Armenian nationalist or 
Kurdish nationalist groupsC226>. The reasons most often advanced by 
supporters of the regime in Turkey now for the military take-over in 
that country on 12 September 1980 and for the current pace of return to 
multi-party parliamentary democracy include the slide to anarchy 
through the activities of terrorist groups of both Left and right. 
Under the military regime, Parliament was dissolved, political parties 
were banned and fundamental rights have been suspended. Many thousands 
were arrested in Turkey over this period and prosecutions Leading not 
seldom to death sentences and executions were performed under martial 
Law provisions concerning felonies against the State which were 
imported directly from the criminal code of the inter-war Italian 
fascist regime. And, although parliamentary elections in November 1983 
and the Local elections in March 1984 have witnessed a relaxation in 
restrictions on the activities of political parties<227>, Turkey is 
still Living under an authoritarian rule which is itself a confirmation 
of the survival of Latent extreme-right tendencies in contemporary 
Europe. 
185. The National Action Party (MHP - Milliyetci Hareket Partisi) which no 
Longer has any official status, claimed 300 000 members and had 16 
seats in the Assembly before the military take-over. A number of its 
members were involved in acts of violence, as well as being the targets 
for violence themselves. Various organizations owed their formation to 
this party, including the Federation of Turkish Democratic Idealist 
Associations, the Great Ideal Societyand the Grey Wolves. These last, 
in Wilkinson's view constitute 'a far more substantial threat of 
violence and intercommunal hatred conflict than the tiny fringe groups 
that congregate in Diksmuide•C228>, for it is they who have set up 
organizations in various countries of Western Europe, in particular 
West Germany. Some have close Links with German neo-nazis. The Grey 
Wolves organization has achieved a Level of notoriety perhaps out of 
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proportion to its size, through the attempted murder of 
Pope John Paul II by Mehmet Ali Agca; but according to an indictment of 
the military prosecutor for the 1981 trial of Colonel Turkes (leader of 
the MHP) the Grey Wolves were responsible for organizing or carrying 
out 694 murders in the years 1974 - 1980. Their notoriety has been 
increased through the alleged links between them and the Bulgarian 
secret service and perhaps with other East European centres in the 
murder attempt on the Pope. The Bulgarian connection is contested, and 
the trial's conclusion is awaited. The Committee of Inquiry received 
extensive documentation on the Grey Wolves' activities in Germany, 
through IG Metall (the Metal Workers Union of the Federal Republic of 
Germany), and in Switzerland. Reports in Info-Turk of June 1985 
suggest that the organization is active also in Belgium through the 
Frankfurt based Turk-Federasyon which last met in West Germany on 
18 May 1985 in Castrup-Rauxel, when a resolution was adopted in support 
of their former chairman Serdar Celebi <now on trial in Rome for 
involvement in the murder attempt on the Pope). 
186. As a largely emigrant community the Turks are more often the subject 
than the initiator of racial discrimination. But the case of the 
Armenians and the Kurds as well as that of the persecution and 
dislocation of a numerous and flourishing Greek population in Turkey 
show that these minorities have suffered significantly during this 
century, even to the extent of the genocide of the Armenians in 1915 -
an accusation that, although supported by evidence, has never been 
accepted by successive Turkish governments<229>. Armenian groups 
have been active in many countries of Western Europe, claiming 
responsibility for violent attacks on Turkish diplomats and individuals 
and organizations favourable to the Turkish Government. 
2.3.6. Eastern Europe 
187. In respect of East European countries the rapporteur does not intend to 
undertake the same type of analysis as for the other European 
countries, considering that the situation here is fundamentally 
different. Whereas in our analysis so far we sought to identify some 
of the dangers threatening the democratic pluralist system and its 
values, we now have to deal with societies where this order and these 
values are not even recognized. Like Mr Glucksman, your rapporteur 
believes that the concept to be applied here is that of totalitarianism 
and he agrees with Professor Voslensky that there is no way that 
totalitarianism can be situated in the democratic spectrum of 
right-to-left. The Committee's very terms of reference are simply 
inapplicable to the situations which would have to be described and 
assessed. 
188. But because one specific issue has been often raised both in the 
Committee's discussions and in the memoranda it has received, the 
rapporteur will deal with it. It concerns the situation of Jews in the 
Soviet Union, to which Mr Wiesenthal in particular referred. 
The 1.18 million Jews in the USSR are deprived of their right to their 
history, their religion and their language. In 1984 and the first two 
months of 1985 the police carried out, under various pretexts, many 
arrests of persons who had engaged in teaching privately the Hebrew 
language. These teachers have been given prison sentences from 
18 months to 4 years and many of them <Yakov Mesh, Yosef Berenstein, 
Mark Nepomniashchy) have been exposed to great mental and physical 
suffering<230>. The European Parliament has repeatedly condemned 
these practices<231>. 
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189. 
190. 
191. 
A report by Mr Hugosson, adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe on 26 September 1985, states : 'The position of Jews 
in the USSR has not improved since 1982; on the contrary there is some 
evidence to suggest that it has got worse : only 896 Jews were able to 
Leave the Soviet Union Last year; repression of Jewish activists has 
intensified particularly since July 1984; Jewish culture- in the 
widest sense of the term - is at risk; an antisemitic campaign in the 
guise of the fight against Zionism, is raging in the media ( ••• ). It 
is reported that the number of Jews employed in the Local •soviets• in 
1983 has decreased by more than half since 1967. ( ••• ) Some Soviet 
writers have even gone so far as to accuse 'the Zionists• of helping 
Hitler to come to power and collaborating in the extermination of the 
Jews by the nazis during the second world war•<232). 
The Jews are not the only community to suffer from discrimination in 
the Soviet Union. The policy of 'Russianization• has affected several 
other national groups and is one of the reasons for protest action most 
often invoked by dissidents. Thus Mr Vladimir Bukovsky in 
December 1973 sent a Letter from prison to Mr Alexei Kosygin, then 
President of the Council of Ministers, to protest against 
Russianization measures which had Lead to the detention of 'Large 
numbers of Armenians, Lithuanians, Ukranians, Jews, Tartars and others 
in concentration camps and prison•<233>. In 1982, the European 
Parliament concerned itself particularly with the situation in the 
Baltic republics<234>. 
With regard to the situation in Poland, a Letter written by 
Adam Michnik shortly before his recent court conviction<235). 
It serves to flesh out the statements of our experts and helps to 
understand the scale of the various phenomena which have inevitably 
been somewhat •compressed' in this overview: 
'The real "heroes" (of this trial) are its SB (political police) 
stage-managers and their faithful collaborator, the presiding judge of 
the Gdansk court Krzysztof Zieniuk who is trying us. Krzysztof Zieniuk 
is a fascist. I use the term reluctantly, conscious of the 
associations it evokes. But his methods are so typical and wellknown 
from the history of Hitler's (and Stalin's) courts of Law that this is 
the most appropriate description. It harks back to the times when 
sentences were pronounced by bandits in judges' robes. ( ••• ) In a 
police report on my person, annexed to the documents of the case, a 
Warsaw secret policeman, a certain sergeant Andrzej Solecki, was kind 
enough to enter my nationality as 'Jewish'. There is only one 
precedent for such a definition: the nazi racial Laws. It was by the 
application of this criterion that the nazis exterminated my father's 
family. Communist anti-semitism is nothing new in Poland's history. 
Imported from Stalin's Russia it has always performed a double 
function. It has always been the instinctive ideology of fascist-
minded blockheads who found employment in the political police and the 
party apparatus. It has also served as a tool to besmirch Poland's 
name in world opinion. And what a tool ••• •<236>. 
192. At the end of 1981 the Solidarity weekly devoted an article to the 
problems of the Belorussians. There are some 450 000 Ukranians, 
Belorussians, Lithuanians, Jews, Czechs and Slovaks Living in Poland. 
The position of the German minority in Poland is also a constant object 
of attention<237). 
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204. The possibility of militant groups turning to terrorism is a different 
problem: in the Last ten years we have seen that 'black' terrorism very 
often takes place in imitation of terrorist activities under other 
colours. In particular, a sometimes alarming surge in Left-wing 
terrorism, followed by a refinement of the methods used, have helped to 
encourage more widespread resort to violence by extremist groups. With 
the growth of Left-wing and Islamic terrorist activities, the endemic 
intermingling of terrorist movements carries a danger of proliferation, 
aggravated further by certain present-day technological developments 
(attention is drawn to the existence in the United States of 
computerized networks for the dissemination of news inciting hatred, 
see footnote 249 below). 
205. In general, these groups do not have regular contacts abroad. But 
there are many cases of sporadic cooperation, especially where 
terrorist acts are concerned. Some German organizations, however, 
cooperate on a fairly permanent basis with sister organizations 
abroad. 'Imported terrorism' is a new phenomenon, particularly common 
in Federal Germany and France. 
(b) Racism 
206. There is usually a racist component in the right-wing extremism of 
militant groups. The most frequent feature of such groups is 
anti-semitism, although there is no Lack of hostility towards other 
ethnic groups. This is combined with various 'theories' of racial 
superiority - ethnic, national or European. The practical expression 
of this militant racism depends to a Large extent on the size and 
nature of immigrant groups in the country concerned. Where immigrants 
constitute a significant proportion of the population, incitement to a 
'race war' may be used as a means of mobilizing such groups' membership 
and gaining publicity for them. 
207. At a different Level, elements of racial discrimination can be found in 
the Legislation, ca~e Law and, above all perhaps, in the administrative 
practices of European countries. Some features of this situation make 
it possible to speak of institutionalized racial discrimination, but it 
would be a gross exaggeration to speak of the existence of 'state 
racism' in democratic Europe. The only form of currently practised 
state racism which we have met within the geographical confines of our 
inquiry is without doubt the anti-semitism existing in the Soviet Union. 
208. Discriminatory behaviour also exists in everyday public and private 
Life and is particularly strong in areas with Large immigrant 
populations. It is accompanied by rising xenophobia which is recorded 
in opinion surveys, sometimes of an alarming intensity. In a situation 
of economic and social crisis, xenophobia can be politically 
exploited. It is a very difficult problem: present-day political 
reality based on the Legitimacy of the nation state and its culture is 
undergoing change. Right-wing extremism should not be equated with 
xenophobia. Nor, can xenophobia as an ill-defined attitude of mistrust 
and intolerance towards foreign communities be equated with racism, 
which is characterized by an aggressive and deliberate hostility 
towards these same foreign communities. 
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209. Lastly, we have noted evidence of the spread of pseudo-scientific 
racist or narrowly elitist theories (see paragraph 41 above). This 
relative resurgence seems to us to be Less due to any theoretical 
renewal than to the rise of xenophobic sentiment which provides fertile 
ground for the spread of such ideas as well as a demand for their 
scientific Legitimation. 
2.6 TOWARDS AN·IDENTIFICATION OF THE CAUSES 
210. Of necessity, the above summary of the situation anticipated an 
investigation of its causes. That investigation, in any event, can 
only be of a general nature. A scientifically sound causal approach 
would have to explain a set of strictly-defined facts, events and 
phenomena, whereas our investigation has dealt with Large-scale, 
ill-defined assemblies of facts and conditions. It has, on the other 
hand, enabled us to present a broad panorama into whose framework it 
will be easier, we hope, to insert case studies and specific 
investigations or explanations. 
211. (a) Right-wing extremism 
-An unhealthy fascination with the past, the durability of ideas 
inculcated by state indoctrination, the survival of personalities 
associated with old regimes - all these constitute the historic 
fall-out which favours the persistence of right-wing extremism. It 
should also be remembered that some dictatorships survived until 
recent times. 
- Some of our experts (in particular Mr Scheuch and Mr Wiesenthal) 
regard this persistence as a sort of 'normal pathology' of 
democratic societies which we should not, of course, accept but 
neither should we expect to eliminate completely. 
- An 'incidental' cause may also be seen in the other political 
forces' efforts to exploit the existence and the fluctuations of 
right-wing extremist centres. The realities of the political game 
sometimes induce parties to undertake manipulations for electoral 
purposes. The presence of the extreme-right reawakens memories of 
the past and consequently stimulates the urge to seek out others 
for purposes of association which various sides will try to exploit 
for their own benefit. The accompanying publicity favours, in 
turn, the extreme-right's survival. 
- Such exploitation is today all the more dangerous because the 
'instinct for association' tends to be far Less significant today 
than in the past and thus cannot offset the effects of the 
publicity. In the Committee's proceedings much was said about the 
importance of the generation effect: 40 years after the end of the 
Second World War the taboos which prevented the discussion of 
certain subjects or the propounding of certain theses may be about 
to crumble. The 'historical fall-out' may outlive historical 
memory. If that is so, what is needed now is not words but genuine 
revival of democratic culture. 
- Finally, the support which extremist (and particularly 'black' 
terrorist) circles may receive from abroad or from groups of 
various persuasions, and the sporadic Links with the Latter, should 
not be overlooked. 
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212. (b) Racism 
- The causes of racism are difficult to identify, evaluate and place 
in perspective, given that some are of a very general nature, while 
others are specific to a particular local situation or time. 
Distinctions must also be drawn between a large variety of types 
and degrees of racism, as we have tried to do when dealing with 
definitions and describing the situation country by country. 
- As regards what might be called 'unorganized' racism, as a 
component of extremist ideologies, its fortunes are inextricably 
linked with those of the latter. The same might be said of 
anti-semitism, were it not that a real though not very significant 
substrata of prejudice exists and that there is institutionalized 
anti-semitism (in the USSR). Anti-semitism, moreover, is readily 
identified with what we called in Part 1 functional racism<252>. 
Something must also be said of the racist element inherent in 
spontaneous fear of the stranger as an unknown being which plays a 
part in the uncontrollable instinct for collective or individual 
self-protection. Several of our experts have expressed the view 
that it was pointless to ask 'Why?', as feelings of distrust and 
rejection towards 'the other' are universal. The essential 
question therefore was how to overcome this distrust and 
rejection. 
The problem is exacerbated by the Large scale of international 
population movements whose causes may be political (persecutions; 
annexations of territory, changes of regime), economic (differences 
of economic conditions, international division of labour) or 
historical (in the case of Europe, a colonial past). 
- The overall social context in which most of the migratory flows 
have taken place also explains the spread of racist or xenophobic 
attitudes. It will be noted that some of the complaints are heard 
so universally that, rather than referring to the specific problems 
of particular communities, they evidently indicate discontent 
common to all the European countries which at one time brought in 
Large numbers of foreign labour: for not only did immigration 
policies pursued throughout the 1960s take no account of Long-term 
perspectives but also the migratory influx was taking place while 
the host countries were in the grip of a four-fold crisis: 
• an urban crisis, due to a high rate of population growth as well 
as the difficulties characteristic of rapid economic growth. The 
immigrant groups were the first to suffer from shortages and 
inconveniences in Living conditions, public transport, housing 
and various aspects of environmental decline; 
• an educational crisis: democratization of education, rapid growth 
of numbers of teaching staff, a crisis of values on which the 
educational system had hitherto been based - all these made the 
new arrivals' acculturation more difficult than it would have 
been in the past when standards of reference and models to be 
followed were less in doubt; 
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• a cultural crisis: what has been said above applies not only to 
schools but to all social institutions. It can be said here that 
the distrust and hostility towards immigrants do not result from 
an excessive confidence in our societies in their own models and 
capabilities but, on the contrary, from a lack of certainty, not 
to say anxiety, on that score • 
• an economic crisis: this has undoubtedly acted as catalyst but 
its consequences as regards xenophobia would not have been as 
described above had the preceding three factors not prepared the 
ground. What is more, it usually happens that in difficult 
economic and social conditions social cohesion and solidarity are 
weakened and emargination occurs with all its multiple and always 
negative consequences. 
213. In addition, historic and international factors help to shape the 
reactions both of the natives and the strangers in each country. The 
extent to which this can happen is well illustrated by the case of the 
Maghreb community in France. 
214. To sum up we should like to quote the following analysis by 
Veronique de Rudder: 'White "gut" racism, which has been much studied 
in the United States, is due less to the number of foreigners present 
than to the changed self-image that the native inhabitants experience 
< ••• > Rejection of the stranger is a response to the feeling of 
self-devaluation'<253). 
215. It is in this light that we should try to understand the particular 
forms that this rejection takes, and especially the violence by which 
it is accompanied. Here it can only be said that violence towards 
immigrant communities is related to the specific cultures of the social 
sectors. generations or regions involved. Thus the authors of a study 
on hooliganism in British football describe the emergence of a 
lifestyle in which high alcoholic consumption, 'machismo', local 
solidarity and support for the same team are highly valued~ while the 
exercise of violence provides almost sexual satisfaction<2,4>. 
216. Obviously such behaviour patterns must rebound on attitudes towards 
strangers. Xenophobia is not a parasite that develops within the 
social body, it merely highlights the flaws which afflicted it before. 
217. The phenomena which are the subject of the present report must 
therefore be viewed from several, complementary aspects: as a threat 
(associated with the 'generation effect', i.e. the waning of historical 
memory) to the traditional forms of toleration as Spinoza defined it in 
1670: 'Men should be given freedom to judge and they must be governed 
in such manner that when openly professing diverse and contrary 
opinions they yet live in concord'(255); as a reaction to feelings of 
insecurity and a perception of economic, demographic and cultural 
decline (a social withdrawal which can only further aggravate the 
emargination already occurring); as an a reaction to the harshest 
manifestations of the crisis; as a special problem concerning isolated 
social groups and the microcultures which they generate. 
How much weight should be given to each of these factors depends on the 
precise configuration in each particular situation with which this 
report is concerned. 
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2.6.1 The economic situation and the rise'of extremist movements 
218. A word must be added on the relationship between the phenomena studied 
here (fascism and racism) and the economic situation: this point was 
repeatedly made to the Committee. While deterioration of the economic 
conditions is not necessarily the main reason for the rise of 
anti-democratic forces within a society, it is certain that 
unemployment or inflation, when they reach a certain level, comprise 
among their effects a crisis of confidence which - the institutions of 
a society functioning in concert - is likely to spread rapidly from the 
economic to the political sphere. The relationship between the rate of 
unemployment and the nazi vote speaks for itself(256>: 
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219. Comparison with other countries indicates, however, that the implied 
relationship comes into effect only if economic conditions deteriorate 
beyond a certain level and if at the same time other factors are 
present (organized groups, international environment, political culture 
and history, cultural and institutional crisis)<257>. 
Unemployment, 1928-33 (Annual average as percentage of labour force) 
1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 
Germany 8.6 13.3 22.7 34.3 43.8 6.2 
United States 4.4 3.2 8.9 15.9 23.6 24.9 
United Kingdom 10.8 10.4 16.1 21.3 22.1 19.9 
France 4.0 1.0 2.0 6.5 15.4 14.1 
Sweden 10.8 10.2 11.9 16.8 22.4 23.3 
Studies of the most recent period seem to suggest that it is not so 
much the effects of present economic difficulties as the fear of 
long-term unemployment and recession which are likely to undermine the 
democratic instinct<258>. 
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220. Thus radicalization of attitudes is Likely to occur when certain 
sections of the population, mainly the young, feel deprived of all 
prospect of a stable job and therefore of any chance of really being 
integrated into society. This is only one of the potential causes of 
the radicalization of Language and behaviour and does not by itself 
account for all the cultural and political manifestations of the 
process. One such manifestation is the choice of a scapegoat on whom 
to blame the deterioration of the situation as a whole, a role which 
some have no hesitation in assigning to immigrant workers and their 
families or to any group perceived as on the fringes of society, as a 
'foreign body'. The tensions resulting from the economic situation 
therefore feed on the prejudices and difficulties which already 
existed. More significant than the economic situation, perhaps, is the 
way in which society reacts to the challenge presented by that 
situation, whether it is able to mobilize new reserves of energy, 
inventiveness and mutual support, or not. Extremist movements have 
been known to emerge in periods of expansion, because of conflict over 
the form that expansion should take and the way in which the benefits 
should be divided. Extremist sentiment never attacks one aspect only 
of the disputed milieu, but the whole social ethos. The economic 
crisis is certainly an essential contributary factor, but one that is 
too closely tied up with other aspects of the problem to be singled out 
arbitrarily. 
2.7 ARE FASCISM AND RACISM ON THE INCREASE? 
221. Under the terms of this inquiry, we must consider whether fascism and 
racism are on the increase. 
There is no question of an increase in organized fascism. It ebbs and 
flows irregularly, with groups claiming innovation employing age-old 
tactics. The statistics available to us suggest that the number of 
militant members of right-wing extremist organizations decreased 
sharply during most of the seventies and is stable today although in 
some cases there has been a slight increase again. At all events, it 
represents an absolutely minute percentage of the population. 
222. At the same time, some extremist movements in certain countries have 
become more radical in both words and action and have sometimes 
resorted to terrorism. This trend should be seen in a general context 
of increased acceptance of verbal and sometimes physical violence and 
of more or less explicit tolerance of all forms of extremism. Although 
today there seems to have been a sharp decline in this tendency 
throughout the political spectrum, it did at the time trigger off a 
process, the effects of which are still felt and could flare up again 
sporadically. The radicalization of some groups, which sometimes 
distanced them from their parent movements, is a tendency peculiar to 
right-wing extremism for which the choice between legal participation 
and violent action is posed in particularly dramatic terms. The choice 
finally made by an individual or group cannot always be explained on 
purely strategic grounds and may have something to do with an internal 
ethical and political codeC259>. 
223. The most extremist groups find very Little sympathy amongst the 
electorate. The breakthrough by some groups hitherto practically 
unknown on the electoral scene is mainly due to exploitation of 
equivocal political topics, especially xenophobia, but it is not 
possible to assess at this stage the scope of the changes that such 
electoral swings could make. 
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224. The problems encountered do not seem to have had the effect of 
increasing opposition to the democratic system: in April 1985, 51% of 
Community citizens said they were satisfied with the way in which 
democracy functioned in their countries compared with 48% in September 
1973 (the percentage of dissatisfied citizens decreased from 56 in 1973 
to 45 in 1985)(260>. 
225. Xenophobia on the other hand is on the increase, insofar as an increase 
in intolerance towards certain non-Community immigrant groups can be 
discerned. This intolerance is displayed in different degrees of 
intensity towards different immigrant groups. It cannot be said that 
more or Less intolerance is shown according to whether the immigrant 
does not or does belong to a Community country. The manner in which 
each of these two categories of immigrant is treated under Community 
Law does not appear as yet to play a significant part in determining 
social attitudes in this way. 
226. The emergence of xenophobic tendencies certainly creates a fertile 
breeding ground for right-wing extremism and all formations that openly 
favour xenophobia. It should by no means be forgotten that the other 
political forces, in short-sightedly accommodating to the uncertainties 
of the electoral climate, frequently all too easily condone the 
expression of ill-suppressed xenophobic feelings in the political Life 
of the countries of Europe. A new type of spectre now haunts European 
politics: xenophobophilia. The term suits not only those who help to 
stir up xenophobic feelings so as to exploit them politically, but also 
those who, while disapproving of the emergence of xenophobic 
tendencies, nonetheless try to derive political gain therefrom. 
3. ACTION AGAINST FASCISM AND RACISM 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
227. Although fascism and racism have certain ideological traits in common 
and have often joined forces throughout history, they are nevertheless 
two distinct types of political and social behaviour. Different 
intellectual processes and different methods of resistance and combat 
are required to judge and control them even though in the Last 
analysis, such processes and methods are inspired by and find 
Legitimacy in the principle of democracy and respect for human rights. 
It will therefore be necessary in principle to consider each of these 
two concepts when describing the action taken against fascism and 
racism in contemporary Europe and the rest of the world. 
228. It will also be necessary to identify the action taken against fascism 
and racism at different Levels of contemporary political Life in 
Europe: at international, European, Community and national Level. 
These Levels are admittedly neither autonomous nor isolated. On the 
contrary, they are subject to increasing mutual interpenetration and 
interdependence partly because of the increasingly widespread and 
intense institutionalization of relations between European countries 
and partly because of the increasing interchange of ideas, political 
and social models and information between them. We will see how this 
interpenetration and interdependence increases the number of means of 
action available as well as their effectiveness. But at each Level 
action against fascism and racism is always devised and taken in the 
Light of the factors peculiar to it. That is particularly true at 
national Level where action by the state must also be taken into 
account. Our analysis and assessment will therefore cover each of the 
Levels mentioned. 
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3.2 THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION 
229. In relation to the subject of this inquiry, international action 
consists mainly of that taken by world-wide organizations: the United 
Nations Organization and specialized agencies. 
3.2.1 Racism and racial discrimination 
230. The United Nations Organization has been particularly energetic and 
active in promoting racial equality. The statutory authority for such 
action is the United Nations Charter, whose preamble proclaims the 
attachment of the contracting states to fundamental human rights and to 
the dignity and worth of man<261>. But it was after 1948 that the 
organization adopted a series of very important international texts: 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on 10 December 1948; the 
9 December 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide<262>; the United Nations Declaration on the 
Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination<263>; the 
International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial 
Discrimination of 21 December 1965<264>; the International CQvenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 16 December 1966(26~); the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 
16 December 1966(266) and the Optional Protocol thereto<267>; and 
the International Convention on the Elimination and Punishment of the 
Crime of Apartheid of 30 November 1973<268>. 
231. Four other conventions concluded under the auspices of specialized 
agencies should also be cited here. First of all, the International 
Labour Organization Convention No. 111 concerning discrimination in 
respect of employment and occupation<269>; Convention No. 97 
concerning migrant workers (revised in 1949)(270>; Convention No. 143 
concerning migrations in abusive conditions and the promotion of 
equality of opportunity and treatment of migrant workers<271>; and, 
Lastly, the Convention against discrimination in education adopted by 
the UNESCO General Conference<272>. 
232. Although these are the most important Legislative instruments adopted 
by the UN, ILO and UNESCO, they are not the only texts adopted by these 
organizations on the subject. The fight against various manifestations 
of racism and racial discrimination and efforts to achieve racial 
equality at world-wide Level have inspired an almost interminable 
series of acts adopted at the various Levels of these 
organizations<273>. 
233. The most important international instrument as regards the fight 
against racism and racial discrimination is still the 29 December 1965 
International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial 
Discrimination. Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 
29 December 1965 and opened for signature and ratification on 
7 March 1966, it entered into force on 4 January 1969. By August 1984, 
124 countries, including the Member States of the European Community, 
with the exception of Ireland5 and Spain and Portugal were contracting parties to the Convention<274 • 
234. The Convention is divided into a preamble and three sections: the first 
section (Articles 1 to 7> defines racial discrimination and Lists the 
basic obligations the contracting parties undertake to fulfil; the 
second section (Articles 8 to 16) deals with the mechanisms and 
measures for implementing the Convention; the third section 
(Articles 17 to 25) consists of the usual final clauses. 
WG(VS)/2441E/2464E 
- 67 - PE 97.547/fin. 
235. In this Convention, the term 'racial discrimination' means 'any 
distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, 
colour, descent or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or 
effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or 
exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of 
public life' (Article 1(1)). The Convention does not however apply to 
distinctions, exclusions, restrictions or preferences made by a state 
party to the Convention between citizens and non-citizens 
(Article 1(2)). 
236. Under this Convention the states parties undertake to eliminate racial 
discrimination in all its forms and promote understanding among all 
races (Article 2(1)); to 'prevent, prohibit and eradicate' apartheid in 
all territories under their jurisdiction (Article 3); to 'condemn all 
propaganda and all organizations which are based on ideas or theories 
of superiority of one race or group of persons of one colour or ethnic 
origin, or which attempt to justify or promote racial hatred and 
discrimination in any form' and to this end to declare punishable by 
law incitement to racial hatred and discrimination as well as acts 
aimed directly or indirectly against any race or group of another 
colour or ethnic origin, and to declare illegal and prohibit 
organizations and activities which incite racial discrimination 
<Article 4)(275); to guarantee racial equality before the law in the 
enjoyment of a series of fundamental rights (Article 5); to guarantee 
effective protection and remedies against racial discrimination 
(Article 6); and to adopt 'immediate and effective measures' in the 
fields of teaching, education, culture and information in order to 
promote the objectives of the Convention and respect of fundamental 
rights (Article 7)<276>. 
237. As regards implementing mechanisms, the states parties undertake to 
submit periodic reports, in principle every two years, on the action 
they have taken to·fulfil their obligations under the Convention 
(Article 9). These reports are examined by the Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination, consisting of 18 experts 'of high 
moral standing and acknowledged impartiality' elected from among the 
nationals of the states parties and serving in a personal capacity 
(Article 8(1) and (2)). The committee submits an annual report on its 
activities to the General Assembly of the United Nations 
<Article 9(2))<277). 
238. If a state party considers that another state party is not giving 
effect to the provisions of the Convention, it may bring the matter to 
the attention of the committee. The communication triggers off a 
procedure for conciliation and amicable settlement of the dispute 
(Articles 11 to 13). Under Article 14(1) a state party may declare 
that it recognizes the competence of the committee to receive and 
consider communications from individuals or groups of individuals 
within its jurisdiction claiming to be victims of a violation by that 
state party of any of the rights set forth in the Convention. The 
committee does not have competence to receive 'individual' 
communications unless at least 10 states parties are bound by the 
declaration provided for in Article 14(1). As the tenth declaration to 
this effect was deposited on 16 August 1982 by France, Article 14 of 
the Convention entered into force the same day<278>. 
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239. The system of national periodic reports and their examination by the 
committee ensures that implementation of the Convention is monitored to 
some extent. However, we should not overestimate its effectiveness. 
Reports are drawn up by national administrations and their content may 
vary considerably both as regards completeness of information and 
exactitude. Moreover, consideration of the reports by the committee is 
restricted not only by procedural and technical constraints but also by 
the geographical and therefore to some extent political composition of 
the committee<279). 
240. On the other hand, it should not be forgotten that the effectiveness of 
the Convention varies from one state to another depending on the system 
in force in each state party as regards the relationship between 
international treaties and national law. In states where such treaties 
are incorporated into national Law, the Convention becomes an integral 
part of the national Legal system. To the extent that its provisions 
are self-executing by nature, they may be invoked by private 
individuals before the national Legal and administrative authorities. 
On the other hand, in states that do not incorporate international 
treaties into their national Legal system, the Convention constitutes a 
source of international obligations for the state party in question but 
does not directly engender rights in the case of individuals. 
241. Other United Nations bodies or specialized agencies also deal with 
racial discrimination issues; for instance, in addition to the General 
Assembly, there is the Security Council, the Economic and Social 
Council, particularly the Commission on Human Rights, the Committee on 
Human Rights, the Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities, the Special Committee against Apartheid and 
bodies set up in specialized agencies such as ILO and UNESCO. 
3.2.2 Right-wing extremism and authoritarian regimes 
242. Although the United Nations and the specialized agencies are 
undoubtedly very active in combating racial discrimination - even if 
their action is characterized by a plethora of manifestations and acts 
that are not always coordinated and sometimes based on particularist 
political objectives -the organization does not show so much 
determination as regards authoritarian and in particular fascist 
ideologies and regimes. Although this may not be justifiable in terms 
of principle, it is understandable: being a world-wide organization, 
the UN has in its ranks all possible varieties of regime, including the 
hardest dictatorial and totalitarian regimes, ranging over the whole 
political spectrum. That is why its efforts to confront political 
extremism and the violation of democratic freedoms are confined to 
declarations from the General Assembly and other UN bodies condemning 
Nazism, fascism and their reappearances, as well as all 'totalitarian 
ideologies and practices' above all with regard to their racial 
aspects. But it seems that the presence of totalitarian regimes on the 
world political scene is not enough to provide concerted action in the 
UN. There is a basic contradiction in the Organization's attitude on 
this point: on the one hand a flood of texts in which it solemnly 
proclaims its attachment to fundamental freedoms including those 
inherent in a democratic society<281), and on the other its failure 
to act and be effective in the face of constant flagrant violations of 
those freedoms by a Large number of its member states. There is of 
course nothing new about this statement. But to repeat it in an 
analysis made by the European Parliament is a basic duty of political 
candour. 
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3.3 THE EUROPEAN DIMENSION 
243. By the European dimension of measures to combat fascism and racism we 
mean the action taken by and under the auspices of the Council of 
Europe. Action by the European Community will be dealt with 
separatelyC282>. 
The Council of Europe, an organization that currently brings together 
21 European states, including the ten Member States of the European 
Community, Spain and Portugal<283>, is particularly active in 
combating authoritarian doctrines and political regimes<284) as well 
as racism and racial discrimination. It takes action at five levels: 
Parliamentary Assembly, Committee of Ministers, machinery for 
protecting human rights, drawing up conventions and taking initiatives 
that provoke thought and debate. 
244. Between 1966 and 1984 the Parliamentary Assembly and the Committee of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted a series of acts 
(recommendationst resolutions and declarations) on the issues covered 
by our inquiry<2oS>. Particularly worthy of mention are the 
Parliamentary Assembly's resolution No. 743/1980 on the need to combat 
the reappearance of fascist propaganda and its racist aspects and the 
important explanatory statement by Mr Robert Krieps on which it is 
based<286>, as, too, the Parliamentary Assembly's recommendation 
968/1983 on xenophobic attitudes and movements in the member countries 
in regard to migrant workers<287>, based on a report by 
Mr R. Muller<28a>. 
245. The importance for the purposes of our inquiry of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (official title: European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms) as well as its 
control and disciplinary mechanisms<289) cannot be overemphasized. 
This convention is undoubtedly the most effective international 
instrument in the field of protection of fundamental rights. In its 
entirety, it constitutes a powerful means of action against 
authoritarian political tendencies and racial discrimination. But it 
also contains various provisions more directly geared towards those 
objectives: the conceP.t of 'democratic society' is one of its 
underlying principles<290>; as regards its application, Article 14 of 
the Convention prohibits any discrimination based, inter alia, on race, 
colour, Language, religion, political or other opinion, national origin 
or association with a national minority; it contains a series of 
clauses that enshrine the public liberties inherent in democracyC291) 
as well as the primacy of law<292>; and Lastly, it proclaims the 
principle of parliamentary democracyC293). 
246. The effectiveness of the European Convention on Human Rights is 
undoubtedly due to its institutional control and discipline machinery, 
composed mainly of the Commission and the European Court of Human 
Rights. Two types of petitions may be submitted to the Commission and, 
if necessary, the Court: a 'governmental' petition submitted by a 
contracting state against another contracting state and 'individual' 
petitions, the key-pin of the system. Thus, any person, 
non-governmental organization or group of individuals claiming to be 
the victim of a violation of one of the rights set forth in the 
Convention may submit a petition against the contracting state 
allegedly guilty of the violation. 'Individual' petitions thus 
guarantee the individual effective access to the system for protecting 
human rights. The weakness of the mechanism Lies in the fact that 
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complaints may be Lodged only against contracting states that have 
specifically declared that they recognize that the competence of the 
European Commission of Human Rights extends to individual petitions. 
However, it should be pointed out that all the Member States of the 
Community, except Greece, and also Spain and Portugal have made this 
declaration. 
247. The cases relating to democratic freedoms brought before the Strasbourg 
institutions have included: the 'Greek case' brought before the 
European Commission on Human Rights by Denmark~ Norway, Sweden and the 
Netherlands against the Greek military regime<~94>; the petitions 
presented by Denmark, France, Norway the Netherlands and Sweden 
against the Turkish military regime<~95>; the petition presented by 
the German Communist Party regarding its disbanding by a decree of the 
German Constitutional Court<296>; the petition by X against Italy 
concerning an attempt to re-establish the Fascist party<297>; the 
Glimmerveen and Hagenbeek petition against the Netherlands concerning 
. political activities connected with the Nederlandse Volksunie<298>. 
It is worth noting that in the Last three cases the Commission 
considered that the national authorities concerned were justified under 
the terms of the Convention in limiting the exercise of c~rtain 
freedoms on the grounds that such exercise was intended to 'destro~ th~_ 
rights and freedoms recognized in the ( ••• ) Convention• (Article 17 of 
the Convention). 'The purpose of Article 17', the Commission observes, 
'is to prevent totalitarian groups from being able to exploit the 
principles Laid down in the Convention for their own ends•<299>. The 
Glimmerveen and Hagenbeek case against the Netherlands, referred to 
above, is also of interest as regards the question of racial 
discrimination, which is also the subject of the petitions concerning 
the cases of East African Asians <citizens of the United Kingdom and 
the Colonies<300) against the United Kingdom, and the Abdulaziz 
Cabales and Balka Dali case against the United Kingdom<301, 3025. 
248. The Council of Europe has performed a considerable feat in drawing up a 
Long series of conventions on a variety of topics. Many of these 
agreements are of direct or indirect relevance to our inquiry. 
Particular mention should be made of the European Convention on the 
Legal Status of Migrant Workers<303>. 
249. The Council of Europe has also taken the initiative in organizing many 
debates and conferences and commissioning studies that are of direct or 
indirect relevan~e to our inquiry, such as the Conference on the 
Defence of Democracy against Terrorism in Europe - Tasks and problems 
(12-14 November 1980)(304) and the Conference on Intolerance in 
Europe <9-11 December 1980)(305>, the colloquy on the human rights of 
aliens in Europe <17-19 October 1983)<306) and the meeting on 'aliens 
in Europe: a threat or an asset?' (20-21 March 1984)<307>. 
3.4 THE COMMUNITY DIMENSION 
250. Any attempt to outline the action of the European Communities in the 
areas covered by the inquiry immediately raises the question of the 
demarcation of Community competence: on first sight, the Community's 
sphere of activity as defined by the Treaties does not seem to refer 
directly to subjects such as measures to combat right-wing extremism or 
racism. Former Commission Member, Mr Ivor Richard, dwelt at Length on 
this aspect of the problem when addressing our Committee<308>. 
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251. There are two questions to answer as regards Community action in areas 
of interest to our inquiry: Has the Community taken any such action? 
Has the Community the power, and if so to what extent, to extend its 
action in order to tackle problems caused by the existence of 
right-wing extremist and racist tendencies in the Member States? We 
will try to answer the first question in this part of the report. The 
second question, on the prospects for future Community action, will be 
dealt with in Part 4 of the report<309). 
3.4.1 Right-wing extremism 
252. The European Community is an organization of states based on the 
principles of democracy, primacy of law and respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms. These principles which are merely outlined 
in very general terms in the preamble to the Treaty establishing the 
European Economic Community! have frequently been reaffirmed by the 
various Community bodies<31u>. 
253. Being a member of the Community presupposes that the state in question 
is democratic. This principle has been confirmed twice: firstly 1 in 
the Community's attitude in the case of two countries, Greece<311) 
and Turkey<312) that aspired to membership and were Linked to the 
Community by association agreements when they fall under the rule of 
authoritarian regimes; and secondly, in the wording of the Commission's 
opinion on the accession of Greece, which makes democracy a 
prerequisite for membership of the Community<313>. 
254. Many acts done by the European Council, the European Parliament, the 
Council and the Commission<314>, as well as major decisions of the 
Court of Justice of the European Communities<315), confirm the 
Community's att~chment to the principles of pluralist democracy, the 
primacy of Law and fundamental rights. A distinction must be made 
here: firstly, Community action must be consistent with democratic 
principles and respect for fundamental rights. Democratic principles 
and fundamental rights are an integral part of the Community Legal 
system and their violation by a Community act makes that act illegal. 
Secondly, the Member States too must act in accordance with the 
principles of democracy and guarantee fundamental rights. This is a 
prerequisite for, and a consequence of, membership of the Community. 
We therefore have good reasons for concluding that the Community, as an 
international organization as well as a group of states, is in essence 
opposed to any extremist or authoritarian political tendency. 
3.4.2 Racism and racial discrimination 
255. The Community's attachment to democratic principles and respect for 
fundamental rights determines its attitude to race relations. Legally 
bound to conform to the principles set out in the European Convention 
on Human Rights and the constitutional traditions of the Member 
States<316>, the Community must plainly avoid any racial 
discrimination in its activities<317>. But more than avoidance is 
required. Its task is also positive and must be expressed in policies 
geared to more full and more effective racial equality in the areas 
covered by the Treaties<318>. In its claim for greater powers, the 
European Parliament has frequently used all the forms of expression 
available to it to take a stand against signs of racism in the 
Community and outside and in favour of attitudes and action to promote 
racial harmony. 
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256. In the Council and Commission, Community action centres mainly on the 
problem of immigrants. Having already adopted various measures on 
behalf of migrant workers<319J in the past, the Community now seems 
ready to pursue a broader and more systematic policy on the subject. 
In its communication to the Council entitled 'Guidelines for a 
Community policy on migration•<320), the Commission outlined an 
action programme for migrant workers in which it accorded priority to 
migrants who were nationals of the Member States but also proposed 
measures that dealt with the whole question of migration. This 
important document was debated at Length by the European Parliament on 
the basis of the report by Mrs F. Marinaro, and her motion for a 
resolution was adopted by a large majority<321>. Following this, on 
16 June 1985, the Council adopted a resolution defining the policy it 
intended to follow<322). Subsequently the Commission adopted a 
decision on 8 July 1985, pursuant to Article 118 of the EEC Treaty, 
initiating a procedure of prior notification and consultation on 
migration policies in regard to non-Member States<323). This move by 
the Commission has come up against the objections of certain Member 
States who have disputed its justification in Community Law before the 
Court of Justice. 
257. Nevertheless the Community does not seem to have used to the full its 
powers in areas covered by this inquiry. The European Parliament, like 
the main para-Community structures such as the European Council and the 
European political cooperation machinery, is undoubtedly entitled to 
widen its scope for action on the subject. But even the main 
decision-making institutions, i.e. the Council and the Commission, can 
obtain wide margins for manoeuvre by interpreting the texts defining 
their powers in terms of purpose, if necessary creating implicit powers 
before considering amendment of the Treaties. We will deal with this 
subject in Part 4 of the report<324). 
3.5 NATIONAL DIMENSION 
3.5.1 Introduction 
258. It is obviously impossible to provide a complete List in this report of 
the institutional measures and mechanisms in force in Europe in the 
areas covered by our inquiry. They are many and varied. They touch on 
many branches of Law and are part of national legal systems, each of 
which has its own peculiar characteristics and structure. A 
comparative-Law study of such range has no place in a parliamentary 
report, especially when it must cover a much wider range of topics and 
had to be drafted in an extremely short time. The rapporteur therefore 
intends to outline the situation summarily and selectively and make 
some general comments, to be followed by recommendations<325). 
3.5.2 Right-wing extremism 
259. Measures for coping with extremist political tendencies vary widely 
according to the Legal systems of the European country in which they 
are adopted. There are at least four reasons for these differences: 
firstly, historical reasons valid for countries in which Nazism and 
fascism have in the past been not only the dominant ideology but also a 
form of power; secondly, legal reasons which find expression in the 
legislative concepts and customs as well as the fundamental structures 
of the national legal system; thirdly, the scale of the problem in the 
country in question; and fourthly, political reasons, in other words 
the considerations that determine options and priorities amongst the 
means to be used. 
WG(VS)2464/2441E - 73 - PE 97.547/fin. 
260. From the point of view of content, the institutional mechanisms can be 
identified at several levels: first of all, there are legal systems 
that still have preventive and punitive mechanisms specifically 
designed to combat contemporary forms of fascism and Nazism. At the 
other end of the scale are legal systems with vague provisions against 
any form of political extremism that is incompatible with the 
democratic order or threatens it. Looking at it another way, there are 
legal systems that make more or less wide use of the means afforded by 
criminal law and others that merely introduce purely administrative or 
civil sanctions. A third distinction should be made as regards control 
and sanction mechanisms: they may be judicial or administrative but, as 
a general rule, national legislators prefer to use both these types of 
mechanisms simultaneously, as much for political reasons as because of 
constitutional constraints. 
261. The first category of Legal rules relating to right-wing extremism 
embraces provisions concerning the democratic nature of political 
formations and in particular political parties. For example: Article 1 
of the Basic Law (1949) of the Federal Republic of Germany (internal 
organization of parties in accordance with democratic principles, 
conformity with free and democratic fundamental order), the XIIth 
transitional and final provision of the Constitution of the Italian 
Republic (prohibiting the fascist party) and Article 49 of the same 
Constitution (creation of parties to contribute towards defining 
national policy in accordance with democratic methods), Article 29(1) 
of the (1975) Greek Constitution (the organization and activities of 
political parties must contribute to the untrammelled functioning of 
the democratic regime) and Article 6 of the Spanish Constitution (the 
parties are the expression of political pluralism, they may be freely 
created and freety carry out their activities in compliance with the 
Constitution and the law, and their internal structure and fuctioning 
must be democratic). There are no implementing mechanisms for some of 
the provisions concerning the democratic nature of political parties, 
which therefore remain a kind of imperfect law. On the other hand, 
others are backed up by penalty procedures. Article 21(2) of the Basic 
Law of Germany for instance provides that parties may be dissolved by a 
decree of the Federal Constitutional Court for infringement of the 
Constitution. Similarly, Italian Law (Law No. 645 of 20 June 1952) 
provides for legal sanctions against political formations that are 
regarded as attempts to recreate the fascist party<326). 
262. National provisions governing the Legality of associations of every 
kind are also applicable. Under these provisions public Legal or 
administrative authorities may declare associations with aims in 
conflict with the Law and constitutional democratic principles, as well 
as paramilitary groups, to be illegal. There is for instance the 
Belgian Law of 29 July 1934 (prohibition of private militias), the 
French Law of 30 January 1936 (dissolution of combat groups and private 
militias), Articles 18 and 19 of the Irish Law (1939) on offences 
against the state, Article 9(2) of the German Basic Law<327) 
Article 46 of the Portuguese Constitution (prohibition of military or 
paramilitary associations or associations claiming to draw their 
inspiration from fascist ideology) and Article 22(2) of the Spanish 
Constitution (prohibition of secret or paramilitary associations). 
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263. Criminal law is a powerful means of combating right-wing extremism. In 
most of the European legal systems, recourse is merely had to the 
pertinent general penal Law provisions, for instance provisions 
governing breach of public order or participation in the activities of 
prohibited associations. Anti-terrorist Legislation also allows for 
prosecution and prevention. Some national Legal systems have however 
developed penal mechanisms tailored to the special characteristics of 
the offending situation. The most striking example is to be found in 
the law of the Federal Republic of Germany. 
Under various penal code provisions (particularly Articles 84 et seq.), 
a series of activities typical of extremist groups, including 
participation in the activities of prohibited organizations, the 
production and distribution of extremist propaganda and the use of Nazi 
and fascist emblems<328) are deemed to be punishable offences. 
264. To democratic regimes, the institutional - Legal, judicial, 
administrative - system is an important method of defence against the 
dangers of political extremism. It should be made the subject of 
systematic comparative studies by national and European institutions on 
a country by country basis. The European Parliament should play a full 
and active role here, as we suggest below<329>. 
3.5.3 Racism and racial discrimination 
265. The Laws of almost all the Member States of the European Community 
contain general clauses, in principle of a constitutional nature, 
prohibiting discrimination based on race. Moreover, as contracting 
parties to the European Convention on Human Rights, and possibly 
international conventions on fundamental rights, they have commited 
themselves in one way or another to bring their Laws into line with the 
principles of racial equality enshrined in those Conventions. 
266. 
267. 
268. 
At all events, relatively recently legislators in the countries of 
Europe introduced into their respective Legal systems special laws or 
provisions aimed at penalizing different forms of racial discrimination 
and incitement to racial hatred and at promoting racial equality more 
and more effectively and fully. The main reason for these legislative 
initiatives is the fact that the countries concerned have acceded to 
the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination. As we have seen<330), this Convention requires the 
states parties to take two types of measures: firstly, to make a series 
of racist or racially discriminatory acts punishable under criminal law 
and secondly, to create conditions conducive to racial harmony and 
equality in their territory. 
We shall not repeat here the international undertakings given by 
European countries for combating racial discrimination<331) or the 
different repercussions they have had on the national law<332>, 
which, it must be said, differ from country to country. This part of 
the report will deal exclusively with national Legislative provisions 
and state machinery. 
Protection against racial discrimination and incitement to racial 
hatred may be based on the provisions of common constitutional, or on 
civil, administrative or penal Law. Thus constitutional or civil 
provisions on respect due to human beings or on the right to 
personality as well as penal protection of the honour of persons alive 
or dead may be applied to cases of racial discrimination. It is 
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269. 
270. 
271. 
nevertheless a fact that there is a marked need for special provisions 
directly geared to the issue of race relations. To meet this need, but 
at the same time in order to fulfil the undertakings contracted by 
virtue of the International Convention on the Elimination of ALL Forms 
of Racial Discrimination, Legislators in the countries of Europe have 
adopted a series of Legislative acts: the Law of 18 February 1971 
amending certain provisions of the Penal Code <Netherlands); 
Law No. 72-546 of 1 July 1972 on measures to combat racism (France); 
Article 266 b of the Penal Code amended in 1971 (Denmark>; Law No. 654 
of 13 October 1975 (Italy>; the Race Relations Act (United Kingdom, 
1976)<333>; Law No. 927/1979, supplemented by Law No. 1419/1984 
(Greece); the Law of 9 August 1980 adding new Articles 454 and 455 to 
the Penal Code (Luxembourg); the Law of 30 July 1981 on the punishment 
of certain acts inspired by racism and xenophobia (Belgium); and 
Articles 130 and 131 of the Penal Code (Federal Republic of Germany). 
Under this special Legislation against racism and racial 
discrimination, regulations have been introduced that in some cases 
cover several areas. Its main objective however is to impose penal 
sanctions on manifestations of racism, incitement to racial hatred and 
cases of racial discrimination. Some of these Laws provide that such 
offences may not be prosecuted unless the injured person or group of 
persons Lodges a complaint. Others allow for automatic prosecution by 
the Public Prosecutor's Office. Article 5 - II of the French Law cited 
above authorizes associations whose intention to combat racism is 
declared in their statute, to exercise under certain conditions, the 
recognized rights of a civil party in the case of certain offences. 
Article 5 of the Belgian Law cited above extends this provision to 
associations that declare in their statutes their intention of 
defending human rights. It should be noted that the committee provided 
for in the International Convention on the Elimination of ALL Forms of 
Racial Discrimination verifies whether such Legislationis consistent 
with the undertakings given by the individual states when ratifying the 
Convention. 
The mere existence of Legislation obviously does not mean that the 
solutions it affords are applied in practice. Attainment of the 
Legislative objectives depends to a Large extent on the attitude of the 
administrative authorities whose duty it is to implement the provisions 
in question and also on the interpretation given by the judge. Several 
of our experts have pointed out that despite the Legislators' 
intervention, which in itself has been effective, racial discrimination 
still to some extent pervades daily Life(334>. 
In addition to Legislative measures and the ordinary administrative and 
judicial machinery for implementing them, specialized national 
institutions have been created specifically to cope with the problem of 
race relations. The most important example is the Commission on Racial 
Equality created in 1976 in the United Kingdom under the 1976 Race 
Relations Act. The task of this Commission is to work towards 
eliminating discrimination, promote equal opportunities and the 
establishment of good relations between people of different racial 
groups, monitor application of the Race Relations Act and, where 
necessary, propose amendments to that Act. The Commission's activities 
cover several areas of social Life and it is authorized to open 
enquiries into situations allegedly involving racial 
discrimination<335>. 
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3.5.4 General remarks 
272. One characteristic of national action at institutional level is the 
increased involvement of the Legislator. Although the legal system of 
any particular country may have shortcomings or gaps as regards racial 
equality, or allows racially discriminatory situations to continue 
either overtly or Latently, it is nevertheless a fact that the 
institutional achievement of the Community Member States is generally 
satisfactory. Resolute efforts must however be made to continue this 
work and to draw constantly on the accumulating experience whilst 
ensuring that all those concerned can participate in the dialogue which 
is the basis of this process<336). 
273. Having said that, we must neither over-estimate nor under-estimate the 
part played by the Law and the legal machinery. It must be borne in 
mind, first of all, that any measure, whether negative or positive, to 
eliminate racial discrimination in a democratic regime must be based on 
a rule of law. From this point of view, the law constitutes an 
essential and omnipresent instrument. But it must also carry out 
another function, preventing and punishing extremist, racist or 
racially discriminatory behaviour. Two points must be taken into 
account here : firstly, suppression of political extremism and racism 
must not overstep the limits of the liberty that a democratic regime 
guarantees to persons under its jurisdiction<337>. Suppression of 
forces that threaten democracy must not diminish that very democracy 
which is the essence of politics in Europe. We must beware of using 
preventive measures and 'homeopathic' remedies that end up depriving 
democracy of that very political salubrity we intend to protect. 
Secondly, in combating political extremism and racism which is an 
eminently political task for our democratic society and which therefore 
takes the form of intellectual confrontation between democratic and 
anti-democratic forces, recourse should be had to the suppressive 
function of the law only as a final resort<338>. Nevertheless, the 
suppressive function of the Law will have an important role to play in 
this context<339). Definition of that role hinges on finding a 
delicate balance between safeguarding fundamental freedoms and measures 
to cope with behaviour that takes advantage of those freedoms in order 
to destroy them<340). 
3.6 EDUCATION - CIVIC EDUCATION 
274. In a recent speech, the French Minister for Education, 
Mr Jean-Pierre Chevenement, recalled Montesquieu•s statement that 'it 
is republican government that needs all the power of education ••• 
political virtue is self-abnegation, which is always very painful 
only in democracies is government in the hands of each citizen. But 
government is like everything else in the world: to preserve it, we 
must love it ••• everything depends on creating such a Love in the 
republic, and education must take care to inspire such Love<341>. In 
fact everyone agrees that education is undoubtedly the best way in 
which to eliminate the seeds of racism and intolerance from a society 
and to give its citizens the intellectual and moral means of deciding 
freely and rationally. Development of a national democratic conscience 
and ability to resist fascist and, more generally, totalitarian 
temptations, depends on the quality of the education system. The 
education system of a contemporary democratic society must be based on 
values that stem from respect for human dignity, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. It must try to apply those values in its 
structures and organization as well as in the content of its teaching 
and its pedagogical methods<342>. 
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275. The problem of tackling fascist and racist phenomena arises at 
different Levels of education, as discussed by the Committee: 
(a) The anti-discriminatory objective of schools and the equal 
opportunities they are intended to provide form an integral part of 
the European democratic heritage. Even though schools fail all too 
often in their objectives, reaffirming them and trying to attain 
them go a Long way towards establishing a climate of confidence in 
the social institutions. 
(b) The fight against fascist and racist temptations is also part of 
the general context of education which must not distort the picture 
of foreigness, their past history or present culture nor propagate 
discriminatory stereotypes (as for instance of the position of 
women as it has been and sometimes still is presented in readers), 
but must provide the historical, scientific, Literary and 
philosophical background that will enable pupils and students to 
form their own opinions and absorb the values that govern the Life 
of a democratic society. 
(c) The question of specific instruction in democracy and human values, 
both personal and social, that permits construction of a free, open 
and non-discriminatory society crops up in this context. In the 
countries of Europe, it has taken the form of instruction in 
various subjects that have been gradually marginalized if they were 
not so from the outset. However, there has been a revival of 
interest in civic education in the broad sense of the term, i.e. 
including instruction in the basic rules of social Life, initiation 
into political and social macro-mechanisms, awareness of human 
rights and, for the countries of the Community, knowledge of the 
history and principles of European construction and Community 
mechanisms<343>. 
276. These different aspects of education have found expression in texts 
adopted by international institutions. Article 26(2) of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights states that 'education shall be directed to 
the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening 
of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote 
understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or 
religious groups, and shall further the activities of the United 
Nations for the maintenance of peace'. Article 13(1) of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 
16 December 1966 stipulates that 'the States parties to the present 
Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an education' and repeats 
the principles enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
The United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of ALL Forms of 
Racial Discrimination mentions education as one of the areas ~here 
special efforts will be made to prevent discrimination based on race, 
colour or ethnic origin <Article 3(1)). Article 8 of the same 
declaration states that all effective measures will be taken 
immediately in the fields of teaching, education and information in 
order to eliminate discrimination and racial prejudice and promote 
understanding, tolerance and friendship among nations and racial 
groups. The same principles are Listed in Article 7 of the 
International Convention on the Elimination of ALL Forms of Racial 
Discrimination which was adopted on 21 December 1965 and entered into 
force on 4 January 1969<344>. UNESCO is the international 
institution most directly concerned with educational issues. 
Article 1(2){b) of its Constituent Act invited the organization 
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gradually to attain the ideal of equal educational opportunities for 
all without distinction as regards race, sex or economic or social 
situation. Its activities in this field Led to the 14 December 1960 
Convention against Discrimination in Education and the 1974 
recommendation on education for understanding, cooperation and 
international peace and instruction in human rights and fundamental 
freedoms<345>. UNESCO also organizes important seminars and round 
tables. The round table organized in Geneva from 5 to 9 November 1979 
on education relating to problems of racial discrimination is worthy of 
mention. Most of the participants had stressed that education as 
regards racism should take greater account of the social context, help 
dominated groups to resist violation of their rights and be Linked to 
human rights teaching. 
277. Following the Directive of the Council of the European Community of 
25 July 1977 (77/486) on the education of the children of migrant 
workers for whom school attendance is compulsory<346) and various 
international agreements on transfers of manpower, several European 
countries with a large immigrant population included teaching of the 
language and culture of the country of origin in their curricular or 
extra-curricular activities. This provision is particularly important 
in the intra-Community context since in France, for instance, 50% of 
Italian children or children with Italian parents Living there 
currently follow such courses<347>. 
278. From the Committee's discussions, particularly the submission by the 
representative of the foreign workers and migration service of the 
Belgian province of Limbourg, and from documents received, it was 
possible to identify some of the problems currently encountered in 
defining an education policy that ensures training in democracy and 
non-discrimination in a multi-cultural context: 
(a) An overall educational policy : the Limburg service representative 
stressed that minority cultures and intercommunal democracy should 
be introduced not only in classes and regions with a Large 
proportion of children from cultural minorities but in all classes 
and regions since such instruction should ease communication in all 
social situations. It was not certain that this aspect was fully 
incorporated into the education policies of various European 
countries. 
(b) Language teaching: mastery of a Language is essential as a means 
of communicating and obtaining equal opportunities. The relative 
merits of the different teaching systems were still being 
discussed: basic education in the mother-tongue, immediate 
immersion in the Language of the host country, supplementary 
courses in the mother-tongue or the language of the host country. 
In fact, the grounds for such discussions more or Less disappear as 
the flow of immigrants diminishes, but Large areas of linguistic 
ignorance nevertheless remain to constitute a potential source of 
difficulties and tension<348). 
(c) The problem of the increase in xenophobic feelings and racism in 
schools was also brought up<349>. There were many reports of 
signs of contempt and fear as well as of hostility in the face of 
competition that was deemed to be unfair in a world where the fear 
of unemployment is already a burden on the adolescent. It was 
absolutely essential for teachers to pay attention to daily signs 
of hostility and discrimination. 
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279. The principles of these three aspects of education are known in all the 
Community countries. Their application is more or Less urgent and 
difficult, according to the size and diversity of the various cultural 
and ethnic groups Living in one area and the tensions that may arise. 
There is a wealth of Literature on the subject of education in a 
multi-cultural context which highlights the numerous difficulties of 
principle and practice<350). 
280. Of the various national campaigns now under way, mention should be made 
of the measures taken in the United Kingdom following the Swann 
report: consideration of ethnic diversity throughout the country in 
teacher-training courses, support for research projects in educational 
science and for Local initiatives, the compilation of statistics on the 
problems and successes of various ethnic communities<351). France, 
for its part, decided in September 1981 to create priority education 
areas (ZEP) in social settings where educational failures had been 
particularly marked. The ZEP are meant to combat discrimination by 
providing better material resources and allowing teachers to draw up 
educational programmes that take account of the realities of the area 
in question<352>. Again in France, the Ecole Nationale de La 
Magistrature provides courses on the control of racism and on human 
rights. In the FRG, prevention of racial hatred and totalitarian 
ideologies is in the hands of political education centres which are 
partly financed by the Federal Government and the Lander and controlled 
by them<353>. In the Netherlands, schools provide courses on world 
history, brochures are published and various initiatives organized for 
ethnic minorities<354>. In Italy, the Ministry of Education includes 
civic education in teacher-training courses and encourages research 
programmes in the field of human rights and racial discrimination. 
Various societies such as the Societa italiana per L'organizzazione 
internazionale (SIOI) help to keep the public informed(355). Belgium 
promotes Language training for the children of migrant workers<356). 
The other Community countries have also introduced various specific 
measures<357). 
281. Thus, while the role of education is absolutely essential to the 
formation of democratic conscience, the education systems of the 
different European countries are confronted with enormous challenges. 
It should be noted that, apart from the specific problems mentioned 
above, the success of the education system as a whole determines to a 
very Large extent the Likelihood of new extremist or xenophobic 
outbursts. A society whose education system is undergoing a serious 
crisis risks rapid degeneration into a 'dog-eat-dog' society or one in 
which radical solutions are sought. In such a context, it would be 
spurious to increase civic education unless care were taken 
simultaneously to improve general education and the chances of success 
afforded by it. 
3.7 INFORMATION MEDIA 
282. The moral responsibility of the news media in the prevention of fascist 
and racist phenomena is often discussed at Length. The press and 
audio-visual sectors are generally credited with providing 
opportunities for extending one's horizons and arousing curiosity and 
respect for alien cultures. As Mr Krieps said(358), they play the 
role of a historical memory bank, as evidenced by the showing of 
Holocaust and the discussion it occasioned. They also allow the 
democratic debate full range by organizing forums and debates. 
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283. Nevertheless, serious criticism is Levelled at them for presenting the 
external world in a way that often favours dominant social cultures. 
Frequent dramatization of the news distorts reality and runs the risk 
of creating contempt, misunderstanding and animosity. Information 
about minorities is quite often biased, dwelling at Length on the 
misdemeanours of some members of minority groups, giving poor coverage 
to the problems of such communities and ignoring almost all their 
achievements. The problem gets even worse when presentation of current 
events damages the image of the country of origin (a point on which 
Iranian refugees, for instance, have particularly strong feelings). 
Lastly, by giving sensational coverage to acts of violence, and star 
billing to their perpetrators, plus the type of fiction sometimes 
broadcast, the media could develop a culture of violence that could 
foster a sort of unhealthy fascination. 
284. Yves Michaud's comment on this is that the interdependence of violence 
and its representation is obviously not new. Violence does not consist 
merely of neutralizing the adversary and causing damage, it serves as a 
warning and a threat and bodes ill for those who are still unscathed. 
But no matter how much of an effort was made, the picture presented was 
always vague and cloudy, depending on rumours and reports of rumours. 
Increased scope for communication and the mastery that can be achieved 
by manipulating it have radically changed the situation<359>. It is 
obvious that media coverage has become one of the main incentives to 
further terrorism. A professional code of ethics on the reporting of 
acts of violence is sometimes called for. Consideration undoubtedly 
still has to be given to controlling the effects of some types of 
news. In its resolution of 1 October 1980 on the need to combat the 
reappearance of fascist propaganda and its racist aspects, the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe drew the attention of 
journalists and representatives of the mass media to their 
responsibility as regards the publication of news of a type that could 
foster racist and elitist reactions (paragraph 7)<360>. In our view, 
this appeal should apply not to the dissemination of news as such but 
to its selection and manipulation since they may incite racial 
intolerance and hatred. 
285. It is difficult to assess the value of all media activity in the area 
of concern to us or describe the way in which it continues to form the 
democratic conscience of a country. The unpredictability of news and 
the way it is handled, differences between audiences and their 
perception of news, mean that media activities must by their nature be 
equivocal. 
3.8 ORGANIZED SOCIAL REACTION 
286. In the post-war period, it was frequently remarked that there had been 
little social reaction to the increase in fascism and anti-semitic and 
racist tendencies. In many European countries ad hoc groups then 
sprang up anxious to prevent and if necessary counteract any 
recrudescence of such ideologies and movements. There is a distinction 
to be drawn between the action of such groups, the political reaction 
by democratic parties and the reaction of the state, by which we mean 
both the legislative apparatus and administrative action. 
287. The action of organized groups against intolerance and discrimination 
does not however date from the immediate post-war period: the assertion 
of democratic rights and principles against arbitrary nationalist 
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prejudices found archetypal expression at the time of the Dreyfus 
affair whose repercussions were felt well beyond the borders of 
France. The Human Rights League and the International League Against 
Anti-semitism (LICRA) were created as a result of this incident. 
Political, state and social reactions vary widely in form and effect 
from one country to another depending on the country's history and any 
remaining threats to its democratic system. Resistance groups to 
post-war European dictatorships, in Greece, Spain, Portugal and Turkey, 
merit special mention here. 
288. Throughout its proceedings, the Committee had direct or indirect 
contacts with several organizations that work to preserve the lessons 
Learned from events in the pre-war and war-time periods. Although we 
by no means intend to give a complete List, mention can be made of the 
Mouvement contre le Racisme et pour L'Amiti~ entre les Peuples (MRAP, 
France), the Mouvement contre Le Racisme, L'Antis~mitisme et La 
X~nophobie (MRAX, Belgium), foundations and documentation centres such 
as the Anne France Stichting (Netherlands), the Dokumentationsarchiv 
des Oesterreichischen Wilerstandes (Austria) and the F~d~ration 
Internationale des Resistants as well as many resistants' and 
ex-servicemen's associations. The task of many of these movements has 
broadened and changed with the passage of time, especially at the time 
of decolonization and then the arrival of Large numbers of foreign 
workers in some Community countries. At the same time and since, very 
many associations to assist immigrants and combat xenophobia were set 
up. The Committee has for instance received documents and reports from 
the Runnymede Trust (United Kingdom), the Minority Rights Group, 
several Belgian associations, some official (Vlaamse Overleg Comite 
over Migratie - VOCOM), other private (Ligue des Familles, Caritas 
Catholica) and numerous specialized and Local associations, which 
sometimes have an overall coordinating structure (as is the case of the 
Fed~ration des Associations de Soutien aux Travailleurs Immigr~s -
FAST! - in France). The network of defence and monitoring associations 
and action committees is particularly dense in the United Kingdom where 
a periodical (Searchlight) exclusively concerned with right-wing 
extremism is also published. The Churches also play an important role 
in the countries concerned by supporting migrant communities and 
issuing reminders of the principles of fundamental rights and human 
dignity<361>. 
289. Questions have been asked about the political colour of these 
associations ever since they were set up. Many of them in fact have 
Links with political parties and movements. Although that by no means 
discredits their action, there is nevertheless a dilemma : a 
consensual, Little-politicized strategy could well be founded on flimsy 
and changeable principles; a more directly political message is perhaps 
more coherent but the audience will be smaller and the message more 
controversial. For all that, two new developments have taken place in 
recent years that have enriched the debate. The first is the 
development of groups socially active in the human rights field. These 
groups may take various forms (Amnesty International, the International 
Commission of Juriots, committees to monitor compliance with the 
Helsinki accords, L'Action des Chretiens pour L'Abolition de La Torture 
and the Internationale Gesellschaft fur Menschenrechte), but they all 
help to increase awareness of the concept of human rights and thus of 
democracy. The second new development is the gradual abolition of the 
implicit distinction made in past decades between 'protected 
communities' and 'protective' associations. The phenomenon that 
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Francois Gaspard and Claude Servan-Schreiber rightly called the 'end of 
the immigrants', in other words real integration of immigrant 
communities into the social and cultural fabric of the host country, 
has had a lot to do with it. The social reaction is thus more diverse 
and more widespread than it was before. 
290. The merging of these two trends - consensus on specific matters and 
general involvement transcending political divisions- probably 
explains the form of an association such as SOS - Racism whose rapid 
growth in many European countries bears witness to changes in public 
op1n1on. An exchange of views between members of the Committee and the 
association's French and Belgian representatives revealed that opinions 
sometimed differed on what form organized social action should take 
today, particularly the relations it should have with political action 
and movements. Be that as it may, the current success of initiatives 
such as those taken by SOS - Racism once again shows that social 
reaction to extremist ideologies and movements has always depended very 
much on the overall cultural climate. 
3.9 CULTURAL ACTION 
291. In fact, the debate about racism and fascism has never been merely 
political; it has also been cultural and even literary from the 
outset. It is concerned with human feelings, representation of the 
past, the power of rhetoric and the use of symbols. Although this is a 
constant factor in all political debate, it is much more marked in the 
case of movements and ideologies that make a virtue of irrationality. 
292. The cultural fight against fascist leanings is almost always organized 
around the figure of the intellectual whose identity has been shaped by 
the philosophy of the enlightenment that inspired modern European 
culture, by political romanticism, by the legacy of the Dreyfus affair 
and by neo-Kantian currents. In the traditional view of writers such 
as Charles Peguy or Julien Benda the intellectual does not intervene in 
the political and social field because of some technical competence but 
because of the responsibility he feels he has for bearing witness to 
certain timeless values. Whereas cultural expressions of fascism give 
preference to might over right and to historical particularism over the 
universal, the intellectual 'joins the resistance' prompted by a 
conviction which Pascal shared that 'it is a strange and long war in 
which violence tries to suppress the truth. Whatever violence can do, 
it cannot blunt the truth, it merely serves to enhance it further. All 
the light of truth can do nothing to stem violence, it merely adds fuel 
to the flames. When force is pitted against force, the more powerful 
destroys the weaker; arguments that are true and convincing confound 
and dispel those that are nothing but vanity and lies•<362>. 
293. Before the war, this 'humanist' tradition nurtured the anti-fascist 
protests of such different personalities as Thomas Mann, Robert Musil, 
Stefan Zweig, Andre Gide, Georges Bernanos, Miguel de Unamuno and many 
others. After the second world war, the leading anti-fascist figures 
not only had the same preoccupation as their predecessors but also 
those inspired by Marxist logic, Christian personalism, decolonization 
movements and a new European concept of democracy. These influences 
are to be found, in various forms, in Jean-Paul Sartre's Reflexions sur 
la Question Juive, in the works of Heinrich Boll and Albert Camus and 
in periodicals such as Esprit in France and Cuadernos para el dialogo 
in Spain. However, at the same time, a feel1ng of some 1mpat1ence 
arose at the rather automatic nature of the rhethoric that passed for 
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anti-fascism; the criticism levelled by Plato at Socrates when speaking 
of his meeting with poets and artisans is relevant here : 'Because each 
was perfect master of his art he considered himself to be perfectly 
wise in all other matters, including the most important.' The 
anti-racist reaction then looked for support amongst 'professionals' 
such as scientists meeting under the auspices of UNESCO, mainly 
biologists and anthropologists. Theories of political action and of 
democracy also became more positive, drawing extensively on American 
political science research (Robert Dahl, Charles Lindblom, 
Sidney Verba, etc.)<363>, and turned more towards studies of the 
functioning and disfunctioning of the democratic order. 
294. Lastly, under the shock of the anti-Stalinist reaction and then Later 
of the discovery of the 'voices from under the ruins' (East European 
dissidents, especially Solzhenitsyn), the anti-fascist intellectual 
gradually changed into an anti-totalitarian intellectual. This is 
undoubtedly the most positive achievement of the post-war intellectual 
adventure: the struggle for human dignity is an undivided struggle, it 
snaps its fingers at political, religious, social and national Labels; 
it is waged on all fronts, far and near; the personal responsibility of 
each and every one is entirely committed, without any possible refuge, 
pretext or mitigation. This message undoubtedly deserves to be passed 
on to the entire politicl body and social body. 
4. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS - RECOMMENDATIONS 
4.1 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 
295. The Committee's terms of reference en)oln it to examine 'means of 
combating' fascist and racist groups. The tenor of the Committee's 
proceedings and the analysis contained in the preceding pages induce us 
to give a broad interpretation to this aspect of our brief and to 
examine the means of combating both the various aspects of the 
phenomena of fascism and racism and those factors which contribute to 
their perseverance, and occasionally growth. 
296. The 'means', as we have seen, can and do take various forms. Fascist 
and racist groups, both in their activities and their ideology, 
represent specific dangers which we have assessed above. The armoury 
of defence against these dangers, on the Lines already suggested in the 
discussion of legal means, should be constantly enriched and improved. 
Some of the recommendations which follow will deal with this. 
297. It must nevertheless be said that, throughout our inquiry, these groups 
have been often revealed not so much as the causes of particular social 
ills but as symptoms of these. This can be observed at two levels: 
firstly, in that some of these groups perform the function of 
instruments of protest, whether this protest is expressed in militancy 
or at the ballot box, and however ill-defined it may often appear; 
secondly, in that these groups do exploit xenophobic, racist or 
possibly authoritarian tendencies which they may excite and aggravate, 
but which nevertheless pre-date such groups' activities. These 
pre-existing tendencies themselves require differentiated treatment: 
racism and racial discrimination constitute forms of externalized 
behaviour which can be recognized by the law and impeded by the Legal 
process. It is not so with xenophobia, which is a latent resentment or 
'feeling', an attitude that goes before fascism or racism and can 
prepare the ground for them but, in itself, does not fall within the 
purview of the Law and Legal prevention. It will be obvious that the 
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diversity of these phenomena, of their constituent elements and their 
means of expression, require a more comprehensive approach, if the 
recommenations here set down are not to be a mere inventory of 
disparate items but may become the expression of a coherent and firm 
political purpose. 
298. Although the facts reported in these pages - the persistence of 
extremist groups, the violence to which some of these resort, the new 
and growing manifestations of xenophobia, the weaknesses and 
ambiguities of the institutional apparatus and of the traditional 
political and social forces - remain of a dimension that makes them 
controllable, they are nevertheless symptomatic of a problem 
unprecedented in the experience of the European democracies 
large-scale and constantly growing population transfers and new human 
and cultural contacts which are taking place within a legal and social 
framework that often does not keep pace with the extent of the changes 
in progress. In other words, our analysis both of the situation and 
its causes and of the action undertaken points to the existence of a 
specific crisis: as human contacts and intercultural confrontations 
develop, closed societies are gradually becoming obsolete. 
299. The inadequacy of closed societies can be seen, first and foremost, 
within the Community. Here, however, the changes engendered by 
constantly growing political, cultural, social or economic 
interdependence are taking place under the control of a legal and 
political system which, for all its weaknesses, does provide the 
necessary stimulation and regulation. 
300. That is not the case of changes which transcend the Community 
framework. In the forefront of these is the difficult process of 
integration of migrant workers and their families within the social 
tissue of a Europe which, by the process of Community unfication, is 
already, not only in fact but also in law, multi-ethnic and 
multi-cultural. As Commissioner Sutherland said, there are 
12.5 million immigrants (workers and their families> in the ten 
Community countries at present, compared with 12 million in 
1974(364>. Of these, 9 million are from non-member countries, with 
Turks, Yugoslavs, Algerians, Moroccans and Tunisians making up the main 
nationalities. There are some 1.5 million Spanish and Portuguese; 
after the accession of Spain and Portugal the number of immigrants from 
Community countries will thus rise to 5 million. Two conclusions may 
be drawn from these figures. First, the total number of immigrants has 
been relatively stable over the past ten years. Second, the number of 
immigrants of Community origin, irrespective of nationality, as a 
percentage of the total number of immigrants, will rise by one third on 
enlargement. When planning for the future, therefore, the Community 
will need to take into account the presence in its midst of several 
ethnic communities and its undoubted duty to work for their integration 
into European society<365>. 
301. If we add to these the number of nationals who are still regarded, and 
still regard themselves, as members of 'foreign' minorities (as is in 
particular the case in the United Kingdom and France>, if we remember 
the scale of other changes which have occurred in recent decades, and 
especially the increase of contacts with and of information on other 
parts of the world, we can get some idea of the strength of the 
cultural shock under which Europe has been Labouring since it ventured 
on the path of unification. It is only natural that to this state of 
affairs should be attributed many of the malfunctionings of our 
national systems and the numerous manifestations of contemporary 
political extremism. 
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302. These changes are taking place in conditions which are undoubtedly 
unique in history: for the most part the migrations and population 
displacements have occurred in conditions where there was no observance 
of the rights and freedoms recognized by the European democracies or 
those which governed settlement and nation-building, as was the case 
with the United States, although the conditions and consequences of 
migratory movements in that country and in Europe are today more 
similar than ever beforeC366). 
303. The uniformity of the conditions in which these movements are taking 
place in Europe are all to her credit. Every person, whether a 
Community national or not, automatically enjoys in its territory the 
fundamental freedoms. That is by no· means the case of Community 
nationals in the territories of non-democratic societies where these 
rights are often mocked. We are still very far from achieving 
geographical homogeneity in this respect, far from universal 
implementation of human rights. 
304. Nevertheless in the face of these movements our intellectual and 
institutional equipment remains gravely inadequate. One of the 
underlying motives in fascist and racist Leanings is a desire to flout 
our democratic heritage within which, for all its known imperfections, 
these changes and movements have been taking place. But it is also 
true that to ignore or minimize the resistance to these current changes 
is to risk exacerbation of the problems and of the resistance and thus 
to undermine the democratic system from another side. 
305. Society and its institutions have been reacting in a disjointed manner 
to the challenges presented by the movements described above and to the 
political exploitation of the difficulties they generate. The existing 
system of prevention and restraint has been complemented by ad hoc 
measures addressed to particular sections of the population or to the 
attainment of specific objectives. While comprehensive consideration 
was given to the principles and consequences of Community construction, 
it failed to take into account the new view of the world which must 
comprise not only that construction but also the population transfers 
and cultural exchanges which had been taking place internationally and 
transcended the Community's purlieu. 
306. The rapporteur would Like to suggest that Community authorities not 
only have the right but, above all, an imperative need to adopt a more 
global approach to certain phenomena which until now they have 
considered only fragmentarily. This new approach could be described as 
a European policy of inter-community relations. By 'inter-community 
relations' we mean relations between communities identified by various 
parameters: ethnicity, culture, religion, history, and which themselves 
have an awareness of such identity. Such a policy would bring 
together, around a consistent framework of principles and objectives, 
such strands as what is usually called 'Community policy on migration', 
action in defence of fundamental rights and freedoms, some aspects of 
political cooperation (relations with countries with Large immigrant 
populations) and educational, social and cultural policy. 
307. The reasons for this proposal must be clear from the preceding 
considerations, but Let us here recall the principal among them: 
fascist and racist or, more generally, anti-democratic, movements 
flourish on the malfunctioning of national systems and of the Community 
system. In this respect the hardest problem today concerns the 
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difficulties of passage between societies built on different, though 
equally Legitimate, cultural and social models. These models not only 
distinguish different population groups: often they are in conflict 
within the psyche of one individual or of a single section of the 
population. Their interdependence, and their confrontation, can be 
observed within countries, and all the more so, of course, within the 
Community. The gradual and more or Less explicit settling of what had 
been 'migrant' communities into the situation of 'minorities' is one, 
though not the only, reason for the crisis of cultural identity 
experienced by very broad sections of society. A new policy regulating 
relations between communities means both strengthening the Legal norms 
of democratic exchange - those precisely which fascist and racist 
movements oppose - and creating new instruments needed to cope with the 
various implications of inter-communal relations. The recommendations 
which follow will be articulated on this concept. 
308. Lastly, the answers to the challenges raised by the subject of our 
inquiry must clearly be drawn from the idea of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. It is in this source - from which those aspects 
of Europe's political and philosophical traditions which gained 
universal acceptance were also drawn - that we must Look for and find 
the precepts for our political conduct and the basis of that model of 
society which democratic man, in all the diversity of his past 
experience and future aspirations, seeks to attain. 
4.2 RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE RAPPORTEUR 
309. The recommendations formulated below represent but a part of what is 
virtually an infinite range of possibilities. Political inspiration 
can always add to the List, political reason can make selections and 
establish priorities within it. 
4.2.1 At the institutional Level 
(a) Countries which have not yet done so must ratify the international 
conventions (UN, UNESCO, ILO, Council of Europe) relating to the 
subject of this inquiry. 
(b) Countries which have not already done so should issue declarations 
and perform ratifications relating to 'individual' petitions 
(Article 25 of the European Convention on Human Rights, Article 14 
of the International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of 
Racial Discrimination, Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights)<367>. 
(c) Commitments undertaken in virtue of international conventions must 
be given full implementation in domestic Law. 
(d) National Legislation on combating political extremism, racism and 
racial discrimination must be continually revised and adjusted and 
its application in practice must be ensured<368). 
(e) Effective means of Legal recourse in disputes relating to racial 
discrimination must be established. 
(f) The legislation described under (d) above must be subject to 
monitoring, analysis and assessment of implementation by national 
administrative and judicial authorities. 
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(g) The benefits of genuine free Legal aid and free Legal consultation 
must be extended to proceedings in disputes relating to racial 
discrimination. 
(h) A policy must be formulated and introduced for positive 
institutional measures to create at national Level specialist 
bodies concerned with race relations (investigative and 
conciliation authorities, ombuds~an, research and initiating 
committees). 
(i) In the spirit of resolutions already voted by the European 
Parliament, progress must be made towards the creation of a 
European Legal area in order to prevent the activities of and 
collusion between terrorist and extremist organizations in the 
execution of their acts and the distribution of illegal propaganda 
material and to defend the fundamental principles of democracy 
offered by the rule of Law. 
(j) An effort must be made to define more broadly Community powers and 
responsibilities in the area of race relations by applying a 
teleological interpretation of the Treaties, on the basis, inter 
alia of seeking the useful effect of the relevant provisions and of 
the European Community's implicit powers, by recourse to the 
procedure under Article 235 of the EEC Treaty, and, if necessary, 
by revision of the Treaties. 
(k) Commission initiatives must be encouraged in the area of questions 
identified by this inquiry. 
(L) The questions identified by this inquiry must be introduced into 
the purview of para-Community mechanisms, for instance the European 
Council and European political cooperation. 
(m) An effort should be made to draw up a declaration against racism, 
racial discrimination and xenophobia and in favour of harmonious 
relations among all the communities existing in Europe, to be 
adopted jointly by the Community political institutions, in 
accordance with the spirit of the Commission proposal and the 
Council resolution. 
(n) The role of the European Parliament, in its capacity as an organ of 
deliberation, debate and political initiative, should be enhanced 
in matters relating to respect for, and consolidation of, the 
democratic order, the fight against racism and harmonious relations 
among all communities residing in Europe. 
4.2.2 At the level of information 
(a) A comparative-Law study should be undertaken on the various Legal 
instruments introduced in the countries of the Community to deal 
with the matters which are the subject of this inquiry and on the 
effectiveness of these instruments. The European Parliament should 
encourage this project to take effect. 
(b) In each State bodies should be set up to provide information on the 
Legal protection against discrimination, racism and incitement to 
hate and racial violence. Efforts should be made to improve the 
spread of information on Legal recourse at the international, 
European, Community and domestic Level, using all the available 
information and communications techniques, including in particular 
the technological opportunities afforded by telematics and data 
processing. 
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(c) Within the framework of Euro-barometer one or more surveys should 
be carried out on the present state of relations between the 
different communities living in Europe. It should comprise 
questions on the respondent's feelings about contacts with 
communities other than his own and also on his understanding of 
democratic values. The necessary funds should be provided in the 
Community budget. 
(d) case studies should be carried out in a number of Community urban 
centres where minority communities are strongly represented, in 
order to compare both the problems that arise and the strategies 
adopted to deal with them. 
(e) The professional ethics of the information industry with respect to 
manifestations of violence, and especially of racial violence, 
should be carefully considered. The European Parliament could take 
the initiative in organizing a symposium on this subject. 
(f) It should be brought home to those concerned at all levels of the 
information industry that the mass media have an important role to 
play in eliminating racial prejudice and promoting harmonious 
relations among communities resident in Europe. The minority 
communities must be fairly represented in the information media. 
4.2.3 At the level of education 
(a) In all educational structures and policies the aim of 
non-discrimination must be promoted. 
(b) Much more importance must be given to c1v1c education throughout 
the school curriculum, with the aim of fostering allegiance to the 
principles and practice of democracy and pluralism, tolerance and 
mutual respect between human beings and a sense of civic 
responsibility. 
(c) The anxieties set out in the present inquiry must be taken into 
account when drafts of a European civic education textbook are 
prepared. 
(d) Special attention should be given to the civic education of 
teachers. They must be given a knowledge of the principles and 
essential content of the legal texts relevant to our subject. They 
should be made aware of the problem of relations between children 
and adolescents belonging to different communities and taught the 
appropriate pedagogic approach. 
(e) Instruction in minority cultures and languages should be encouraged 
in order that societies may become more open both to these minority 
communities and to the world outside the Community. 
(f) Contemporary history should be taught at an earlier age, presenting 
the children with an accurate picture of the crimes commited by 
European fascist and totalitarian regimes, and more particularly of 
their acts of genocide. A Community initiative should be promoted 
for the preparation of a European textbook of contemporary history 
on the basis of work already done by the Council of Europe and by 
UNESCO. 
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4.2.4 At the Level of action by social forces 
(a) On the model of the Youth Forum, an Inter-Community Forum should be 
set up under the aegis of the European Community. 
(b) Encouragement should be given to European dialogue and meetings 
between the people, institutions and associations combating racism 
and working for human rights. The trade unions, professional 
organizations and other institutions concerned should take part in 
this dialogue. 
(c) Encouragement should be given to contacts and dialogue between 
different religions and persuasions, both to promote religious 
tolerance and to encourage joint debate on the place of the various 
faiths in modern European society. The European Parliament could 
take the initiative of organizing a conference on this subject. 
(d) Detailed consideration should be given to the responsibilities of 
democratic political bodies in the face of the problems highlighted 
by this inquiry and in order to try to establish an ethic of debate 
on the subject. The European Parliament could play a crucial role 
in this. 
4.2.5 Guidelines for general debate 
(a) The issues raised and the solutions envisaged should have constant 
priority in considerations on the formulation of national and 
Community institutional, economic and social policies and in the 
fields of education, culture and information. 
(b) Within the European Parliament discussion and debate should take 
place on the issues raised by the inquiry and political 
responsibilities in this area should be defined at international, 
national and Community level. 
(c) An effort should be made to identify the areas of tension and 
problems in multi-community Europe and on this basis to define the 
political' and social balance which should be attained. 
(d) The debate should be widened, with contacts being established in 
the appropriate international authorities with the aim of obtaining 
reciprocity of treatment in relations between Community Member 
States and third countries. 
4.2.6 The Committee of Inquiry requests the appropriate committees of the 
European Parliament to study closely the ideas and the proposals set 
out in this document. The report and especially its recommendations 
can undoubtedly give rise to parliamentary initiatives, whether in the 
form of motions for resolutions or oral questions with debate, 
initiatives which could result from joint action by different groups 
within the Parliament, thus witnessing to a consensus that goes beyond 
political divisions. The Committee also asks the Council, the 
Commission, the national Governments and Parliaments and all the 
democratic forces of Europe to study these proposals and to draw 
practical conclusions from them, bearing in mind not only the 
seriousness and urgency of this further challenge facing Community 
Europe today but also the duty of democratic vigilance and political 
responsibility which lies upon it. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
5.1 Forty years after the victory over the Nazi and fascist regimes, groups 
and individuals in the Community and in other countries of Western 
Europe still proclaim their adherence to those regimes' ideologies, or 
at least some of their features, and especially those which are racist 
and anti-democratic. 
5.2 These groups are in general extremely small. Their multiplicity, due 
to ideological dissension, constant personal squabbles and occasional 
outlawing, can hardly disguise the smallness of their numbers and the 
meagreness of their resources. It may be said that the more radical 
their ideology and behaviour, the more peripheral these groups become. 
5.3 Even when those movements all or part of whose ideology can be 
described as right-wing extremism manage to achieve representation in 
local or parliamentary bodies, their public following by and large 
remains very limited and is unlikely seriously to undermine the 
European democracies. 
5.4 What is more, right-wing extremism has suffered the consequences of the 
fall of the dictatorships in Greece, Spain and Portugal. The 
Community's attitude has helped to restore democracy in these 
countries. The last enlargement of the Community will formally mark 
the end of the authoritarian right-wing regimes which emerged in Europe 
in the 1930s. As regards Turkey, a country in association with the EEC 
and aspiring to membership, the European Parliament has on many 
occasions expressed its concern over, and its condemnation of, the 
violations of human rights occurring in that country. 
5.5 In recent years individuals and movements belonging to the extreme 
right have taken to violence, often resulting in murder, instances of 
which have been particularly pronounced in Italy and Federal Germany. 
These developments are associated with the appearance of a general 
climate of thoughtless toleration towards violence, extremism and 
depreciation of constitutionality. 
5.6 What is more, some extreme right-wing ideas have recently been given 
more explicit and perhaps broader expression than before. This is 
particularly the case of supposedly 'scientific' racism which, by 
invoking strange mixtures of ideas, false generalizations and sometimes 
pure myths and inventions, erects the differences between individuals 
and groups of people into an absolute system and on the basis of such 
'theories' attempts to justify racial segregation. 
5.7 Among other themes which have made their appearance or reappearance in 
recent years we should note: the denial of the fact of genocide 
perpetrated by the Nazi regime, the inevitability of a 'race war', the 
resurgence of 'national-revolutionary' attitudes, also called 'the 
third position' or 'strasserism' <a mixture of spurious neutralism with 
a theory of 'national socialism'), virulent anti-semitism, often 
disguised as 'anti-zionism', and glorification of 'purifying' or 
'liberating' violence. Some of these trends have contributed to the 
emergence of a terrorist movement which eludes classification in 
traditional political terms, such classification being in any event 
inapplicable when dealing with phenomena outside the democratic 
political spectrum. 
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5.8 By way of pinpointing the phenomenon, it should be said that the 
various extremist groups often provoke each other, attempting to 
exacerbate opposing views and polarize attitudes. Moreover the 
international context, and especially reference to totalitarian and 
dictatorial regimes, help to dramatize clashes within democratic Europe. 
5.9 Links exist between the various European extreme right-wing groupings 
and between these and the American continent and the Middle East, as 
well as contacts with extreme Left-wing groupings or state services of 
the Communist dictatorships and others. Thanks to these Links, there 
is sporadic exchange of material assistance as well as a certain 
consonance in the theories propounded by the various groups. The 
extent of such Links is, however, Limited by various differences, 
rivalries and incompatibilities. The supposition that these various 
movements pursue a coordinated international strategy is not borne out 
by the evidence and is hard to reconcile with the nature of the facts 
Listed here. 
5.10 There is cause for more concern over the rise of more or Less diffuse 
feelings of xenophobia and the increase in tensions between different 
communities. It has a distressing effect on the immigrant communities 
which are daily subject to displays of distrust and hostility, to 
continuous discrimination, which Legislative measures have failed to 
prevent, when seeking accommodation or employment or trying to provide 
services and, in many cases, to racial violence, including murder. The 
situation is aggravated by the fact that, rightly or wrongly, these 
minorities have Little confidence in the institutions on which they 
should be able to call to uphold their rights and offer them protection. 
5.11 The development of this situation is associated with a global social 
malaise, the elements of which are difficult to identify and assess and 
in any case may vary from context to context. They comprise the 
time-honoured distrust of strangers, fear of the future combined with a 
self-defensive reflex which together often lead to a withdrawal 
symptom, prejudices arising from the way national and international 
news is presented, and occasionally a spiral of violence in which 
aggression and defence are almost inextricably intertwined. All these 
elements can be found in crisis-ridden urban centres where physical, 
economic and social conditions gravely militate against dialogue and 
tolerance. 
5.12 There are movements seeking to give radical expression to the feelings 
and aspirations engendered by these social and cultural changes. They 
would be more Likely to succeed if the democratic parties were 
short-sightedly tempted to exploit the possibilities offered by a 
disturbance of the electoral balance and if they gave preference to 
rhetorical incantations over the search for realistic solutions in the 
spirit of social peace and democratic dialogue. 
5.13 For the time being the climate of mistrust and xenophobia existing here 
and there has not weakened overall confidence in the democratic 
institutions. But this confidence could be eroded, not so much by the 
'historic fallout• represented by the activities of groups obsessively 
attached to out-dated totalitarian regimes and ideologies as by the 
'generation effect', whereby knowledge of the harm perpetrated by these 
regimes and of the pernicious nature of their ideologies could 
gradually become attenuated. It is the generation effect, together 
with the attractiveness of protest movements in general, that is 
undoubtedly the reason why the youngest age·groups account for a Large 
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proportion of extremist right-wing militants. Moreover, an allegiance 
to democratic values has to face the battering to which they are Liable 
to be subjected by every kind of extremism and totalitarian tendency 
beyond the traditional political classifications. 
5.14 Considerable efforts have been made since the end of the war at 
international, European, Community and national Level to draw up the 
necessary Legal instruments to ensure both the eradication of all forms 
of racism and discrimination and the protection of fundamental rights. 
Though success in this area has been mixed and though there have been 
doubts and errors in the formulation of a policy on migration, 
particularly in the Last few years, West European and Community States 
continue their efforts to prevent and check fascist and racist speech 
and action and to abolish such forms of discrimination as still exist. 
5.15 Recourse by private individuals to the Legal means which have been 
introduced is nevertheless not easy. Apart from procedural 
difficulties, administrative practice often puts an impenetrable screen 
between the intention and the deed. The first victims of such a state 
of affairs are precisely those whom the provisions are intended to 
protect. 
5.16 In Eastern Europe the situation is essentially different: not only are 
fundamental rights and democratic values systematically denied, in a 
way inherent in the very nature of the regime, but there are many 
instances of discrimination, not to say persecution, of ethnic 
minorities in what has always been a very culturally mixed area. The 
most glaring example is the position of the Jewish community in the 
Soviet Union where the conduct of the authorities can justifiably be 
described as 'state racism'. 
5.17 The success of educational policies, both as regards the eradication of 
all forms of discrimination and instruction in toleration and 
democratic values, is closely dependent on the design and performance 
of the educational system as a whole and of the confidence which it 
consequently commands. In general, civic education in the broad sense 
- and particularly the prevention of racist prejudice and instruction 
in human rights and democratic values - receives far Less attention 
than it merits. 
5.18 The information media, which play an essential role in the functioning 
of every democratic system, bear an important responsibility for the 
image of the minorities that is presented to society and, more broadly, 
for the mutual perceptions of different sections of the population by 
the way in which they succeed or fail in their task. The perception of 
violence depends Largely on the way in which it is presented by the 
media. The professional ethics of the media require closer 
consideration in this respect. 
5.19 Groups and institutions devoted to combating fascism and racism and the 
protection of the minorities perform a most useful task in information 
and representation. That task is fully accomplished when it is carried 
on in a spirit of dialogue and pluralism and with due consideration to 
the expectations and aspirations of the public at Large. The emergence 
of new cultural forms of combating intolerance and discrimination must 
be recognized and encouraged. 
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5.20 In matters concerning the defence of human rights and democratic 
values, the responsibility of all citizens, and especially of Leaders 
of public opinion, can neither be reduced nor delegated. There is no 
room for considerations of political expediency. 
5.21 The Large population movements which have taken place in recent years 
with the consequent entry of new communities into the social tissue of 
a number of European countries, the cultural changes taking place and, 
not Least, the growing openness of societies to events throughout the 
world- all these call for the formulation of a new global policy which 
will ensure that the new minorities can find their place in the social 
fabric of European nations and that these national societies develop 
harmoniously in understanding and respect for the democratic values. 
A European policy on inter-communal relations must become part of any 
genuine policy for European Union. 
6. RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE INQUIRY 
6. To this effect, the Committee submits the following recommendations: 
6.1 At the institutional Level 
(a) Countries which have not yet done so must ratify the international 
conventions (UN, UNESCO, ILO, Council of Europe) relating to the 
subject of this inquiry. 
(b) Countries which have not already done so should issue declarations 
and perform ratifications relating to 'individual' petitions 
(Article 25 of the European Convention on Human Rights, Article 14 
of the International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of 
Racial Discrimination, Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights). 
<c> Commitments undertaken in virtue of international conventions must 
be given full implementation in domestic Law. 
(d) National Legislation on combating political extremism, racism and 
racial discrimination must be continually revised and adjusted and 
its,application in practice must be ensured. Forms of racial 
discrimination present in current national Legislation must be 
identified and expunged. 
(e) Effective means of Legal recourse in disputes relating to racial 
discrimination must be established and the organizations involved 
must be guaranteed the right to institute civil proceedings. 
(f) The Legislation described under (d) above must be subject to 
monitoring, analysis and assessment of implementation by national 
administrative and judicial authorities. 
(g) The benefits of genuine free Legal aid and free Legal consultation 
must be extended to proceedings in disputes relating to racial 
discrimination. 
(h) A policy must be formulated and introduced for positive 
institutional measures to create at national Level specialist 
bodies concerned with race relations, where such bodies do not 
already exist, to protect the victims, and prevent manifestations, 
of racial discrimination. 
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(i) In the spirit of resolutions already voted by the European 
Parliament, progress must be made towards the creation of a 
European Legal area in order to prevent the activities of and 
collusion between terrorist and extremist organizations in the 
execution of their acts and the distribution of illegal propaganda 
material, and to defend the fundamental principles of democracy 
afforded by the rule of Law. 
(j) An effort must be made to define more broadly Community powers and 
responsibilities in the area of race relations by applying a 
teleological interpretation of the Treaties, on the basis, inter 
alia, of seeking the useful effect of the relevant provisions and 
of the European Community's implicit powers; by recourse to the 
procedure under Article 235 of the EEC Treaty; and, if necessary, 
by revision of the Treaties. Action must be taken on the 
communication from the Commission to the Council for a Community 
policy on migration, on which Parliament has delivered its opinion, 
and on the resolutions adopted by Parliament on the same subject. 
(k) Commission initiatives must be encouraged in the area of problems 
identified by this inquiry. 
<L> The questions identified by this inquiry must be introduced into 
the purview of para-Community mechanisms, for instance the European 
Council and European political cooperation. 
(m) An effort should be made to draw up a declaration against racism, 
racial discrimination and xenophobia and in favour of harmonious 
relations among all the communities existing in Europe, to be 
adopted jointly by the Community political institutions, in 
accordance with the spirit of the Commission proposal and the 
Council resolution. Plans should be Laid for a European Year to 
promote inter-community harmony, during which Community funds would 
be allocated for holding conferences or arranging other events for 
the purpose of combating racism, racial discrimination and 
xenophobia and encouraging tolerance and mutual respect between the 
different communities Living in Europe. 
<n> The role of the European Parliament, in its capacity as an organ of 
deliberation, debate and political initiative, should be enhanced 
in matters relating to respect for, and consolidation of, the 
democratic order, the fight against racism and harmonious relations 
among all communities residing in Europe. 
6.2 At the Level of information 
(a) A comparative-Law study should be undertaken on the various Legal 
instruments and practices introduced in the countries of the 
Community to deal with the matters ·which are the subject of this 
inquiry and on the effectiveness of these instruments. The 
European Parliament should encourage this project to take effect. 
(b) In each State bodies should be set up to provide information on the 
means of Legal protection against discrimination, racism and 
incitement to racial hatred and violence. The means for 
coordinating such bodies at European level should be provided. 
Efforts should be made to improve the spread of information on 
Legal recourse at the international, European, Community and 
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domestic Level, using all the available information and 
communications techniques, including in particular the 
technological opportunities afforded by teLematics and data 
processing. At all points of entry into Community Member States 
directories should be provided, Listing, in the appropriate 
Languages, the names, addresses and telephone numbers of 
counselling and Legal advice services provided for migrants, 
immigrants, refugees and persons seeking a reception centre. 
(c) Within the framework of Euro-barometer one or more surveys should 
be carried out on the present state of relations between the 
different communities Living in Europe. It should comprise 
questions on the respondent's feelings about contacts with 
communities other than his own and also on his understanding of 
democratic values. The necessary funds should be provided in the 
Community budget. 
(d) Case studies should be carried out in a number of Community urban 
centres where minority communities are strongly represented, or 
where surveys have identified a high Level of racism, in order to 
compare both the problems that arise and the strategies adopted to 
deal with them. 
(e) The professional ethics of the information industry with respect to 
manifestations of violence, and especially of racial violence, 
should be carefully considered. The European Parliament could take 
the initiative in organizing a symposium on this subject. 
(f) It should be brought home to those concerned at all Levels of the 
information industry that the mass media have an important role to 
play in eliminating racial prejudice and promoting harmonious 
relations among communities resident in Europe. The minority 
communities must be fairly represented in the information media. 
6.3 At the Level of education 
(a) In all educational structures and policies the aim of 
non-discrimination must be promoted. 
(b) Much more importance must be given to c1v1c education throughout 
the school curriculum, with the aim of fostering allegiance to the 
principles and practice of democracy and pluralism, a critical 
approach, tolerance and mutual respect between human beings and a 
sense of civic responsibility. Special training programmes based 
on these principles should be provided for civil servants working 
in areas where racial tension is Likely or dealing with the 
problems and needs of individuals belonging to minority communities. 
(c) The concerns evident in the present inquiry must be taken into 
account when drafts of a European civic education textbook are 
prepared. 
(d) Special attention should be given to the c1v1c education of 
teachers. They must be given a knowledge of the principles and 
essential content of the Legal texts relevant to the subject of the 
inquiry. They should be made aware of the problem of relations 
between children or adolescents belonging to different communities 
and taught the appropriate pedagogic approach; they should be 
alerted to the danger of racist ideas which are presented through 
the subtle manipulation of Language. 
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(e) Instruction in minority cultures and Languages should be encouraged 
in order that societies may become more open both to these minority 
communities and to the world outside the Community. Full 
application of the Community directive on the teaching of the 
Language and culture of children's country of origin during the 
normal school timetable by all the Member States should be 
monitored. 
(f) Contemporary history should be taught at an early age, presenting 
children with an accurate picture of the crimes committed by 
European fascist and totalitarian regimes, and more particularly of 
their acts of genocide. A Community initiative should be promoted 
for the preparation of a European textbook of contemporary history 
on the basis of work already done by the Council of Europe and by 
UNESCO. 
6.4 At the Level of action by social forces 
(a) Efforts must be made to ensure that the European countries pursue a 
policy designed to provide full employment and underpin social 
peace; this policy should be defined so as to withstand social and 
economic crises which put democracy itself at risk. 
(b) Institutions and associations opposed to racism, and immigrants' 
organizations, trade unions, professional organizations and other 
bodies concerned should be invited to promote the creation of an 
Intercommunity Forum under the aegis of the European Communities on 
the model of the Youth Forum. This body's main tasks should be to 
provide an exchange of information and improve the coordination and 
allocation of duties in action and research. The Forum would be 
financed by the Communities' budget. 
{c) Encouragement should be given to European dialogue and meetings 
between people, institutions and associations combating racism and 
working for human rights. The trade unions, professional 
organizations and other institutions concerned should take part in 
this dialogue. Discussion and debate should be encouraged in the 
European Parliament with a view to drawing further public attention 
to the subjects considered by the Committee of Inquiry and the 
conclusions it has reached, and in particular, to the institutional 
response, i.e. that of the forces of law and order, to terrorism. 
{d) Encouragement should be given to contacts and dialogue between 
different religions and persuasions, both to promote religious and 
spiritual tolerance and to encourage joint debate on the place of 
the various faiths in modern European society. 
{e) Detailed consideration should be given to the responsibility of 
democratic political bodies in the face of the problems highlighted 
by this inquiry and in order to try to establish an ethic of debate 
on the subject. The European Parliament could play a crucial role 
in this. 
6.5 Guidelines for general debate 
{a) The issues raised and the solutions envisaged should have constant 
priority in considerations on the formulation of national and 
Community institutional, economic and social policies and in the 
fields of education, culture and information. 
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(b) Within the European Parliament discussion and debate should take 
place on the issues raised by the inquiry and political 
responsibilities in this area should be defined at international, 
national and Community Level. In two years' time, and at regular 
intervals thereafter, there should be a review of developments in 
the matters considered by the inquiry, and of the extent to which 
the recommendations in this document have been carried out. 
(c) An effort should be made to identify the areas of tension and 
problems in multi-community Europe and on this basis to define the 
political and social balance which should be attained and the 
strategies required for action. 
(d) The debate should be widened, with contacts being established in 
the appropriate international authorities with the aim of obtaining 
reciprocity of treatment in relations between Community Member 
States and third countries. 
6.6 The Committee of Inquiry requests the appropriate committees of the 
European Parliament to study closely the ideas and the proposals set 
out in this document. The report and especially its recommendations 
can undoubtedly give rise to parliamentary initiatives, whether in the 
form of motions for resolutions or oral questions with debate, 
initiatives which could result from joint action by different groups 
within the Parliament, thus witnessing to a consensus that goes beyond 
political divisions. The committee also asks the Council, the 
Commission, the national governments and parliaments and all the 
democratic forces of Europe to study these proposals and to draw 
practical conclusions from them, bearing in mind not only the 
seriousness and urgency of this further challenge facing Community 
Europe today but also the duty of democratic vigilance and political 
responsibility which Lies upon it. 
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(3) Bureau document 2/BUR/AX/0257/1. 
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(5) See the three European Parliament resolutions of 14 February 1985, 
OJ No. C 72 of 18.3.1985, pp. 65-70 
DEFINITIONS : FASCISM 
(6) J. LINZ : 'Some notes towards a comparative study of fascism in 
sociological historical perspective' : Fascism : A Reader's Guide, 
W. LAQUEUR (ed.) London, Wildwoodhouse, 1976, p. 3- 21. 
(7) S.G. PAYNE : 'The Concept of Fascism' - in S.U. LARSEN et al. - Who were 
the Fascists? - Bergen, Universitetsforlaget, 1980, p. 14 - 25. 
(8) 'Report on the situation of homosexual women and men regarding a rise of 
fascism and racism', 18 March 1985 
(9) Hearing of 18-20 March 1985; see Annex 4 
(10) M. CLEMENZ, Gesellschaftliche Ursprunge des Faschismus, Frankfurt 
D. EICHOLTZ, Geschichte der deutschen Kriefwirtschaft, Berlin 1969 
<11) The Third Internationale, in 1935, described Fascism as the final phase 
of imperialism of monopolistic capital. In 1936 Daniel GUERIN published 
Sur Le fascisme developing this thesis. See Alan s. MILWARD 'Fascism and 
the Economy' in w. LAQUEUR (ed.), Fascism: a reader's Guide, pp. 413-414 
(12> Eugen WEBER is one of many who regard fascism rather as a movement of 
resistance against the development of capitalism and the social changes 
it brings (Varieties of Fascism, New York, 1964). 
A. SCHWEITZER has tr1ed to account for the support given to Nazism by 
many small and medium businessmen opposed to big business (Big Business 
in the Third Reich, BLOOMINGTON, Ind., 1964). The theory of a collusion 
between big business circles and Hitler is vehemently and scrupulously 
criticized by Henri Ashby TURNER, Big Business and the rise of Hitler, 
O.U.P. 1985. As for the results of electoral studies, they have been 
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summed up as follows by Seymour LIPSET: 'The ideal-typical Nazi voter in 
1932 was a middle-class self-employed Protestant who Lived either on a 
farm or in a small community, and who had previously voted for a centrist 
or regionalist party strongly opposed to the power and influence of big 
business and big Labour•. (Political Man, Berkeley, 1963, p. 149) 
(13) Alan S. MILWARD, op.cit., p. 411. Can it be said that the aim and role 
of Italian fascism was to hasten the advent of industrial capitalism? It 
would need to be explained why the rate of increase in the budget of the 
Ministry of Agriculture up to the end of 1939 was exceeded only by those 
of the Ministries of War, Aviation, Internal Affairs and Justice (ibid, 
p. 428) --
<14) Article 9 of the State Treaty signed by Austria and the Allied Powers 
(15.5.1955) on the re-establishment of an independent and democratic 
Austria draws a distinction between national socialist/Nazi organizations 
on the one hand and fascist ones on the other. The distinction goes 
beyond purely historical considerations and concerns differences of 
political substance between the two phenomena. Similar provisions will 
be found in treaties signed with East European states. Some historians, 
including Poliakov and Zeev Sternhell, consider that nazism is part of a 
continuous ideological development in Europe. Others (Shulamit Volov, 
Raoul Hilberg) stress its specific features, as manifested in the 
terrible 'final solution•. Luc Rosenzweig (Liberation, 25 April 1985) 
rightly considers that Claude Lanzmann•s film 1Shoah 1 is part of this 
historical debate. The analysis by R. SCHMIDT, 1Nationalsozialismus -
ein deutscher Faschismus?', in Politik und Zeitgeschichte, Beilage zur 
Wochenzeitung 'Das Parlament•, 30 March 1985, p. 13 et seq., is also of 
1nterest. 
(15) British and Italian movements in particular frequently refer to the 
brothers Strasser. As regards Germany, we read in the 
Verfassugsschutzbericht for 1984: 'For some years now Hitler has not been 
regarded as the unchallenged key figure by all national socialists. It is 
the early phase of the national-socialist revolution that is now 
attracting increasing attention. And it is from the brothers Otto and 
Gregor Strasser and other national socialists of the early era that a 
number of neo-nazi ideologists are taking their idea of a German 
socialism which in 1984 has been associated with "anti-imperialist" 
campaigns.• 
<16) This is apparent above all in the pronouncements of supreme federal 
courts of the Federal Republic of Germany on right-wing extremism. See 
DUDEK and JASCHKE, Rechtextremismus, I, p. 23 et seq. Compare also 
Italian case Law, referred to below, para 261. In deciding on its method 
of work, the Committee thought it better not to try to find a too 
theoretical definition of fascism, but to opt for a pragmatic approach to 
the concept which should also include the phenomena of national-socialism 
and neo-nazism. See PE 94.269. 
DEFINITIONS : RACISM 
(17) UNESCO, Four Statements on the Race Question, Paris, UNESCO, 1969 - Third 
Statement. 
The following observations should also be noted: 'Techniques of 
classification are part of the scientific method. Faced with an 
assemblage as complex as the billions of people we see around us, it is 
natural to divide them in groups and to assign them to different 
•races•. We find, however, that when we try to base this classification 
on the genetic inheritance of individuals or populations, the picture 
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produced is indistinct, the divisions imprecise < ••• ). The geneticist's 
answer is thus clear: for him the word 'race' has virtually no meaning'. 
Jacquart ALBERT - 'A La recherche d'un contenu pour le mot 'race' : La 
reponse du geneticien' - M. OLENDER (ed.), Pour Leon Poliakov : Le 
racisme, mythes et sciences, Bruxelles, ed. Complexe, 1981, p. 31 - 40. 
There is an excellent summary of the absurdities perpetrated in the name 
of a supposed 'genetic superiority' in S.J. GOULD - The Mismeasure of Man 
-New York, Norton, 1981. 
(18) UNESCO, ibid, Fourth Statement. 
(19) See the references cited in footnote <17) and s. ROSE et al., Not in our 
Genes, 1984 Penguin Books; and the review Le Genre Humain (Brussels, ed. 
Comp(exe) 
(20) ibid 
<21) Pensees, Brunschwig 93 
(22) in Le Genre Humain, No. 12, p. 127 
(23) In a preface to one of his Latest books, Claude LEVI-STRAUSS, whose 
article 'Race and history' is perhaps the most remarkable among those 
published on the subject of racism by UNESCO in 1950, states that the 
charge of racism cannot be raised against cultures 'whose attachment to 
certain values makes them partly or totally unresponsive to other values 
( ••• ). Such failure of communication, while it does not justify 
oppression or destruction of these rejected values, or of those who 
believe in them, is not obnoxious in itself, if kept within these 
Limits. It might indeed be regarded as the price which must be paid for 
the preservation of the value system of each spiritual family and for the 
strength they must find within themselves for their own renewal. ( ••• ) 
(Cultures) are not indifferent to one another and from time to time they 
borrow from one another, but, if they are not to perish, it is important 
that in other respects they should remain to some extent mutually 
impermeable (Le Regard Eloigne, Paris, Plon, 1984, p. 15). Levi-Strauss 
invites his readers to contemplate with scepticism, indeed perhaps with 
melancholy, the prospect of 'a world of cultures so enamoured of one 
another that their sole desire is mutual celebration in an amalgamation 
in which each will have Lost any attraction it might hold for the others 
as well as its own raison d'etre' (ibid, p. 16). 
(24) Like fascism, racism too is used as an 'idea of struggle' at both 
national and international political Level. It is perhaps in the light 
of this observation that one should read Resolution 3379 adopted on 
10 November 1975 by the UN General Assembly, which defined Zionism as 
'a form of racism'. See on this Resolution, I. MEYER, The UN Resolution 
equating Zionism with Racism: Genesis and Repercussions, INSTITUTE OF 
JEWISH AFFAIRS, Research Report No. 1, April 1985. Strongly criticized 
(cf observations of Mr May and Mr Savitt, hearings PE 97.446/Ann. p. 2, 
PE 97.448/Ann. p. 20 et seq.), this resolution did facilitate the 
expression of antisemitic feelings through criticism of the State of 
Israel and, for this reason, helped to create confusion between 
anti-Zionism and antisemitism. The following commentary on the 
resolution is worth quoting: 'In its political form Zionism is quite 
clearly a nationalist movement of the kind commonly found in certain areas 
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of Europe in the 19th century, and which spread to much of Asia and 
Africa in the 20th century. It is not more racialist or more 
discriminatory than other movements of this kind - in fact it is less so 
than most of them, because it is based on an entity defined primarily in 
religious rather than ethnic terms. Rabbinic law defines the Jew as an 
individual born of a Jewish mother whatever the religious or racial 
origin of the father, or an individual converted to Judaism. This is not 
a racial definition: for the racist, fathers are at least as important 
as mothers and identity cannot be changed at will. Zionism has always 
accepted this definition of the Jew and the laws of the modern State of 
Israel recognize a convert to Judaism as a Jew and a convert from Judaism 
as a non-Jew. Zionism is certainly a form of nationalism, and the State 
of Israel may, therefore, practice certain forms of discrimination, but 
these are not racialist insofar as that word retains its precise meaning 
at the present time. The contrary charge, that anti-zionism is a form of 
anti-Judaism, is also false. Zionism is a political ideology which Jews 
and others can accept or reject as they wish. There are good and 
faithful Jews who are non-Zionists or even anti-Zionists, and an 
anti-Zionist attitude does not necessarily mean that its exponent is 
antisemitic.' (Le retour de l'Islam, Paris, Gallimard, 1985, p. 121; 
original version of this text in: 1The Anti-Zionist Resolution', Foreign 
Affairs, Oct. 1976, p. 54-64. 
(25) Cf. J. LINZ 'Political space and fascism as a late-comer' in S.U. LARSEN 
(ed.), Who were the Fascists?, Bergen, Universitsforlaget, 1980. 
(26) cf Resolutions of the European Parliament on the situation in southern 
Africa, OJ C 68 of 14.3.83, p. 42, OJ C 46 of 20.2.84, p. 79. OJ C 72 of 
18.3.85, pp. 82 and 83, and OJ C 122 of 20.5.85, pp. 115-119 and debate 
on the situation in southern Africa and the motions for resolutions 
B 2-819/85, B 2-820/85, B 2-821/85, B 2.824/85, B 2-836/85, B 838/85, 
B 2-856/85 (PV 27, PE 99.573 of 11 September 1985) which all became void 
after voting 
THE SITUATION AND ITS CAUSES : FOREWARD 
<27) See for example Verfassungsschutzbericht 1983, pp. 11 - 184. 
(28) Cf. the report by Mrs Marie-Jane PRUVOT (PE 89.163/fin., No. 2). 
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 
<29> See the literature quoted in P. DUDEK and H.-G. JASCHKE, Entstehung und 
Entwicklung des Rechtsextremismus in der Bundesrepublik, vols. 1 and 2, 
1984, vol. 1, p. 488 et seq. 
(30) Contributions by Professors SCHEUCH, GRESS, von KIELMANSEGG, MAY, 
MUELLER, VOSLENSKY, WIESENTHAL, HORCHEM, STRAUSS, LUMMER, HENNIG and 
KUHNL. See also notes from Committee members Mr F. SCHWALBA-HOTH and 
Count von STAUFFENBERG, Doc. PE 95.459 and PE 98.111. 
(31) The Verfassungsschutzberichte (hereafter referred to as VSBerichte) are 
annual reports on left- and right-wing extremism and on counterespionage 
which the Federal Department for the Protection of the Constitution 
(Verfassungsschutzamt) prepares and which the Federal Ministry of the 
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Interior has been publishing since 1961. The rapporteur would Like to 
thank the Secretary of State for Parliamentary Affairs, Mr Spranger, for 
making available to him the 1983 report and the proofs of the 1984 
report. For a commentary in legal and political terms on the VSBerichte, 
see F. GRESS and H.-G. JASCHKE, quoted below, footnote 20, p. 61 et seq. 
See also LICHTENSTEIN in The Extreme Right, p. 80, 81. 
(32) F. GRESS and H.-G. JASCHKE, Rechtsextremismus in der Bundesrepublik nach 
1960 - Dokumentation und Analyse von Verfassungsschutzberichten, preface 
by E. Lutz, Member of the Bundestag, Pressedienst Demokrat1sche 
Initiative, No. 18, 1982. 
<33) This monograph (quoted above, footnote 29) is remarkable for its wealth 
of information and the quality of its analysis. 
<34) See above, footnote 30. 
(35) VSBericht 1983, p. 113 et seq., VSBericht 1984, p. 11 et seq. 
(36) For a detailed table of the periodicals and their printing numbers see 
VSBericht 1984, p. 13. 
(37> By decision of 7 December 1983 of the Federal Minister of the Interior, 
for activities hostile to the Constitution (Verfassungswidrigkeit). See 
also the notes by Mr Schwalba-Hoth and Count von Stauffenberg, quoted 
above, footnote 30. The ANSNA has asked the Federal Constitutional Court 
to have the decision repealed. 
(38) VSBericht 1984, p. 141 et seq. 
(39) VSBericht 1984, p. 143. 
(40) VSBericht 1984, p. 143, VSBericht 1983, p. 127. 
(41) LICHTENSTEIN in The Extreme Right, p. 87 and VSBericht 1984, p. 143, 
quote COBRA (Comit~ objectif d1entraide et solidarite avec Les victimes 
de La repression antinationaliste, France), HNF (Hulpkomitee voor 
nationalistische politieke gevangenen, Belgium) and COFPAC (Committee to 
free patriots and anticommunist political prisoners, United States). 
(42) VSBericht 1984, p. 144, VSBericht 1983, p. 128. 
(43) VSBericht 1984, p. 145et seq. 
(44) The DRP was the first serious attempt to bring together right-wing 
extremists in the Federal Republic of Germany. Founded in 1950, the 
party fought Federal and Lander elections throughout the fifties with 
considerable success. It has, however, gradually lost support, one of 
the reasons being its involvement in anti-semitic acts of profanation in 
1959. See the account by DUDEK and JASCHKE, vol. 1, p. 281 et seq. 
Although the NPD's activities are regularly mentioned in the VSBerichte, 
it continues to function as a Legally recognized party. On several 
occasions it was proposed to challenge its constitutionality before the 
Federal Constitutional Court, but this was never done, DUDEK and JASCHKE, 
vol. 1, p. 244 et seq. The same authors quote (p. 349) a decision of the 
Baden-Wurtemberg Administrative Tribunal (1978) which found that the NPD 
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was not pursuing objectives hostile to the Constitution 
(Verfassungsfeindliche Ziele). However, in a recent judgement concerning 
a matter of military discipline, the Federal Administrative Tribunal did, 
on the contrary, find that the NPD was pursuing objectives incompatible 
with the basic democratic and Liberal system (unvereinbar mit der 
freiheitlichen demokratischen Grundordnung), VSBericht 1983, p. 135. 
<45) For numerous examples of anti-Community propaganda see VSBericht 1983, 
p. 132. 
<46) The OM 1.8 million which the party received on this account enabled it to 
stabilize, at least for the short term, its precarious financial 
situation; VSBericht 1984, pp. 130 + 149 
(47) DUDEK and JASCHKE, vol. 1, p. 285. 
(48) 'The NPD- Aufstieg und Niedergang', DUDEK and JASCHKE (footnote 29), 
vol. 1, p. 281. 
(49) According to the security services the membership of the DVU was over 
11 000 in 1983 (1982 : 10 000), VSBericht 1983, p. 137. 
(50) VSBericht 1983, p. 137 and 138. 
<51) VSBericht 1984, p. 36. 
(52) VSBericht 1984, p. 154; KRIEPS, Report of the Parliamentary Assembly of 
the Council of Europe Doc. 4590 and Resolution 743 (1980), p. 11; DUDEK 
and JASCHKE (footnote 17), vol. 1, p. 52. LICHTENSTEIN in The Extreme 
Right, p. 82 speaks of a weekly circulation of 130 000 copies and of a 
readership of nearly half a million. 
(53) A technical term referring to a rewriting of history with the aim of 
rehabilitating nazism. cf. INSTITUTE OF JEWISH AFFAIRS, Research Report 
No. 1, March 1982, p. 1, and No. 4, May 1982, p. 1 et seq. 
(54) VSBericht 1983, p. 137, 138. 
(55) He offers to the public every possible vehicle of communication: books, 
newspapers, picture series, biographies, discs, cassettes, DUDEK and 
JASCHKE (footnote 29), vol. 1, p. 35, VSBericht 1983, p. 139. 
(56) VSBericht 1983, p. 139, VSBericht 1984, p. 154. 
(57) VSBericht 1983, p. 139 and 140, VSBericht 1984, p. 155. 
(58) VSBericht 1983, p. 141. 
(59) VSBericht 1983, p. 141, VSBericht 1984, p. 157. 
(60) VSBericht 1983, p. 141, 142, VSBericht 1984, p. 157. 
(61) VSBericht 1984, p. 158 
(62) VSBericht 1983, p. 143 et seq., VSBericht 1984, p. 159 et seq. 
(63) VSBericht 1984, p. 160. 
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(64) VSBericht 1983, p. 146 et seq., VSBericht 1984, p. 162 et seq. 
(65) VSBericht 1984, p. 162, 163. 
(66) Scheuch, Hearing, p. 1, VSBericht 1983, p. 158, VSBericht 1984, p. 170 
(67) VSBericht 1983, p. 171 et seq., VSBericht 1984, p. 168. 
(68) VSBericht 1984, pp. 167, 168 
(69) Information from FIR, 40 ans apres, p. 61. See Jewish Chronicle News 
Service, 30 April 1985, these reunions are the subject of political 
controversy. 
<70) Motions for resolutions B 2-772/85, B 2-1460/84, B 2-1336/84 inter alia. 
(71) GRESS and JASCHKE, (footnote 32), p. 9, 68. 
(72) GRESS and JASCHKE, (footnote 32), p. 68, 69. 
(73) GRESS and JASCHKE, (footnote 32), p. 69. 
(74) VSBericht 1984, pp. 128, 148. 
E. Hennig, deposition, p. 1; Gress, Hearing, p. 10, 11. 
(75) Cf. R. Kuhnl, deposition, p. 1, 2, 8; see also Schwalba-Hoth, Note, (see 
footnote 30 above>, p. 5. 
(76) Scheuch, Hearing, passim; see also Professor Gress' conclusion, Hearing, 
p. 16. 
(77) SOZIALWISSENSCHAFTLICHES INSTITUT NOWAK UNO SORGEL. The survey was 
commissioned by the Federal Ministry of the Interior and carried out in 
1981. 
(78) See LICHTENSTEIN in The Extreme Right, p. 79. 
(79) See Stauffenberg, Note (footnote 30 above), p. 5. 
See also Scheuch, Hearing, p. 6, 7. Also 'How popular is neo-Nazism in 
Germany?' INSTITUTE OF JEWISH AFFAIRS Research Report No. 6, May 1981 
p. 1 et seq. 
(80) DUDEK and JASCHKE (see footnote 29 above), p. 482, 483 and cover, p. 4. 
<81) For immigration statistics see VSBericht 1983, p. 162. 
(82> Scheuch, Hearing, p. 7 et seq. 
BELGIUM 
(83) The case of the WNP has been traced by Rene MAQUIN. Des Taupes dans 
l'Extreme-Droite, La Surete de l'Etat et le WNP (Brussels: EPO) 1985 
<84) Further evidence of nostalgia for the era of collaboration can be found 
in the following information published in Resistance Unie, the organ of 
the information service of the Federation Internat1onale des Resistants 
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Joseph ALGAZY, La Tentation Neo-Fasciste en France, Paris, Fayard, 
'1984. 
Alain ROLLAT, Les Hommes de l'Extreme Droite, Paris, Calman-Levy, 
1985. 
Jean-Marc THEOLLEYRE, les Neo-Nazis, Paris, Messidor, 1982. 
(93) Rapport du Senat sur le terrorisme, Imprimerie du Senat, spring 1984. 
(94) Debates of the French Senate on 4 October and 15 November 1980. See 
also the report by Mr Krieps to the Council of Europe, p. 9-10. The 
Directory Political Dissent includes among extreme-right groups held 
responsible for acts of violence: Groupe action Jeunnesse, Club Charles 
Martel, Delta, Faisceaux Nationalistes Europeens (founded in 1980 after 
the FANE was disbanded>, Honneur de La Police, La Mangouste, Nouveau 
Front Nazi, Odessa, Organization pour La Liberation de La France and 
Mouvement Nationaliste Revoluntionnaire. Most of these groups are known 
of only because they have claimed responsibility for a particular act of 
violence. 
(95> Cf. Pierre THUILLIER, Les Biologistes vont-ils prendre le pouvoir? and 
Darwin et Co, Brussels, Complexe, 1982. Professor G1rardet has noted 
that the New Right's anathema to American society is largely the result 
of its rejection of any society founded on the idea of the 'melting-pot'. 
(96) Mr Pierre Bousquet is a former member of the Waffen-SS. Questioned on 
this on 13 February 1984 on Antenne 2, Mr Le Pen said: 'Perhaps 
Mr Bousquet is a former SS man but I am one of those Frenchmen who are 
for national reconciliation and when twenty, thirty, forty years have 
passed since the War all I want to know about a man is whether he is 
prepared to serve his country'. Mrs Chombart de Lauwe reminded the 
Committee that the Militant group left the Front National in 1982 and 
set up a 'French Nationalist Party' which a number of former members of 
Doriot's Parti Populaire Francais have joined. 
(97) Romain Marie - real name: Bernard Antony - has also written: 'The modern 
world is once again facing the Jewish problem. Jews are at the centre 
of contemporary debate. Marx and Rotschild can be said to represent two 
sides of the same medal ( ••• ). Another aspect of the Jewish problem is 
the propensity of Jews to occupy all the key posts in Western societies' 
(Present, No. 35, December 1979). 
(98) Face a La Trois, FR 3, 6 July 1985. 
(99> Thus on l'Heure de Verite, A 2, 13 February 1984 and Face a La trois, 
FR 3, 6 July 1985. Whatever Mr Le Pen's popularity among adherents of 
the Front National, it can hardly be called a 'cult of the leader', see 
survey 'Le Pen and his people' in l'Express, 1 March 1985. 
<100) Radio Monte-Carlo, 17 February 1985. 
It is of interest to quote here the replies of some French politicians 
to the question put by the association 'SOS-Racisme': 'Do you think the 
National Front is a racist political party?' (Le Monde, 15 March 1985). 
J. Chaban-Delmass: 'If it is not entirely racist then at least it has 
unacceptable racist overtones'. 
J.P. Chevenement: 'Yes'. 
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F. Doubin: 'He is a super-racist and he practises blanket intolerance 
against all those who are not made on the same pattern as he and his 
friends'. 
L. Jospin: 'It is a party which is against immigrants and is often 
xenophobic; many of its leaders are, however, careful to disguise their 
racism and their anti-semitism•. 
C. Labbe: 'The National Front has raised a number of issues by which I 
am concerned because they refer to some of our national values. But at 
the same time, unfortunately, some of its representatives propound the 
kind of primitive racism which is all the more reprehensible because it 
is part of a particular political demagoguery to which some less 
sophisticated sectors of society may be vulnerable'. 
J. Lang: 'Yes'. 
J. Lecanuet: 'I hesitate to give a categorical opinion because it does 
not put forward, it does not formulate, racist dogmas as they have come 
down from the nineteenth century or from twentieth century Hitlerism. 
But there is a strong whiff of racism about the way it blames foreign 
residents in France for all the employment difficulties and for all the 
troubles that result from a climate of insecurity. 
G. Marchais: 'Yes, of course. And it represents a very serious threat. 
Clearly, the basis of Le Pen's success is the current crisis in the 
country. With the recent aggravation of the crisis, the unemployment, 
the difficulty of making ends meet and so on, Le Pen and his people 
naturally look for scapegoats. And they've found the immigrants, and 
they keep on blaming them. But there are others: the young people, the 
unemployed, the Communists and indeed why not the Republic itself?'. 
M. Rocard: 'In the sense that it is always clamouring that all our 
troubles come from abroad- yes•. 
P. Seguin: 'Yes'. 
0. Stirn: 'Absolutely. It is a racist political party: it is baying at 
Simone Veil, calling her a Jew, it is baying at me, associating my name 
with that of my great-uncle Captain Dreyfus'. 
J. Toubon: 'I think that many of its leaders and many of its ideas are 
indeed racist. But it is difficult to form an opinion about an 
organization whose only public utterances are heckling and invective•. 
S. Veil: 'The National Front's racist and xenophobic propositions are 
calculated to give credibility to the idea that some categories of 
people, by the very fact that they are 'alien to the national community' 
exacerbate the country's difficulties: the climate of insecurity, the 
cost of national insurance, unemployment, the decline of moral values. 
By creating scapegoats who are blamed for the defilement of the country, 
this kind of political discourse singles out these individuals or groups 
for discrimination and hate'. 
Many references may be found to the numerous statements on the subject 
by Mr Le Pen. For example, interviewed by Mr J.-L. Servan Schreiber on 
the TV programme 'L'Heure de Verite• (Antenne 2, 13 February 1985), 
concerning remarks he had made during his electoral campaign at 
Le Morbihan and their seemingly 'racist tenor•, Mr Le Pen replied that 
he did not think they were racist : that impression was 'contradicted by 
so many explicit statements I have made about the fact that I look on 
all Frenchmen as brothers in the nation irrespective of colour, race and 
religion, that I do not think there can be any doubt. Moreover, I wish 
to make clear that I am not xenophobic, that the fact that I prefer 
Frenchmen and France does not mean that I detest foreigners or that I 
detest other countries'. 
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(101) Also in April 1985 the neo-nazi militant of the Hoffmann group, 
Godfried Hepp was arrested in Paris. The Palestine Liberation Front 
formally approached the French Embassy in Tunis asking for his release 
(Liberation, 16 April and 1 July 1985). 
(102) The daily Liberation of 16 November 1984, describing Michel Faci's 
career and contacts wrote: 'As to his sources of income, they are 
revealed, at least in part, by his arrest: it is theft of every kind. 
Recently he was trying to sell, through a friend, his 'unique' 
collection of photographs of reunions of neo-nazis in uniform'. 
(103) See on this point: Le Nationalisme francais, 1871 - 1914, texts selected 
and introduced by Raoul GIRARDET, Paris, Colin, 1966; WEBER Eugen, 
The Nationalist Revival in France 1905 - 1914, Berkeley, University of 
California Press, 1968. 
The type of mentality which gives rise to a particular kind of 
nationalism has been well described by Jean-Paul SARTRE: 'Only a 
Frenchman, born of French parents and coming of peasant stock is really 
capable of 'owning'. To be the owner of a hovel in a village it is not 
enough to have paid for it in good money, you must also know all your 
neighbours, their parents and grandparents, you must know what is grown 
in the surrounding fields, you must know how to plough, fish, shoot and 
trap < ••• ). To be a Frenchman you not only need to have been born in 
France, to vote in its elections, to pay its taxes, you need above all 
to have an understanding and an appreciation of these values, 
Jean-Paul SARTRE, Reflexions sur la Question Juive, Paris, Gallimard, 
1954, p. 100-101 and 98. It is this mentality, which is widespread, 
rationalized and deep rooted, that has fed and still feeds anti-semitism 
and xenophobia in all sections of our society. In a recently published 
book are reproduced the stereotypes which are the staple of the Popular 
Front's film-making, but caricatures of Englishmen, and bankers who are 
inevitably Jews, can be found even in Renoir's 'La Grande Illusion'. 
Francois GARCON, De Blum a Petain, Paris, Cerf, 1 7~me Art 1 , 1985. 
(104) Surveys by the AESOP Institute collated by Gerard MERMET in 
Francoscopie, Paris, Larousse, 1985, p. 166. 
(105) MRAP-SOFRES poll -March 1984, quoted in G. MERMET, op. cit., p. 170. 
(106) Liberation, 20 March 1985. 
<107) For example a sports club run by three Frenchmen born of Algerian 
parents was ransacked in Le Havre. Racist slogans, nazi symbols and 
references to the Occident movement were written on the walls 
(Liberation, 26 April 1985>. Also see Liberation 30 September 1985 
(108) Le Monde, 4 April 1984. 
(109) Between December 1980 and February 1981 a series of scandals implicating 
the attitude of Communist Local authorities towards immigrants shook 
public opinion in France: the mayor of Vitry used a 'bulldozer' (it was 
in fact a mechanical shovel) to demolish a hostel for immigrants which 
he wanted moved to the neighbouring commune. After this, the Communist 
mayors of Seine-Saint-Denis while demanding that 'local authorities 
whose neglect of immigrants is scandalous (i.e. right-wing local 
authorities) should provide reception facilities for them' at the same 
time asked for a reallocation of social aid funds 'so that French 
workers could also benefit' (Le Monde, 1 January 1981). The 
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<101) Also in April 1985 the neo-nazi militant of the Hoffmann group, 
Godfried Hepp was arrested in Paris. The Palestine Liberation Front 
formally approached the French Embassy in Tunis asking for his release 
<Liberation, 16 April and 1 July 1985). 
(102) The daily Liberation of 16 November 1984, describing Michel Faci's 
career and contacts wrote: 'As to his sources of income, they are 
revealed, at Least in part, by his arrest: it is theft of every kind. 
Recently he was trying to sell, through a friend, his 'unique' 
collection of photographs of reunions of neo-nazis in uniform'. 
<103) See on this point: Le Nationalisme francais, 1871 - 1914, texts selected 
and introduced by Raoul GIRARDET, Paris, Colin, 1966; WEBER Eugen, 
The Nationalist Revival in France 1905- 1914, Berkeley, University of 
California Press, 1968. 
The type of mentality which gives rise to a particular kind of 
nationalism has been well described by Jean-Paul SARTRE: 'Only a 
Frenchman, born of French parents and coming of peasant stock is really 
capable of 'owning'. To be the owner of a hovel in a village it is not 
enough to have paid for it in good money, you must also know all your 
neighbours, their parents and grandparents, you must know what is grown 
in the surrounding fields, you must know how to plough, fish, shoot and 
trap < ••• ). To be a Frenchman you not only need to have been born in 
France, to vote in its elections, to pay its taxes, you need above all 
to have an understanding and an appreciation of these values, 
Jean-Paul SARTRE, Reflexions sur La Question Juive, Paris, Gallimard, 
1954, p. 100-101 and 98. It is this mental1ty, which is widespread, 
rationalized and deep rooted, that has fed and still feeds anti-semitism 
and xenophobia in all sections of our society. In a recently published 
book are reproduced the stereotypes which are the staple of the Popular 
Front's film-making, but caricatures of Englishmen, and bankers who are 
inevitably Jews, can be found even in Renoir's 'La Grande Illusion'. 
Francois GARCON, De Blum a Petain, Paris, Cerf, 1 7~me Art 1 , 1985. 
(104) Surveys by the AESOP Institute collated by Gerard MERMET in 
Francoscopie, Paris, Larousse, 1985, p. 166. 
(105) MRAP-SOFRES poll -March 1984, quoted in G. MERMET, op. cit., p. 170. 
<106) Liberation, 20 March 1985. 
(107) For example a sports club run by three Frenchmen born of Algerian 
parents was ransacked in Le Havre. Racist slogans, nazi symbols and 
references to the Occident movement were written on the walls 
(Liberation, 26 April 1985>. Also see Liberation 30 September 1985 
(108) Le Monde, 4 April 1984. 
(109) Between December 1980 and February 1981 a series of scandals implicating 
the attitude of Communist Local authorities towards immigrants shook 
public opinion in France: the mayor of Vitry used a 'bulldozer' (it was 
in fact a mechanical shovel) to demolish a hostel for immigrants which 
he wanted moved to the neighbouring commune. After this, the Communist 
mayors of Seine-Saint-Denis while demanding that 'Local authorities 
whose neglect of immigrants is scandalous (i.e. right-wing Local 
authorities) should provide reception facilities for them' at the same 
time asked for a reallocation of social aid funds 'so that French 
workers could also benefit' (Le Monde, 1 January 1981). The 
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Ille-et-Vilaine branch of the Communist Party opposed the building of an 
Islamic centre in Rennes (Le Monde, 12 January 1981). The Central 
Committee stated: 'We have reached crisis point. The employers and the 
Giscard administration - particularly the minister responsible, 
Mr Stoleru, and the prefects - continue, despite their assurances, to 
promote the entry of immigrant workers into France in the worst possible 
conditions, Leading to the creation of ghettos. Such a policy 
aggravates the problems of human relations, of social expenditure, of 
schooling and of unemployment' (Le Monde, 15 January 1981). A newspaper 
reported that the public housing author1ties in Nanterre and Saint-Denis 
wanted to cut down the re-housing of people from France's overseas 
territories (Liberation, 16 January 1981). The town council of 
Ivry-sur-Seine wanted to introduce a quota for children's holiday camps 
'to check and reduce the proportion of immigrants', as the deputy-mayor 
put it (Le Monde, 30 January 1981). The mayor of Montigny-les-Corneilles 
accused a Moroccan family of drugs trafficking, thus exposing it to 
public opprobium. The mayor of Dammarie-Les-Lys demanded that an 
immigrants' hostel be closed down. In Bernard STASI, L'immigration, une 
chance pour La France, Paris, Laffont, 1984, p. 25-30. On the 
March 1983 local elections see Alain ROLLAT, Les hommes de l'extreme 
droite, Paris, Calman-Levy, 1985: 'The climate of fear brought 1ts 
results ( ••• > UDF member Maurice Arreck, the mayor of Toulon, declared 
that his town 'will refuse to become Europe's rubbish bin' and the 
future mayor of Saint-Etienne, Francois Dubanchet (also UDF) said that 
'it was time to put a stop to dark-skinned delinquency' (p. 91). (The 
MRAP took the mayor of Toulon to court over his racist statements but 
the High Court of Montpellier ruled on 19 November 1984 that there was 
no case to answer). 
(110) Quoted in G. MERMET, op. cit., p. 166. 
<111) Early in 1982 a document entitled 'Seven months of discussion and 
action' prepared in the office of the Secretary of State in charge of 
repatriates noted that 'the number of French Muslims and their children 
is estimated at 300 000 of whom 127 000 Live in serious financial 
difficulties ( ••• >. Over 40% of this group, or 120 000, are under 16 
and 22%, or 66 000, are aged between 16 and 25 (corresponding national 
averages: 23% and 14%) ( ••• >. Studies in areas where there are high 
concentrations of these people show that 65% of young people aged 
between 18 and 25 are jobless. If the 16 to 18-year-olds are included 
the total comes to nearly 80% (national average: 13% unemployment among 
young people aged 18 to 25).' -Quoted (p. 103) in ABDELLATIF Saliha, 
'Etre Francais-Musulman en Picardie' - CRISPA, La France au Pluriel?, 
Paris, ed. L'Harmattan, 1984, p. 100-109). 
(112) Ville de Roubaix, L'immigration a Roubaix, constat et perspectives, 
typescript, p. 21-23. The features described here have their 
counterparts in many urban units in several Community countries: there 
is, says Andre Diligent, 'a wealth of differences' in Roubaix. The town 
has always been host to immigrant groups: at first they were Belgian, 
Polish, Italian and Portuguese and since the middle of the 1960s 
Algerian for the most part. It is estimated that there are 9 500 
persons of Algerian nationality in addition to 2 500 franco-muslims, 
1 500 Algerians who have become French by naturalization and about 
6 500 children born to Algerian families after 1 January 1963 -making 
altogether a population of Algerian origin of about 20 000 people 
(nearly 20% of the town's total population). This in a town hit by the 
full force of the crisis and characterized by a Low educational and 
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professional Level of its population: 18% are unemployed, 40% of 
households are below the tax threshold, 72% of the population has an 
educational standard equal to or below the Certificate of Elementary 
Education, 76% of the workforce consists of unskilled Labourers and 
unqualified non-manual workers- there is a permanently high school 
drop-out rate. 
(113) 'While the opening of a pagoda at Vincennes causes not a ripple of 
emotion, the building of a mosque, anywhere in France, gives rise to 
interminable and disheartening controversies. There seems to be 
something in the Frenchman's deepest unconscious which is opposed to 
the slightest affirmation of an Islamic presence in our country, that 
presence being perceived by many of our compatriots as an aggression. 
As Long as the country cannot rid itself of this intolerance, the 
problem of immigrants will continue to create a climate of stress' 
B. STASI, op. cit. p. 147-148. 
'Never before has France had to face up to a problem of this size: how 
to assimilate millions of people of a different religion who are 
determined to hang on to their native roots ( ••• ). There is no doubt 
that there has been a re-awakening of a more dynamic and tougher Islam, 
in France as elsewhere' A. GRIOTTERAY, Les immigres, Le choc, Paris, 
Plon, 1984, p. 105-106. 
'It cannot be excluded that eventually Mohammed's religion will change 
its face and that day, when hundreds of thousands of immigrants in 
France embrace that faith, we shall be facing a very serious situation' 
E. ROUSSEL, Le Cas Le Pen, Paris, Lattes, p. 139). 
<114) Michael BARRY, Le Royaume de L'Insolence, Paris, Flammarion, p. 61-63. 
(115) ibid, p. 63. 
(116) ibid, p. 65-66. He also says: 'Khomeinism follows closely some aspects 
of a raw fascism• (p. 83). 
(117) See also Esprit, June 1985, where other examples are quoted. 
GREECE 
(118) V.A. LENTAKIS, Para-state organizations and (the dictatorship of) 
21 April, Athens 1975; J. KATRIS, 1960- 1970, The birth of neo-fascism 
1n Greece (in Greek), revised edition, Athens 1974; 
B. VACALOPOULOU-GIULIANO, Neofascism in Greece (additional chapter to 
the Greek translation of: G. GODDI, Neofascismo en Europa), Athens, 
1975. p.275 et seq.; Review Anti, No. 1771975, 'Greek Fascism•, 
containing art1cles by G. Sefertzis, A. Lentakis, M. Patrinos, 
P. Servas, p.9 et seq.; A. KOSSONAS, in Anti No. 258, 13 April 1984, 
p.19 et seq.; D. KYRTATOS, in Dekapenthimeros Politis, issued dated 
5 October 1984. p.24 et seq.; P. BOUCALAS and N. XYDIAKIS in 
Dekapenthimeros Polit1s 1ssue dated 14 December 1984, p.12 et seq. Very 
few sources of information on the present state of the subjects of the 
inquiry are available. The historical essays and articles in the 
reviews mentioned above, though accurate on fact, contain politically 
biased analyses, v. LENTAKIS, Para-state organizations, p.386. This 
remains the most comprehensive and systematic work on the subject for 
the period preceding the military dictatorship of 1967- 1974. Also see 
the interesting analysis by C. PANAGOPOULOS in the review Epikentra, 
No. 44/1985, pp. 70-71 
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(119) According toP. BOUCALAS and N. XYDAKIS (footnote 104 above), p.19, 
between 1967 and 1984 there were some 150 organizations which were 
fascist, royalist or associated with the military dictatorship; none 
survived for more than a few months and they have all disappeared for 
lack of support. 
(120) An organization calling itself Chrissi Avgi (Golden dawn) openly praises 
the nazi regime, cf. its publicat1ons, New European Order (in Greek), 
G. METAXAS, The other face of Europe (in Greek). 
(121) FIR, 40 Ans apres, p.23. In December 1984 Le Pen hosted an Athens 
meeting of European right-wing groups, which provoked violent protest 
demonstrations. Speaking afterwards at a press conference, the group's 
chairman Mr Le Pen demanded the release of the imprisoned leaders of the 
military junta, calling them 'political prisoners', The Guardian, 
7 December 1984, The Times, 7 December 1984. See also Neue Zurcher 
Zeitung, 12 February 1984, Dekapenthimeros Politis, No. 29, 
14 December 1984, p.12 et seq. 
<122) See Anti, No. 17/1975, p.14- 15. 
(123) The law 846/1946 abolished 'in the case of the estates of Jews of Greek 
nationality who disappeared during the war as a result of the enemy's 
racial persecution' the State's right of inheritance from intestates in 
the absence of heirs. The assets which had accumulated from such 
estates where handed over to an organization set up by royal decree of 
28/29 March 1949 to lend assistance to the Jewish communities in 
Greece. On the large Jewish community of Thessaloniki, see A NAR The 
synagogues of Thessaloniki, Our Hymns (preface by G. IOANNOU, 
Thessaloniki 1983 (in Greek> p. 13: 'For over four centuries 
Thessaloniki was the refuge of EuropeAs persecuted Jews') and the moving 
account by the same author, 'The refugees' capital, 3rd ed. Thessaloniki 
1984 (in Greek) p. 58 et seq. 
(124) Sporadic outbreaks of anti-semitism are not totally unknown. See table 
presented by Mr May to the hearing, footnote 171 and letter in Le Nouvel 
Observateur of 13-19 September 1985 p. 18. Responsibility for a f1re 
which in 1983 destroyed a number of shops belonging to Jews in 
Thessaloniki was claimed by the 'Greek National Socialist Combat', an 
organization otherwise unknown. Some nationalistic press publishing 
houses issue anti-semitic books. The invasion of Lebanon by the Israeli 
army in 1982 unleashed a wave of criticism and protest against Israel 
often marked by anti-semitic overtones. The assurances given then by 
the government seem to have allayed the Jewish community's anxieties. 
In 1984 the Greek Parliament voted a law which makes discrimination on 
religious grounds and incitement to religious hatred punishable crimes. 
IRELAND 
(125) There is however a National Socialist Irish Workers Party which 
publishes Phoenix as well as propaganda mater1al. 
(126) On the prejudice encountered by the Irish living in the United Kingdom 
see: INFORMATION ON IRELAND, Nothing but the same old story, The roots 
of anti-Irish racism, London, 1985. 
(127) Lansdowne, market research, omnibus survey, February 1981, sample of 
1 400 persons. See also the Sunday Independent, 12 June 1983. 
<128) See paragraph 233 
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ITALY 
(129) See Franco FERRARESI (ed.), La destra radicale, Milan, Feltrinelli, p.101 
(130) Ibid, p.71 et seq. Statistics on political terrorism in Italy will be 
found in: Quaderni dell'Annpia, No. 4 'Atti del Convegno Regionale sul 
Terrorismo aRoma e nel Lazio', Roma, 23- 24 ottobre 1981', p.84 et 
seq. See also R. CHIARINI, P. CORSINI, Da Salo a Piazza della LoggTa, 
Milan, F. Angeli, 1983. 
(131) The conclusion in the decision of 9 February 1974 of the Tribunal of 
Rome describes very accurately the charges against Ordine Nuovo and its 
sister movements: 'The political movement Ordine Nuovo has reconstituted 
the fascist party by setting up a central and a peripheral organization 
and by the use of the press and propaganda. The ideas propagated by 
Ordine Nuovo are similar to fascist ideology as can be seen by comparing 
the Ordine Nuovo and the fascist doctrines whether in respect of links 
to the fascist tradition, or their approval of fascist totalitarianism, 
racism and fascism, their rejection of democracy and the multiparty 
system, their use of violence and their glorification of the principles, 
symbols and methods characteristic of the fascist party now dissolved'. 
(132) V.M. LINKLATER, I. HILTON and N: ASCHERSON, The Fourth Reich: 
Klaus Barbie and the Neo-Fascist Connection (London: Hodder and 
Stoughton) 1984 p. 203 et seq. 
(133) Mr Aniasi also mentioned the Ludwig group ('the last heirs of nazism• 
'swearing death to those who betray the true God'), which, since 1979 
has claimed responsibility for the murder of 28 people, including 
priests, rabbis, homosexuals and prostitutes. In his report to the 
Council of Europe Mr Krieps noted that: (in Italy) 'It is difficult to 
distinguish between the extreme left and the extreme right where 
violence and anti-semitism are concerned. The results are the same: the 
death and mutilation of hundreds of innocent victims, the Latest example 
being the senseless bombing of the railway station in Bologna. Their 
short-term aim - the overthrow of the institutions of the democratic 
state - is also the same• (p.13). 
<134) See also Tiempo, 13 May 1985. 
(135) Claudio Mutti who was expelled from the MSI in 1973 had established the 
newspaper Lotta di Popolo which is frankly sympathetic to the Libyan 
regime. He has translated 'The Little Green Book', one of the sources 
of the 'Terza Posizione•. 
(136) See Mr May's table, footnote 171 below, for antisemitic incidents in 
Italy. 
LUXEMBOURG 
<137> Federation internationale des Resistants - Resistance Unie, 
No. 1/2/1985, p.30. See also Le Republican Lorrain, 28 November 1984. 
(138) See footnote 199 below 
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" 
THE NETHERLANDS 
(139) For a more comprehensive and detailed description of Dutch extreme-right 
groups, see J. Van Donselaar, H. Smeets, M. van Weezel, in The Extreme 
Right, p.29 et seq.; see also J. Kniesmeyer, Hearing, p.3 et seq., FIR, 
40 Ans apres, p.30, 31, G. GADDI, Nee-fascism in Europe, (Greek 
translat1on by B. Vacelopoulou-Giullano), Athens, 1975, p.208, 209. 
(140) Van Donselaar, Smeets, Van Weezel, The Extreme Right p.29. 
<141> Van Donselaar, Smeets, Van Weezel, The Extreme Right, p.29. 
(142) Van Donselaar, Smeets, Van Weezel, The Extreme Right, p.29. 
<143> Van Donselaar, Smeets, Van Weezel, The Extreme Right, p.29, 30; 
J. Kniesmeyer, Hearing, p.3. 
(144) J. Kniesmeyer, Hearing, p.3, 4, Van Donselaar, Smeets, Van Weezel, 
The Extreme Right, p.33. 
(145) J. Kniesmeyer, Hearing, p.4, 5. 
<146) J. Kniesmeyer, Hearing, p.7. 
<147) Van Donselaar, Smeets, Van Weezel, The Extreme Right, p.37. 
(148) The Extreme Right, p.33. 
<149) J. Kniesmeyer, Hearing, p.9. 
<150) Ph. Essed, Alledaags Racisme, Amsterdam, 1984. 
(151) Ph. Essed, Hearing, p.1 et seq. 8. 
UNITED KINGDOM 
(152) OJ C 117 of 15.7.1985, p. 211 et seq. Rapporteur: M. Haagerup 
(Doc. 1-1526/83) 
(153) The Race Relations Acts of 1965, 1968 and 1976 and the nationality laws 
defining the communities which have de jure right to British 
citizenship, e.g. the 1981 British Nationality Act 
(154> s. TAYLOR. The National Front in English Politics, London, Macmillan 
1982, p. 5 
(155) Ann Dummett noted that the 1904 Aliens Act was the first measure of 
immigration control systematically adopted in the UK in peace time and 
was specifically directed against the entry of Jews from Russia, Poland 
and Rumania - •another instance of the anti-semitism that has been 
endemic in Europe for a thousand years.• 
(156) A Conservative splinter group formed the National Party in 1917 with a 
programme based on chauvinist imperialism. Most of them rejoined the 
Conservative Party at the 1918 elections and the party was disbanded in 
1921. D. BUTLER and J. FREEMAN British Political Facts 1900-1967 
(London: Macmillan) 1968. 
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(157) R. BENEWICK. The fascist movement in Britain, London, Allen Lane 1972 
as quoted in s. TAYLOR. op. c1t. 
Sir Oswald Mosley CConservat1ve, the Independant MP 1918-1924, Labour MP 
1926-1931) formed the New Party with 6 other MPs who resigned the Labour 
Whip, after his Memorandum for dealing with unemployment had been 
rejected by the Cabinet. Having Lost three of the six founders within 
days of its founding, and gained a Conservative and Liberal, the new 
Party contested 24 seats at the 1931 General Election and won none. The 
party was name the British Union of Fascists in 1932, did not contest 
the 1935 General Election and was proscr1bed in 1940 having contested 
by-elections in 1939 and 1940. Sir Oswald Mosley formed the Union 
Movement in 1947, contested its first parliamentary seat in the 1959 
General Elections (Lost deposit). It was unsuccessful electorally up to 
1966. See C. CROSS The Fascists in Britain and D. BUTLER and J. FREEMAN 
British Political Facts 1960-1967 2nd Edition (London: MacMillan) 1968 
and R. McKENZIE Br1tish Political Parties (London: Mercury Books) 
pp. 438-439 
(158) One of the fascist groupings formed in the UK after the Italian fascist 
revolution in 1922, the Stamford Fascists (East London based), did 
manage to win three Local authority elections, two in 1924 and one in 
1927. The other groups, the British Fascisti, the National Fascisti and 
the Imperial Fascist League rema1ned small, marginal spl1nter groups. 
(159) TAYLOR, S. op.cit. p. 18 and Paul WILKINSON The New Fascists (London: 
Pan Books) 1983, p. 74 
(160) Ivor CREWE and Anthony FOX British Parliamentary Constituencies 
A Statistical Compendium (London: Faber & Faber) 1984 
The most successful result was in fact in Leicester where in a 
three-cornered fight the NF candidate came within about 18 votes of 
winning the seat. The result in Blackburn - where Kingsley Read and 
another former NF member won- occurred in a multi-member ward, where 
the Local Conservative Party did not field as many candidates as there 
were seats available. See Michael STEED, 'The National Front Vote' 
Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. XXXI, 1978 pp. 282-93, Chris HUSBANDS and 
J. ENGLAND 1The Joker in the Pack: The Efforts of National Front 
Intervention' New Statesman 20 April 1979, pp. 542-45 and 'The Hidden 
Support for Racism' New Statesman 11 May 1979, pp. 674-6 and also 
C. HUSBANDS as well as S. TAYLOR op.cit. pp. 111-140. Some evident 
suggests that electoral support for extreme right wing candidates is 
highest not necessarily in areas with high immigrant populations but in 
those neiQhbouring such areas. While this would suggest familiarity 
breeds tolerance, it does not exclude possible points of extreme tension 
arising in such areas. Membership and electoral support have collapsed 
since 1977; but in October 1985 certain Anti-Racist organizations 
suggested that extreme right-wing organizations are enjoying a revival 
in comparison with the recent past: recruitment efforts are being 
stepped up, and visible signs of their presence are reported more 
frequently. See Searchlight October 1985. 
(161) ANNE FRANK STICHTING The Extreme Right in Europe and the United 
States Amsterdam, 1985. 
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• 
(162) J. TOMLINSON, Left, right, the march of political extremism in Britain, 
London, Calder p.61 et seq. The anti-semitic caricatures published in 
Socialist Worker (November 1982) Socialist Worker (No 937) Militant 
(August 1982) etc. appear remarkably similar to the themes 1n 
Nationalism Today (November 1982 and 1983) or New Nation (Autumn 1980). 
Compare also the extremist participation in the ant1-z1onist 
demonstration of September 1983 as described in National Front News 
No. 51. The role of the Iranian Embassy in the UK in publish1ng and 
distributing the hoax Protocol of the Elders of Zion in Imam illustrates 
the similarities and was raised by a number of experts.-----
(163) H.W. DEGENHARDT (compiler) and A.J. DAY (ed.) Political Dissent : 
An International Guide to Dissident, Extra-Parllamentary, Guerilla and 
Illegal Political Movements (London: Longman) 1983 p. 494 and 495. 
(164) Paul WILKINSON The New Fascists (London: Pan Books) 1983 p. 165 et seq. 
(165> See Harold WILSON The Labour Government 1964-1970 : A Personal Record 
(London: Weidenfeld and Nlcolson) 1971 p. 525 et seq. 
(166) See R. COCHRANE and M. BILLIG, 'Extremism of the Centre: the SOP's young 
followers• New Society, 20 May 1982. 
(167) ANNE FRANK STICHTING op. cit. pp. 92-3; Searchlight March 1985 p.6; 
Nationalism Today and other publications cited above. 
(168) In an lTV •world in Action• interview in July 1981 Willi Kraus, facing a 
four-year prison sentence in the Federal Republic of Germany for nazi 
activities, explained how former member of the NF Directorate, Anthony 
Read Herbert of the British Democratic Party was_ ready to provide 
weapons, through a third party. The programme also Linked the League of 
St. George to the provision of safe houses for Italian right-wing 
terror1sts in London. 
(169) H.W. DEGENHARDT, Political Dissent, p.494 Links Column 88 with active 
terrorist right-wing groups 1n Italy, with Palestinian groups and with 
the Vlaamse Militantenorde in Belgium. 
(170) See ANNE FRANK STICHTING op. cit. and Paul WILKINSON The New Fascists. 
Also See Ray Hill's statement at the Socialist Group Conference, London 
29 March 1985 
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(171) Table of anti-semitic incidents for the years 1981-1983 
EUROPE 1981 1982 1983 
1 • Austria 28 32 23 
2. Belgium 28 26 19 
3. Britain 314 312 221 
4. Cyprus 1 1 
5. Denmark 2 11 9 
6. Finland 7 5 2 
7. France 100 116 93 
8. Germany 88 120 88 
9. Greece 20 34 17 
10. Ireland 1 1 
11. Italy 70 95 28 
12. Luxembourg 1 
13. Netherlands 8 52 20 
14. Norway 1 7 7 
15. Portugal 3 1 
.16. Spain 16 10 10 
17. Sweden 11 8 7 
18. Switzerland 6 22 7 
TOTAL 699 855 554 
Source: M. MAY, written submission to the Third Hearing of the 
Committee of Inquiry, 18-20 March 1985 
(172) This Last publication also appears under the title, Six Million Lost and 
Found, see the catalogue of Historical Review Press which divides up its 
publications in sections, 'Revisionist History', 'National Socialism', 
'Race and Anthropology'. 
<173) The Economist 7 July 1984 p.25, c. BROWN, Black & White Britain, London, 
He1nemann Educational Books, 1984. 
<174) Home Office Study Group, Racial Attacks, London, HMSO, November 1981. 
(175) Racial violence deserves further discussion. See in particular 
c. BROWN, op.cit pp. 247-263; F. KLUG, Racist Attacks London, Runnymede 
Trust, February 1982. Police statistics do seem to indicate an increase 
in racial attacks : COMMISSION FOR RACIAL EQUALITY Annual Report 1984 
pp. 26-7. C.J. TRUEBLOOD, Racial attacks and harassment in Cheetham : 
A brief report and case summary for Cheetham/Crumpsall Community Workers 
Group, January 1982. GREATER LONDON COUNCIL Rac1al harassment 1n GLC 
estates in Tower Hamlets - Emerging patterns (November 1983-1984), 
London, GLC 1985, and submiss1ons by Dr LAYTON-HENRY on 1 Racial attacks 
in England', April 1985, and his 'Racial attacks in Britain' Patterns of 
Prejudice, Vol. 16, No. 2, 1982. See also submission of the BRITISH 
COUNCIL OF CHURCHES (Community Affairs, Community and Race Relations 
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.. 
Unit) to the committee of inquiry and BBC Radio 4 programme 'World This 
Weekend' of 13 October 1985 - The Economist 14 September 1985 pp. 33 and 
41 and ibid of 5 October 1985, pp. 24 and 29. 
(176) V. The Economist 14 September 1985 p. 33, The Times 20 October 1985 
quoted a police inspector as saying: 'We are the visible presence Left 
at the end of the day. The identifiable target. I can't imagine they 
will have a riot at the housing office or the education office but they 
will have a go at the police, which is the culmination of all their 
problems.• See too Karim MURTI 'Observing the Brixton Riot' 
New Society, 4 October 1985, pp. 6 et seq., Martin HARRIS 'Looking back 
on the R1ot' New Society, 4 October 1985, pp. 8 et seq. and 
E. Ellis CASHMORE 1What Lay behind the Birmingham R1ots' New Society, 
13 September 1985, pp. 374 - 376. 
(177> Lord SCARMAN, The Brixton disorders 10-12 April 1981, London, HMSO Cmnd 
8427, November 1981. According to a study made by Sheffield University, 
0.54% of HM Police Force in England and Wales are from ethnic minorities 
(The Times 2 November 1984). The Times Special Report on the police of 
2 October 1985 stated that there were 271 officers from minority ethnic 
groups in the Metropolitan Police Force in 1984: out of the 10 296 who 
applied to join the police in 1984, 400 were from minority ethnic 
groups; 36 of these were recruited out of 1 219 new recruits. 
Leon Brittan, Home Secretary has said: 'There is no doubt at all that 
studies have shown that in certain parts of the police, racist attitudes 
do exist as they do in society as a whole. What is more surprising is 
finding that, for the most part, those attitudes have not affected 
behaviour. That does not mean these attitudes are justified or anything 
other than deplorable and it does mean that we have to take action to 
deal with it' (Daily Telegraph, 10 December 1984). See also COMMUNITY 
ALLIANCE FOR POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY, Annual Report 1984, London Tower 
Hamlets. 
(178) See OJ C 229 of 9.9.1985, pp. 99 et seq. and OJ C 175 of 15.7.1985, 
pp. 211 - 212. 
(179) See e.q. VS Bericht 1984 pp. 157 and 158. 
(180) See the report by the Collignon committee of 9 July 1985, p. 73 et seq. 
Also information supplied by Mr Nothomb, Minister of the Interior 
(pp. 23 and 24), Mr Brouhon, Bourgmestre of Brussels (p. 25) and 
General Bernaert, Commander of the Gendarmerie (p. 27) 
(181) See Committee on Inquiry into crowd safety and control at sports 
grounds, Interim Report (chairman: Mr Justice POPPLEWELL, London, 1985, 
p. 39). Also the press review accompanying the statement by Mr FORD, 
chairman of our committee, during his press conference in Strasbourg, 
12 June 1985, Time, of 10 June 1985, Le Monde, 16-17 June 1985. 
(182) J. WILLIAMS, E. DUNNING, & P. MURPHY, Hooligans abroad: The behaviour 
and control of English fans in continental Europe, London, RKP, 1984; 
the report of the Belg1an Parl1ament Committee of Inquiry on the Heysel 
tragedy; Mr Justice Popplewell's interim report on football violence and 
safety. 
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<183) International Herald Tribune of Tuesday, 1 October 1985, p. 2 
<184) M. KING and C. MAY, Black Magistrates; A study of selection and 
appointment, London, cobden Trust, 1985 
(185) SCARMAN Report; COMMISSION FOR RACIAL EQUALITY Annual Report 1984, 
p.31. See also footnotes 176-177 above. 
<186) S. Rose, Hearing, Annex 4 
(187) See Annual report for 1985 of the COMMISSION FOR RACIAL EQUALITY; 
The Policy Studies Institute and its predecessor PEP have conducted 
several opinion polls on aspects of race relations in the UK, on racial 
discrimination and immigration; see too the Social and Community 
Planning Research studies. Some British poll1ng organizations have 
presented the results of studies concerning these questions, already 
discussed briefly in footnote 160. See too Michael Banton White and 
Coloured: The Behaviour of the British People toward Coloured 
Immigrants (London: Jonathan Cape) 1959. 
E.J.B. ROSE Coloured and Citizenship: A Report on British Race 
Relations (London: O.U.P.) 1968; D.J. SMITH Unemployment and Racial 
Minorities (London: PSI) 1981 and C. BROWN op.cit. note 173. F lEER 
and J. SPENCE Political Opinion Polls (London: Hutchison) 1972, chap. 5 
pp. 121-126. 
(188) R. COCHRANE and M. BILLIG, 'I'm not National Front myself, but ••• ' 
New Society 17 May 1984. Racism here should be distinguished from 
faSClSm : 
'Traditionally, fascism has been considered the politics of personality, 
based on an admiration for a strong Leader. These youngsters tend to 
know the personalities, not the policies, of the main parties; but they 
know the policy not the personalities of the fascist parties. Expulsion 
stands out as a vivid symbol against an otherwise hazy and poorly 
distinguished policy background.' (p.256). 
The curious phenomenon of 'reverse racism' was raised: 'Asians were 
thought to be getting ahead better than white children. It was often 
acknowledged that this was based on more serious application at school, 
harder graft and Longer hours put into work, and even <surprisingly) 
intellectual superiority.' (ibid.). 
The mixture of facetious and serious remarks in the racist views 
expressed is striking: 'Make someone happy: kill a Paki', 'BM boys are 
big and brave, and all deserve a nigger slave', replaced among girls by 
a relative rationalization of the views felt: 'I've got friends who 
would Like to stay in this country, but if it was either get them all 
out or keep them all in, I'd rather get 'em all out' pp. 256-257. See 
also M. BILLIG, Fascists: A social psychological view of the National 
Front, London, Academic Press, 1978. 
(189) R. JOWELL and C. AIREY, British Social Attitudes: the 1984 Report, 
London, Gower, 1984 
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SPAIN 
(190) On the transition period, see Raymond CARR and Juan Pablo FUSI AIZPURA, 
Spain: Dictatorship to Democracy, London, Allen and Unwin, 1981. 
On the nature of the Franco r4gime : 
G. PAYNE, Falange: A History of Spanish Fascism, Stanford University 
Press, 196 , 
- J. LINZ, 'From Falange to Movimiento Organizacion: The Spanish Single 
Party and the Franco Regime, 1936-1968', pp. 128-203 in 
S. P. HUNTINGTON and C. H. MOORE, Authoritarian Politics in Modern 
Society, New York, Basic Books, 19 
(191) The Spanish crisis of the 1930s should be seen in the context of the 
rise of fascist movements, but it was not due to this rise. It was not 
that a fascist party was growing (it existed and collected 0.4% of the 
vote), but that, independently of any social conflict, areas of violence 
were appearing which, together with the instability of the governments 
and the in-fighting and corruption in the political parties, prepared a 
favourable ground for a call to arms. Spain's political history, in 
fact, records several major changes which were not accompanied by a 
political mobilization of the masses (cf. Raymond CARR, Spain 1808-1959, 
Oxford University Press, 1966, also J. LINZ, El Sistema de Part1dos en 
Espana, Madrid, Narcea, 1976). 
(192) For instance an article in Vorwarts ·af 2 February 1984 claims that there 
are so many Franco Loyalists in the army that if the Minister of Defence 
wanted to take account of their political persuasion the whole system of 
rotation and promotion would be blocked. 
(193) P. LETAMENDIA, Les Partis Politiques en Espagne, Paris, PUF, 1983, p. 95. 
(194) For the region of Grenada, see the survey by Cambia 16 of 15 April 1985. 
(195) There is also a small group led by Antonio Tejera called Solidaridad 
Espanola. Its financial branch, Solidaridad y Naturaleza dabbles 1n 
real estate transactions (see EL Pais of 8 November 1984, p. 19). 
(196) Article 31, No. 7, April 1985, pp. 13-14. 
(197) For example: 
'Links between Spanish right-wing extremists or neo-nazis and their 
counterparts in Germany and Western Europe went primarily through the 
"Circulo Espanol de Amigos de Europa" (CEDADE) which despatched neo-nazi 
propaganda material to the Federal Republic of Germany. On the 50th 
anniversary of Hitler's accession to power on 30 January, CEDADE 
published under the title "50th anniversary of national socialism" a 
special issue which was also distributed in the Federal Republic.' 
FRG: Verfassungsschutzbericht 1983, p. 150. Estimates of numbers of 
CEDADE members and associates vary considerably. 
(198) Tiempo, 13 May 1985. 
(199) Discussed in Fanny CORNUAULT, La France des Sectes, Paris, Tchou, 1978. 
For the purposes of its propaganda the sect (at least in France) also 
uses the holiday travel business : the VDT ('Voyages Decouvertes 
Traditions') organization and 'REVES - vacances' (whose advertisements 
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are particularly addressed to the medical world). There is also a group 
called Edelweis established by one Gonzalez Arenas who has a criminal 
record; its activities were denounced in a motion for a resolution 
tabled by Mrs Dury, member of the Commission of Inquiry · 
(Doc. 2-1450/84). Gonzalez Arenas, who is currently being prosecuted in 
Law, denies the charge of neo-nazism against his group (EL Pais, 
29 July 1985). 
(200) Cambio 16, 10 June 1985, p. 53. 
<201) ibid, pp. 48-58 and Liberation, 16 April 1985. 
<202) cf. Sabino de ARANA Y GOIRI (born 1864) in Obras Completas, ed. 
Sabindiar-Batza, Buenos Aires, 1965: 'If at the end of this time of 
bondage the cry of independence resounded, it resounded for God alone.' 
(p. 1333). 
In the ideology of the extremist forms of the independence movement 
(forged by a number of former seminarists) there is a fusion, as if they 
were one and the same entity, of the concepts of the Basque people, of 
the chosen people (of the Old Testament) and of the proletariat. It 
should also be noted that there is a strong millenarian tradition in the 
Basque country. 
(203) Jose MIGUEL DE AZOLA, 'El Hecho Vasco', pp. 213-283, and especially 
pp. 230-239, in J. LINZ (ed.), Espana: un presente para el futuro, 
vol. 1, Madrid, Instituto de Estud1os Economicos, 1984. 
See also Hans-Jurgen PUHLE, 'Baskicher Nationalismus', in H.A. WINKLER 
(ed.), Nationalismus in der Welt von Heute, Gottingen, Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht, 1982, pp. 51-81. 
(204) El Pais, 12 January 1985. 
AUSTRIA 
(205) B. Galanda, Hearing, p. 5, The Extreme Right, p. 69 
(206) B. Galanda, Hearing, p. 7, The Extreme Right, p. 69; FIR, 40 Ans apres, 
p. 1. In addition to the organizations referred to in the text, ment1on 
can also be made of the OTB (Oesterreichischer Turnerbund, Austrian 
Gymnastics Federation) whose organ Bundesturnzeitung was declared to 
have a neo-nazi content by a court (B. GALANDA, The Extreme Right, 
p. 70), as well as the AFAO (Arbeitsgemeinschaft Freiheitlicher 
Akademikerverbande Oesterreichs, Working Community of Liberal University 
Assoc1at1ons of Austria) (B. GALANDA, The Extreme Right, pp. 69-70). On 
Austrian right-wing extremists in general see Dokumentationsarchiv des 
Oesterreichischen Widerstandes, Rechtsextremismus 1n Oesterre1ch nach 
1945, 5th edition, 1981, preface by Erwin Lane, Federal Minister of the 
Interior. 
(207) B. Galanda, Hearing, pp. 7, 8; The Extreme Right, p. 71. 
(208) See on this footnote below. 
(209) B. Galanda, Hearing, p. 8. 
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I 
(210) The action was based essentially on the State Treaty (Staatsvertrag) of 
15 May 1955 between the Allied Powers and Austria on the reestablishment 
of an independent and democratic Austria. Article 9 of the Treaty 
provides that nazi and fascist-type organizations must be dissolved and 
banned and that the Austrian State must introduce denazification 
measures. 
(211) B. Galanda, Hearing, pp. 10, 11. According to research quoted below 
(footnote 318>, the percentage of nazi sympathizers in Austria is 
steadily falling. The number of older nazis who still approve of the 
system as a whole is miniscule (0.1%). On the other hand, the number of 
people who consider themselves to belong to the Austrian nation as well 
as of those who are prepared to defend parliamentarism is constantly 
rising. The proportion of the population Likely to be recruited by 
neo-nazi organizations is no more than 2%. According to 
(212) 
(213) 
(214) 
(215) 
(216) 
<217) 
Dr Heinz Kienzl, an official of the Sozialwissenschaftlische 
Studiengesellschaft, 'Fascism is dead 1 in Austria, see Tiroler 
Tageze1tung, Innsbruck, issue dated 5 July 1985. 
B. Galanda, Hearing, p. 10, The Extreme Right, p. 76. 
B. Galanda, Hearing, p. 10, The Extreme Right, p. 76. Compare, however, 
s. Wiesenthal, Hearing, pp. 9, 10. 
B. Galanda, Hearing p. 10. 
See the Committee's minutes for the meeting of 31 January. PE 95.896 
and PE 96.081 
B. Galanda, Hearing p. 12, The Extreme Right. 
B. Galanda, Hearing p. 11. 
(218) B. Galanda, Hearing pp. 11, 12. Information on anti-semitic attitudes 
in Austrian society is nevertheless contradictory : according to 
research carried out by two Austrian social study institutions (lnstitut 
fur empirische Sozialforschung and Sozialwissenschaftliche 
Studlengesellschaft), the proportion of those openly declaring 
anti-semitic attitudes fell from 13% in 1972 to 10% in 1982. Among 
young people in particular the proportion is 5% (see Tiroler 
Tagezeitung, Innsbruck, issue dated 5 July 1985). In contrast, 
according to information from the EEC Monitor published by BIPAC 
(Britain/Israel Public Affairs Committee), No. 102, 
January-February 1984, p. 10, a survey carried out by the University of 
Vienna showed the survival of much stronger anti-semitic feelings and 
prejudices in Austrian society. On this survey see also B. GALANDA, 
The Extreme Right, p. 69. 
(219) Bomb attacks, mainly on firms belonging to Jews in Vienna and Salzburg, 
were carried out in 1982 with the complicity of a well-known German 
extremist, Eberhard Weil. The trial which followed brought to Light the 
neo-nazis' and right-wing extremists' links with the NDP and the ANR. 
The penalties ranged from three months' suspended sentence to five 
years' imprisonment for Weil. FIR, 40 Ans apres, p. 2. See also 
s. Wiesenthal, Hearing, p. 11. 
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NORWAY 
<220) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 3 March 1981. 
SWEDEN 
In his 1980 report to the Council of Europe Mr Krieps stated: 'In 
Norway Vidkun Quisling's old party, the Natjional Samling is keeping 
quiet about its former adherents. The members of the neo-nazi 
Norsk Front found it easier to throw a bomb in Oslo on 1 May than to 
collect 3 000 signatures necessary for standing in the elections. This 
movement is trying to take over and use a party which is in existence 
but inactive, the Norwegian Democratic Party' (p. 15). Some other 
observers consider that Norsk Front has a somewhat greater following. 
(221) Analyses by Cas Felderer in Index on Censorship, vol. 13, No. 2, 
April 1984 and Searchlight, May 1983. 
SWITZERLAND 
(222) KEESING's CONTEMPORARY ARCHIVES 6 August 1982 p. 31636 and 6 July 1979 
P. 29704. For the details of the system of referenda see Alois RIKLIN 
(ed.) Handbuch Politisches System der Schweiz Vols. I and II (Berne: 
publ. Paul Haupt) 1983 
(223) The Verfassungsschutzbericht (RCH) of 1984. A 'Parti National 
Socialiste 1 was set up in Zurich in August 1985 by Mr Ernst Meister, 
former vice-chairman of 'L'Action Nationale' of Zurcih canton. This 
group is thought to number only half a dozen mbmers (Le Monde, 17.8.1985) 
<224) M. MAY 'Can prejudice be measured? Two cases studies on Anti-Semitism 
in Switzerland', Research Report, Institute for Jewish Affairs, 
December 1981, No. 18, is an interesting study both in its methodology 
and its conclusions. The corresponding findings for the FRG are : 6 to 
7% of the population strongly in agreement with anti-semitic statements 
and 15 to 19% displaying Less pronounced anti-semitic attitudes. See 
S. T. ROTH, 'The German mind and right-extremism: a comment on recent 
findings', Encounter, September 1981. 
(225) Report by Mr Krieps, op. cit. p. 8. See footnote 52 above. 
TURKEY 
(226) H. Degenhardt (ed.) Political Dissent 
<227) See Political Affairs Committee's draft report on the human rights 
situation in Turkey, rapporteur Mr Balfe (PE 98.572) pp. 15-17 
(228) P. Wilkinson, The New Fascists, London, Pan Books, 1983 
(229) Leo Kuper, Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century, 
Harmondsworth: Penguin Books 1981, particularly chapter 6 'Genocidal 
Process: The Turkish Genocide Against Armenians' and also Political 
Affairs Committee draft report on a political solution to the Armenian 
question, rapporteur Mr Vandemeulebroucke (PE 97.248/B), to be debated 
shortly in the committee. See also: Tribunal Permanent des Peuples, 
Le Crime de Silence, Le genocide des Armeniens, Paris, Flammarion, 
1984. G. CHALIAND et Y. TERNON, Le G~nocide des Armeniens, Bruxelles, 
complexe, 1980. J. M. CARZOU, Armenie 1915, Un Genocide exemplaire, 
Paris, Flammarion, 1975. 
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• 
EASTERN EUROPE 
<230) The American Jewish Committee, 'Submission to the European Parliamentary 
Commission of Inquiry', pp. 3-4. To this we should like to add the 
following excerpt from the 'Appeal from Jews in the Soviet Union to Jews 
in the West' (published by the Comite de Solidarite avec les Juifs 
d'URSS, BP 26, 75860 PARIS, Cedex 1): 'You need facts? But how can we 
show you the bleeding larynx of Anatoly Shcharensky after his prison 
hunger strike? Can we make you feel the broken ribs of Zakhar Zunshain 
in a Siberian goulag or feel the blindness of Yossif Berenstein of Kiev 
whose eyes were gouged out in prison? Who can break through the walls 
of the psychiatric hospitals, the courts, the prison cells and the 
barbed wire of prison camps to see the pain and suffering of 
Nadejda Fradkova, Yossif Begun, Yacov Mesh, Yuri Tarnopolski, 
Alexander Kholmianski, Yacov Levin, Mark Niepomniashchy or 
Yuli Edelstein?' (Le Monde, 12 January 1985). See also the remarkable 
'dossier on the persecut1on of the Jews' published by the Cahiers du 
Samizdat in Brussels <No. 108, January 1985), reprinted in Liberation, 
20 June 1985, p. 22. 
(231) Docs. 1-0115/84; 1-0023/82, 1-0810/82; 1-1024/83; 1-'536/83; 1-1117/82; 
1-1364/82. 
(232) Council of Europe, Doc. 5445, rapporteur M. HUGOSSON 
(233) Political Dissent, p. 39 
(234) Report by M. HABSBOURG, Doc. 1-0656/82 
(235) The European Parliament has condemned the trial of Adam Michnik, 
Bodgan Lis and Wladyslaw Frasyniuk in two resolutions adopted in 
June 1985 (Doc. B 2-450/85 and Am. 1 to Docs. B 2-479/85-508/85) 
(236) Reprinted in Liberation, 20 June 1985, p. 22 
(237) Die Welt, 22 May 1985 
(238) The Times, 20 September 1985; Political Dissent, p. 33 
(239) ibid. 
(240) Political Dissent, p. 33-34 
(241) The Sunday Times, 17 February 1985. See also draft report by 
Mrs Van Den Heuvel CPE 94.657/85) 
C242) Diplomats in Sofia believe that the authorities may have been spurred 
into the Latest drastic action by deep concern at the Turkish 
population's rate of increase, which is 2% a year compared with the 
national average of 0.5%. Many Turkish schools have been closed and 
Turkish Language courses have been ended. Islamic holidays and 
traditional religious ceremonies are banned. Mosques have been closed 
and only those of historic interest have survived demolition. Separate 
Muslim cemetaries have been closed. The campaign, though not mentioned 
in the official Bulgaria-press, is no secret to Bulgarians. One 
commented to me Last week: 'The Turks had their turn for 500 years. 
Now it's ours.' Peter Godwin, The Sunday Times, 17 February 1985. 
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(243) PE Doc. B 2-61/85, Council of Europe: Doc. 5446/1985 
(244) PE Doc. 2-1879/84 and draft report by Mrs VAN DEN HEUVEL 
(245) Political Dissent, pp. 60.62, Financial Times, 21 May 1981 and 
5 February 1982 
(246> Overview in RENNER - 'The National Minorities in Czechoslovakia after 
the Second World War'- Plural Societies, vol. 7 no. 1, 1976, pp. 32-41. 
(247) Radio Free Europe Research - Hungary (18 April 1978) 
General survey of the situation in Eastern Europe in Rudolf STROEBINGER, 
Roter Kolonialismns Zurich Interfrom, 1981. 
INTERNATIONAL LINKS 
(248) The rally on 8 May 1985 in Aix-la-Chapelle 'was organized by the Pan 
European Movement, a joint action front uniting, as full or associated 
members, about a dozen European organizations, ranging from the FAP to 
the Wiking Jugend' (Notre Europe, June 1985; on the Dixmude rally, see 
ibid, July-August 1985>. Motions for resolutions against the holding of 
reunions of former nazis in Federal Germany have been tabled in the 
European Parliament. 
(249) Replying to questions from Committee members, Mr Simon Wiesenthal spoke 
of the large number of consignments despatched to Europe by 
Garry Rex Lauck from Lincoln, Nebraska. Also in the United States two 
data banks have been set up in Idaho, West Virginia, for the 
dissemination of racist, and particularly anti-semitic, information by 
telephone. (See R. GENN, Patters of Prejudice, Vol. 19, No. 3, 
July 1985, and Jewish Chronicle, 29 March 1985). 
The American movement is characterized by the strong influence of 
certain violently anti-semitic sects (e.g. the Identity Church) and by 
its heavy reliance on theft to finance its activities <4 to 5 million 
dollars were obtained by robbery by the 'Order' Group alone. See 
The Economist, 27 April 1985 and International Herald Tribune, 
19 April 1985. 
(250) See the sections on the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy and France. 
On the - unclear - Links between neo-nazis and the various factions in 
Lebanon (e.g. the smuggling by the Hoffmann Group of rebuilt German 
military lorries to Beirut) see, inter alia, Israelitisches Wochenblatt, 
No. 31, 5 August 1983, Searchlight, November 1982, Innere Sicherhe1t 
(FRG), September 1981. 
Asala in the latest issue of its publication Armenia has published 
documents showing that at the beginning of the 1980s the neo-nazi Leader 
Hoffmann was a member of the PLO, Agence Telegraphique Juive, 
24 April 1985. Some other examples are provided by Paul WILKINSON: 
'In 1969, Jean Bireault, a Belgian who was secretary of the neo-nazi La 
Nation Europeenne served as an adviser to the Palestinian organization 
AL-Fatah ( ••• > At this period also, the PFLP acquired a former nazi 
commander for their training camp at Basra in South Iraq. ( ••• ). In 
January 1970, in a trial of three captured PFLP terrorists in Winterthur 
(Switzerland), evidence was produced of close Links between the Swiss 
Nazi Party, particularly one of its founders, Francoise Geroude and 
AL-Fathah. ( ••• ). The Yediot Aharonot correspondent in Bonn reported 
that in January 1978 four members of the Free Corps - Saudi Arabia and 
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Free Corps- Hitler groups had been arrested on susp1c1on of smuggling 
from Arab states to members of the PLO in Germany. They were caught 
red-handed and at Least one neo-nazi was in possession of a PLO 
membership card'. (The New Fascists, London, Pan Books, 1983, 
pp. 125-126). 
(251) For instance, the World Union of National Socialists is one of several 
groups which claim world leadership of the neo-nazi movement. Its 
Secretary-General, Paul Heinrich Riis-Knudsen (Denmark) wrote in an 
internal circular that the WUNS is essentially 'an organization of 
individual members ( ••• ). The WUNS has never had a staff of its own. 
Most of the work has been carried out by the staff of the National 
Socialist White People's Party in Arlington, Virginia'. He goes on to 
state as the short-term aim the production of 'high quality' propaganda 
material, but the long-term objective remains the training of 
'professional organizers•. 
Our assessment of the situation as regards international links conforms 
with the opinion expressed by Mrs Kniesmeyer of the Anne Frank Stichting 
when questioned by the Committee on this point. 
TOWARDS AN IDENTIFICATION OF THE CAUSES 
(252) See paragraph 47 above. 
(253) Veronique DE RUDDER in Le Monde, 20 January 1981 
(254) John WILLIAMS, Eric DUNNING and Patrick MURPHY, Hooligans Abroad, 
London, Routledge & Kegan, 1984, pp. 12-16 
(255) Spinoza, Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, chap. 20. 
THE ECONOMIC SITUATION AND THE RISE OF EXTREMIST MOVEMENTS 
(256) Werner KALTEFLEITER, Wirtschaft und Politik in Deutschland, Koln, 
Westdeutscher Verlag, 1968, p. 37, reprinted in J. LINZ and A. STEPAN, 
The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes : Europe, Baltimore, John Hopkins 
University Press, 1976, p. 51. 
(257) LINZ and STEPAN, ibid, p. 52. 
(258) A related point, raised before the Committee by Professor Mandel, is 
that of relations between industry and the world of politics, 
particularly extremist governments. A recent book, Henry Ashby TURNER, 
German Big Business and the rise of Hitler, Oxford University Press, 
1985, seems to give a very complete account of the Hitler period. See 
also the review of Turner's book by Alan MILWARD in the Times Literary 
Supplement, 5 July 1985. 
ARE FASCISM AND RACISM ON THE INCREASE? 
(259) Insofar as it can really be measured, the electoral potential of fascist 
and right-wing extremist parties in the Community is the smallest in the 
political spectrum, except, in some countries, for left-wing extremism, 
cf. Eurobarometer, No. 21 where an attempt to measure the best chances 
of every pol1t1cal grouping is made. It should, however, be remembered 
that the meaning of the various political Labels and the political 
reality behind them vary enormously from country to country. An attempt 
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to interpret these data will be found in: R. INGLEHART, J.R. RABIER, 
'The withering away of Marx: changing political cleavages in Western 
nations', paper presented at the XIIIth Congress of the International 
Association of Political Science, Paris, July 1985. 
(260) Eurobarometer No. 23, June 1985. Only in three countries a drop in 
satisfaction was recorded, very slight in Ireland and Italy, greater in 
Belgium (where however there is a clear upswing after a trough reached 
in 1981). 
THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION 
(261) United Nations Charter, Preamble : 
'··· to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and 
worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and 
nations Large and small ' 
Article 1, para. 3 : 
'To achieve international cooperation ••• and in promoting and 
encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all 
without distinction as to race, sex, Language or religion.' 
Also see Articles 13, first indent (b), SS<c> and 76(c). See also 
International Court of Justice, 'Avis Consultatif sur Namibie', C.I.J. 
Recueil 1971, p. 57, para. 131. 
(262) Came into force on 12 January 1951. 
(263) Issued by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 20 November 1963. 
(264) Came into force on 4 January 1969. See para. 233. 
<265) Came into force on 3 January 1976. 
(266) Came into force on 23 March 1976. 
(267) Came into force on 23 March 1976. 
<268) Came into force on 18 July 1976. 
(269) Came into force on 15 June 1960. See also Recommendation No. 111/1958 
of the International Labour Conference. 
<270) Came into force on 22 January 1952. 
(271) Adopted by the International Labour Conference on 24 June 1975. 
(272) On 14 December 1960. See C. Hadji CONSTANTINOU, The UNESCO Convention 
prohibiting discrimination in the field of educat1on, thesis, 
Thessaloniki, 1962 <in Greek). 
On 14 December 1960 the UNESCO General Conference adopted a 
Recommendation on combating discrimination in the area of education. In 
1974 a Recommendation was adopted on education for international 
understanding, cooperation and peace and on education in human rights 
and fundamental freedoms. 
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(273) For a systematic List of these acts see Compilation of United Nations 
resolutions and decisions relevant to the struggle aga1nst rac1sm, 
racial discrimination and apartheid, Second World Conference to combat 
rac1sm and rac1al d1scrimination (Geneva, 1-12 August 1983>, Pre-session 
documents A/Conf. 119/15, Part I : Security Council resolutions, p. 42, 
Part II : General Assembly resolutions (1946-1978>, p. 200, Part III : 
General Assembly resolutions (1979-1982), p. 196, Part IV : Economic and 
Social Council resolutions, p. 71, Part V : Commission on Human Rights 
resolutions, p. 113. 
(274) See the List of these states in the Report of the Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination, United Nations, General Assembly, 
Official Records : Thirty-ninth session, Supplement No. 18 (A/39/18) 
p. 133 et seq. 
(275) See J.D. INGLES, Study on the implementation of Article 4 of the 
Convention on the Elimination of ALL Forms of Racial Discrimination, 
Un1ted Nat1ons A/Conf. 119/10, 18 May 1983. 
(276) See V.G. TENEKYDES, Study on the implementation of Article 7 of the 
Convention on the El1m1nation of ALL Forms of Racial Discrimination, 
United Nations, 1983. A/Conf. 119/19, 8 June 1983. 
(277> See, for example, the document quoted in footnote 220. 
(278) See the document quoted in footnote 274, p. 1 and 137. Among Community 
Member States declarations on Article 14 have so far been made by: The 
Netherlands, Italy and France. The committee has already received the 
first 'individual' communication which is in process of being studied. 
<279) See V.G. TENEKYDES, Recueil des Cours de L'Academie de droit 
international de La Haye, Vol. 168, p. 459 et seq. 
<280) United Nations Action in the field of human rights, New York 1983 Index; 
- Naz1, Nazism and above all p. 42 et seq., as well as the recent 
resolution 39/114 of 14 December 1984 of the General Assembly, on the 
measures to be taken against nazi, fascist and neo-fascist activities 
and all other forms of totalitarian ideologies and practices based on 
racial intolerance, hatred and terror, Official Records of the General 
Assembly, Thirty-Ninth Session, Supplement No. 51. In the words of this 
Resolution, the General Assembly once again condemns and expresses its 
determination to resist all totalitarian ideologies and practices which 
deprive people of their human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
(281> See, inter alia, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 21, 
para. 1, Art1cle 26, para 2., Article 28, Article 29, para. 1; 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
Article 1, para. 1, Article 4, Article 5, para. 1, Article 13; 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 1, 
para. 1, Article 14, Article 21, Article 22, para. 2, Article 25, 
Article 26. Also see reference in the preceding footnote. 
THE EUROPEAN DIMENSION 
(282) See para. 250 et seq below. 
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<283) The other Member States of the Council of Europe are: Austria, Cyprus, 
Iceland, Liechtenstein, Malta, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and Turkey. 
(284) Article 3 of the Statute of the Council of Europe stipulates that all 
Member States of the Organization must accept the principles of the 
primacy of law and of human rights and fundamental freedoms. In 
addition, Article 8 lays down that any member state which seriously 
infringes Article 3 can have its right to representation suspended, be 
asked to withdraw or, lastly, be excluded from the Organization. On 
this point it is worth noting the Council of Europe's attitude to 
authoritarian European regimes : Spain and Portugal were admitted as 
members only after the restoration of a democratic system. Greece, 
following the military coup d'etat of 21 April 1967, was forced to 
withdraw from the Council of Europe on 12 December 1969. On the 
political work and numerous actions taken by the Organization in regard 
to the Greek military regime, see the excellent survey by Jean SIOTIS, 
La Grece sur le chemin de l'Europe, Melanges Fernand DEHOUSSE, vol. 2 
(La construction europeenne), 1979, p. 73 et seq and 76 et seq. Among 
the documents drawn up by the Parliamentary Assembly, the following 
reports by Mr VAN DER STOEL are particularly relevant : 
1968 (Doc. 2384), 1968 (Doc. 2467), 1969 (Doc. 2525), 1969 <Docs. 2637 
and 2638), 1970 (Doc. 2719) and 1971 (Doc. 2892). See also footnote 296 
below on the machinery for the protection of human rights. On the 
Parliamentary Assembly's attitude to the Turkish military regime see, 
among others, the reports by Mr STEINER 29.9.1980 (Doc. 4621>, 27.1.1981 
(Doc. 4657), 1.10.1981 (Doc. 4784), 11.3.1982 (Doc. 4621), 30.9.1982 
(Doc. 4965), 14.1.1983 (Doc. 5008), 19.9.1983 (Doc. 5117), 7.5.1984 
(Doc. 5208) and 25.3.1985 (Doc. 5378), by Mr URWIN and Mr STEINER 
25.1.1982 (Doc. 4841 rev.>, by Mr BARDENS 24.1.1983 (Doc. 5014) and by 
Mr STOFFELEN 8.5.1984 (Doc. 5216), and the recommendations 904 (1980), 
936 (1982), 938 (1982), directives 392 (1980), 395 (1981), 397 (1981), 
413 (1982), 406 (1982) and resolutions 757 (1981), 765 (1982), 
794 (1983>, 803 (1983>, 822 <1984) and 840 (1985). Also see the action 
brought before the European Commission on Human Rights against Turkey by 
France, Denmark, Norway and Sweden, footnote 295 below. 
(285) See the compendium prepared by the European Parliament for our 
Committee, Doc. PE 94.443 of 12 December 1984, to which should be added 
the resolutions adopted on 26 September 1095 by the Parliamentary 
Assembly concerning the situation of the Jews in the Soviet Union 
(report by Mr HUGOSSON, Doc. 5445 of 26 July 1985) and the situation of 
ethnic and muslim minorities in Bulgaria (report by Mr ATKINSON, 
Doc. 544471985). 
(286) See the compendium referred to above, footnote 285, p. 22. 
<287) See the document referred to above, footnote 285, p. 24 
(288) Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Doc. 5107 of 12 September 1983. 
(289) Also see the European Social Charter. 
(290) Convention, Articles 8 para. 2, 9 para. 2, 10 para. 2, and 11 para. 2. 
(291) Articles 9, 10 and 11. 
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(292) See Preamble, Article 5, para. 1, Article 6 and the provisions referred 
to above in footnote 290. 
(293) Additional Protocol No. 1, Article 3. 
(294) See Council of Europe, the Greek Case, Vol. I 1, I 2 (annexes), II 1, 
II 2 (annexes), Strasbourg 1970, The Greek case Yearbook of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, 1969, Kiss-Vegleris, 1L1Affaire grecque 
devant Le Conseil de l'Europe et La Commission europeenne des droits de 
L'homme', Annua1re Franca1s de dro1t 1nternat1onal, SVII (1971), p. 889 
et seq., Mertens, 1Les organes du Conse1l de (*Europe et Le concept de 
"Dt!imocratie" dans Le cadre de deux affa1res grecques•, Revue belge de 
droit international, VII (1971), p. 118 et seq, S1otis, Loc. c1t. 
(footnote 284 above) • 
(295) These petitions (9940 to 9944/82) were filed before the European 
Commission on Human Rights on 1 July 1982. Declared admissible on 
6 December 1983 (the Commission's Decision of 6 December 1983), they are 
still pending before the Commission. See the communiques of the 
Secretariat of the European Commission on Human Rights of 2.7.82, 
6.12.83, 29.6.84, 28.1.85, 5.2.85, 15.3.85 and 14.6.85. 
(296) This petition (No. 250/57>, disputing the conformity with the 'European 
Convention of Human Rights' of the German Federal Constitutional Court's 
ruling of 17 August 1956 which disbanded the Communist party of Germany 
on grounds of anti-constitutionality, was declared inadmissible by the 
decision of the European Commission of Human Rights of 20 July 1957. 
See the text of this decision in Documents and decisions <Annex to the 
Convention, 1st T.), 1955-1956-1957, The Hague 1959, p. 222 et seq. 
(297> The petitioner had founded a political movement in Italy in 1958 which 
based its doctrine and programme on those of the Fascist Party, even 
adopting its emblems. After being tried and sentenced under the Italian 
Law No. 645 of 20 June 1952 prohibiting the re-formation of the Fascist 
Party, he filed a complaint (No. 6741/74) before the Commission for 
violation of a number of provisions of the European Convention on Human 
Rights. The Commission declared the complaint inadmissible in its 
decision of 21 May 1976 (see European Commission of Human Rights, 
Decisions and Reports, Vol. 5, Strasbourg 1976, p. 83 et seq). 
(298) The petitioners contested the compatibility with the European Convention 
on Human Rights of penalties imposed on them on account of their Link 
with the NVU's racially discriminatory structures and politics. On the 
Latter group see paragraph 125 above. The petitions (8348/78 and 
8406/78) were declared inadmissible by the decision of 13 December 1979 
(see the text of the decision in the European Commission of Human 
Rights, Decision and Reports, Vol. 18, p. 187 et seq). 
(299) Decisions and Reports (referred to above, footnote 296) p. 205. Also 
see the rul1ng of the European Court of Human Rights in the Lawless case 
of 1 July 1961, part 'in jure•, paragraph 6, p. 45. 
(300) See on these cases the decisions on admissibility of the European 
Commission of Human Rights of 10 December 1970 (Directory of the 
European Convention of Human Rights, 13/1970, p. 929 et seq), of 
6 March 1978 (Decisions and Reports, Vol. 13, p. 17 et seq), and the 
Resolution DH <77>2 of the Council of Ministers of the Council of 
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Europe, in Collection of Resolutions adopted by the Committee of 
Ministers in application of Article 32 of the European Convention for 
the Protect1on of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1959-1979, 
Strasbourg 1979. Also see the decision on admissibil1ty of 
17 March 1981 concerning Petition No. 8008/17 (Digest of Strasbourg, 
Case Law relating to the European Convention on Human Rights, Vol. 1, 
p. 170). Council of Europe, European Commission on Human Rights, 
'Bilan' of the European Convention on Human Rights, 1954-1984, 
Strasbourg 1985, p. 154 et seq. It is worth noting that the Commission 
observed in the aforementioned decision of 10 December 1970 that 
'discrimination based on race could in itself in certain circumstances 
constitute degrading treatment in the sense of Article 3 of the 
Convention'. 
(301) On this case see the report of the European Commission on Human Rights 
adopted 12 May 1983 and the ruling of 28 May 1985 of the European Court 
of Human Rights. This case, concerning British immigration Laws and in 
particular the right of relatives of immigrants to join them in the 
United Kingdom, raised questions of racial discrimination. However, 
this complaint was not upheld, the Commission and the Court having 
finally concluded that it was, rather, a matter of sexual 
discrimination. But see dissenting opinion of Mr Carillo, Mr Melchior 
and Mr Weitzel, Members of the Commission, report, p. 38, who concluded 
that the British Laws did contain an element of racial discrimination. 
Following the Court's ruling, the UK Government amended its Laws to 
conform with the judgement. See statement of changes in immigration 
Laws, Laid before Parliament on 15 July 1985 under Section 3(2) of the 
Immigration Act 1971, London, HMSO. 
(302) Two other cases relating to the subject of the Inquiry are at present 
pending before the European Court of Human Rights (Glasenapp and Kosiek 
v. the Federal Republic of Germany). See the relevant reports of the 
European Commission on Human Rights of 11 May 1984. The petitioners had 
been dismissed from their teaching posts on grounds of Lack of Loyalty 
to the Constitution because the first of these two petitioners belonged 
to the NPD (See 47 et seq above regarding this party) and the second 
supported certain political theories of the German Communist Party. 
Also see the ruling of 25 April 1983 handed down by the European Court 
of Human Rights on the Case Pakelli against the Federal Republic of 
Germany, paragraphs 43 to 45. 
(303) See the text of the Convention in the Council of Europe, Series of 
European Conventions, No. 93, Vol. IV (1975-1982), Strasbourg 1983, 
p. 69 et seq. This collection (Vol. I to IV and Index Volumes I to II) 
contains other agreements relating if only indirectly to the subject of 
the inquiry : Convention No. 19 (establishment>, Agreement No. 25 (free 
movement of persons), Agreement No. 31 (abolition of visas for 
refugees), European Convention on Terrorism (1977). For the signing and 
ratification of these Conventions see Council of Europe, Legal Cases, 
state of signing and ratification of these Conventions and Agreements of 
the Council of Europe, 15 May 1984 and DIR/JUR (85)1, 10.4.1985. 
(304) Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Conference on the Defence of 
Democracy against Terrorism in Europe : Tasks and problems (Strasbourg, 
12-14 November 1980), Compend1um of documents, 1981. 
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(305) Council of Europe, European Youth Centre, Conference on Intolerance in 
Europe, 9-11 December 1980. 
(306) Council of Europe, Human Rights, Papers, Colloquy on 'the Human Rights 
of foreigners in Europe', Funchal- Maderia (Portugal), 
17-19 October 1983, Strasbourg 1985. 
(307) Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, 'Confrontation' on 'aliens in 
Europe: A threat or an asset?', Strasbourg, 20-21 March 1984, Minutes, 
Strasbourg 1984. Also, in the context of the work of the Commission on 
Migration, Refugees and Population, see report by M.R. Muller on 
xenophobic attitudes and movements in the Member States towards migrant 
workers (Doc. 5107 of 12 September 1983) and draft recommendation 
submitted by the Commission to the Parliamentary Assembly ibid., adopted 
as Recommendation 968/1983 by the Parliamentary Assembly. Footnote 287 
above. 
THE COMMUNITY DIMENSION 
(308) I. Richard, Hearing, passim. Public meeting of 18 December 1984; also 
see address by P. SUTHERLAND in Dublin on 11 April 1985 to the Annual 
Congress of the Irish Episcopal Commission for Emigrants (PE 98.372). 
(309) See above, Part 4, Recommendations 4.2. 
<310) On 5 April 1977 the Council, the Commission and the European Parliament 
adopted a joint declaration on the protection of fundamental rights in 
the EEC (OJ C 103 of 17.4.1977>. At the European Council in Copenhagen 
on 14 December 1973 a declaration on European identity was adopted 
(Bul. EEC 12-1973). Twelve months Later in Paris the European Council 
was unable to act on proposals designed to create a status of European 
citizenship, but decided to pursue this objective by pragmatic means. 
This declaration Led to a debate in the European Parliament on the 
establishment of a charter of special rights for migrants from EEC 
countries residing in the other Member States (SCELBA report, OJ C 299 
of 12.12.1977). In anticipation of the first European elections in 
June 1979, the European Council adopted a declaration on democracy, 
8 April 1978 (EEC Bul. 4-1978). 
(311) See SIOTIS, referred to in footnote 229a above. By the same author 'the 
European Parliament and dictatorship in Greece : 1967- 1974' in 'the 
European Parliament'. Athens 1978, p. 179 et seq. Among relevant acts 
of the European Institutions, the European Parliament Resolution of 
11 May 1967 (OJ C 103 of 2.6.1967) and that of September 1974 (OJ C 127 
of 18.10.1974) 
(312) See EEC Bul. 9-180 pp. 56 and 57 quoting the Commission's declaration of 
12 September 1980 and the declaration of the Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs meeting in political cooperation on 15 September 1980 regarding 
the situation in Turkey. On 18 September 1980 the European Parliament 
voted a resolution expressing its grave concern over this situation 
(OJ C 265 of 13.10.1980). In addition the Council formally approved the 
decision taken by the Association Council of 30 June 1980, which were 
reaffirmed by the Association Council on 3 December 1980, to maintain 
the existing Links and to endeavour to see that these decisions were 
implemented; the Commission decided not to recommend to the Council that 
the fourth EEC - Turkey Financial Protocol be concluded in December 1981 
following the imprisonment of the former Turkish Prime Minister, 
Mr Bulent Ecevit- see EEC Bul. 12-1981. On 8 July 1982, the European 
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Parliament adopted a resolution on the political situation in Turkey 
(OJ C 238 of 13.9.1982) underlining the importance of a return to 
plura~ist parliamentary democracy for improvements in EEC - Turkey 
relations. 
(313) See the Commission's op1n1on of 23 May 1979 on Greece's application for 
accession to the Community, and the opinion of 31 May 1985 on the 
accession of Spain and Portugal and the declaration of the European 
Council of 23/24 March 1981 (Maastricht) on Spain. 
(314) See the acts and declarations referred to in footnote 310 above. 
(315) See inter alia the following judgements :Stauder (12.11.1969, 
Case 29/69, Judgements of the Court 1969.419), International Company 
<17.12.1970, Case 11/70, Judgments of the Court 1970.1125), Nold 
(145.1974, Case 4/73, Judgments of the Court 1974.491), Defrenne 
(15.6.1978, 4/73, Judgments 1974.491), Hauer (15.6.1978, Case 44/79, 
Judgments 1979.3727>, National Panasonic (26.6.1980, Case 136/79, 
Judgments 1980.2033), Kent Kirk (10.7.1984, Case 63/83, not yet 
published in the Judgements). BEUTLER, BIEBER, PIPKORN, STREIL, Die 
Europaische Gemenischaft- Rechtsordnung und Politik, Second edit1on, 
1982, p. 198 et seq. 
(316) See references in footnote 313. 
(317) See the references in footnotes 310, 313 and 315. 
(318) See Article 27, para. 2, of the Staff Regulations, according to which 
officials are chosen irrespective of race, belief or sex. On religious 
discrimination, see the ruling of the EEC Court of Justice in the Prais 
Case (Ruling of 27.10.1976, case 130/75, Case Law of the Court 1976, 
p. 1589). Also see the declaration of 21 March 1977 by the Governments 
of the Nine Member States of the Community to the Secretary-General of 
the UN marking the day for the elimination of racial discrimination. 
(319) See Council Resolution of 9 February 1976, concerning an action 
programme for migrant workers and their families, OJ C 34 of 14.2.1976, 
p. 2), Council Resolution of 27 June 1980, concerning an approach to a 
Community Labour market policy (OJ C 168 of 8.7.1980, p. 1), Directive 
77/486/EEC (OJ L 199 of 6.8.1977, p. 32>, Final Communique of the 
Conference of Heads of State and of Government of 9 and 10 December 1974 
(Paris), point 10 (phased harmonization of Legislation on foreigners). 
European Council of 25 and 26 June 1984 (Fontainebleau), Community's 
medium-term social action programme (OJ C 175 of 4.7.1984, p. 1). 
(320) COM(85) 48 final I 1 March 1985. 
(321) European Parliament Resolution of 9 May 1985 on the Commission's 
communication to the Council concerning guidelines for a European policy 
on migration (OJ C 141 of 10.6.1985, p. 462) and report by Mrs MARINARO 
(Doc. A 2-4/85). 
(322) OJ C 186 of 26.7.1985, p. 3. 
(323) OJ L 217 of 14.8.1985, p. 25. 
(324) See part 4 above, Recommendation 4.2.1.j). 
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THE NATIONAL DIMENSION 
(325) See paras. 4.2.1 - 4.2.6. above. 
(326) See footnote 297 above (Case before the European Commission on Human 
Rights). 
(327) Also see Article 20 of the German law on associations (Vereinsgesetz), 
VSBericht 1984, p. 23. 
(328) See H.H. KALINOWSKY (et al.>, Rechtsextremismus und Strafrechtspflege, 
Federal Ministry of Justice, 1985. A heated political debate took place 
in the Federal Republic of Germany over a Bill to modify the Penal Law 
and designed among other things to 'criminalize' the denial of the acts 
of genocide perpetrated by the Nazi regime ('Auschwitzluge'). The 
proposed provisions are intended to supplement the existing paragraph 
131 of the German Penal Code which punishes acts in defence of Nazi 
crimes. On this Bill, see s. ROTH, Making the denial of the Holocaust a 
crime in Law, INSTITUTE OF JEWISH AFFAIRS, Research Report No. 1, 
March 1982, P. 1 et seq, Patterns of Prejud1ce, 19 (1985) 2 p. 41 and 
the literature cited ibid. Note 1, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 
1 March 1985, p. 1. In its ruling of 18 September 1979 the Supreme 
Court in Germany ruled that the denial of the Holocaust may constitute 
and insult and an act of contempt towards persons who identify with the 
victims of Nazi persecution. S. ROTH, ibid. p. 5, Patterns of Prejudice 
14 (1980) 1 p. 32. Israel Yearbook of Human Rights Vol. 13 <1983) 
pp. 208 and 223 et seq. 
(329) See below, Part 4, Recommendation 4.2.2 (a). 
(330) See above, para. 257 et seq (THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION). 
(331) See above, para. 260. 
(332) See above, para. 264. 
(333) This followed the first and second Race Relations Acts of 1965 and 
1968. Also see footnote (153). 
(334) It is not possible within the framework of this report to record and 
analyse the national case law relating to the subject of this inquiry 
and·in particular the elimination of racism and racial discrimination. 
The rapporteur will therefore simply select certain references to 
illustrate the variety, topicality and importance of the question and 
the need for a systematic study of the legal and administrative 
application of the legislation governing our subject. References to the 
case law can be found in the periodic reports which the States which are 
signatories to the Convention on the elimination of all forms of racial 
discrimination submit to the Committee set up by that Convention (See 
para. 203 et seq and 207 above). The publications of the Commission for 
Racial Equality are also a valuable source of information in this field 
(see e.g. Review of the Race Relations Act 1976 : Proposals for a 
change, London, July 1985>. Mrs Pau-Langevin, one of the experts 
1nv1ted by the Committee, made available to us a dossier prepared by the 
MRAP which contains numerous references to the French case law on racism 
and racial discrimination, including the following decisions : Lyon 
Tribunal de grande instance, ruling of 30 September 1981 (racial 
discrimination in regard to employment) and ruling of 20 Feburary 1980 
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<racial discrimination in regard to offering of services), Reims 
Tribunal de grande instance, ruling of 8 March 1982 (racial 
discrimination in regard to the offering of services), Poitiers Court of 
Appeal, ruling of 31 March 1983 (discrimination in regard to housing), 
Montpellier Tribunal de grande instance, ruling of 9 November 1984 <case 
of Mr Arreckx, Mayor of Toulon, see footnote 95 above in fine), Cusset 
Tribunal de grande instance, ruling of 1 July 1983 (incitement to racial 
discrimination), Belfort Tribunal de grande instance, ruling of 
5 December 1980 and Paris Tribunal de grande instance, 17th Chamber, 
ruling of 28 October 1982 <racist insults), also the same court, 
17th Chamber, ruling of 24 June 1981 (incitement to racial hatred, 
denial of the holocaust), same court, 17th Chamber, ruling of 
1 July 1981 (Faurisson case, public defamation against a group of 
persons because of their membership of a given ethnic group, nation, 
race or religion, denial of the holocaust, see SJR in Patterns of 
Prejudice 15 (1981) 4, p. 51 et seq), same court, 17th Chamber, ruling 
of 4 March 1981 (Frederiksen case, public defamation against a group of 
persons), Amiens Tribunal de grande instance, 3rd Chamber, ruling of 
31 October 1984 (National Front case). Also see the case Law cited by 
S. ROTH, in Patterns of Prejudice 17 (1983) 4, p. 49 et seq, the same 
author, ibid., p. 52 et seq on Dutch case Law concern1ng the question of 
declarations of non-cooperation with Israel ('Non-Jew Declaration'>, 
which firms with trade Links with the Arab countries are required to 
produce (cf. the motion for a resolution, Art. 47 of the Rules of 
Procedure, by Mr de Vries, PE 97.684, 29 April 1985, and the reference 
to the Flakt case). -On the distinction between anti-zionism and 
anti-semitism see the case Law cited by Mr MAY, ibid. 16 (1982) 2 p. 45 
et seq. - In a ruling of the Court of Appeal in Frankfurt of 
8 January 1985 (Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1985.1720), the Court 
considered that a ban on people of Turkish origin entering a restaurant 
in the form of a notice in Turkish and German constituted racial 
discrimination but not an act which violated the dignity of the persons 
concerned in the terms of paragraph 130 of the German Penal Code. Other 
references to the German case Law, ibid. p. 1721. -A review of 
national case Law appears to indicate that the manner in which the 
judges in the Member States apply the Laws relating to the subject of 
the inquiry is on the whole satisfactory, although there are some 
weaknesses and failures. Systematic study and critical evaluation of 
this case Law is an important aspect of the fight against racism and 
racial discrimination. See Recommendation No. 5.21.2.a below. 
(335) See Review of the Race Relations Act, referred to in the preceding 
footnote. 
(336) See Recommendation No. 4.21.1.d above. 
(337) See the 'due account• clause of Article 4 in the International 
Convention on the Elimination of ALL Forms of Racial Discrimination 
'The signatory states, condemning all forms of propaganda and all 
organizations which derive their inspiration from ideas or theories 
based on the superiority of one race < ••• ) and to this end, taking due 
account of the principles Laid down in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights expressly set out in Article 5 of the present Convention, 
they undertake in particular ( ••• )•. 
(338) See the Federal Minister of Justice in the publication quoted in 
footnote 328 above, preface. 
WG(VS)2464/2441E 
- 135 - PE 97.547/fin./Ann.I 
• 
(339) See KALINOWSKY, quoted above, footnote 328, p. 279. 
(340) Cf. Article 17 of the European Convention on Human Rights; the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, Article 30; International Covenant on Civic 
and Political Rights, Article 5, para. 1. Also see cases cited 
footnotes 296-298 above. 
(341) MONTESQUIEU, De l'Esprit des Lois, L.IV, Ch. 5 (quoted in : speech by 
Mr J.P. Chevenement at the colloquy 'Etre citoyen' on 22 and 
23 November 1984 in Paris). PERICLES, Epitaph 40 : 'We regard the 
citizen who does not take part in political life not as peaceful but as 
useless'. 
(342) See European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 7 December 1976 (the 
Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen case), A Series, Vol. 23, para. 53. 
(343) See, among others, the tri-monthly UNESCO bulletin, Enseignement des 
Droits de l'Homme. On education in tolerance, see: United Nat1ons 
Centre for Human Rights, Seminar on the promotion of understanding, 
tolerance and respect in areas concerning freedom of religion or opinion 
held in Geneva on 3 to 14 December 1984, United Nations, New York, 
1984. The question of a 'European civic education' has been the subject 
of several motions for resolutions. 
(344) See reference given above, footnote 276. 
(345) See para. 255 and footnote 272 above. 
(346) See para. 280 and footnotes 351 - 357 below on the education of the 
children of migrant workers. 
(347) Cf. Alain PIERROT, 'L'Ecole francaise et les Etrangers', Esprit, 
June 1985, pp. 143-154. 
(348) The current debate going on in the USA on bilingual education is of 
interest here. The Secretary of State for Education, 
Mr William J. Bennett, has said 'As fellow citizens, we need a common 
language. In the United States, that language is English ( ••• ). A song 
of cultural pride cannot come at the price of proficiency in English, 
our common language ••• The mastery of English is the key to individual 
opportunity in America'. The prospect of a possible reversal of the 
bilingual approach has provoked protests from a number of senators and 
representatives (International Herald Tribune, 27 September 1985). 
<349) For example: R. COCHRANE and M. BILLIG, 'I'm not National Front myself, 
but ••••• •, New Society, 17 May 1984. 
(350) A bibliography has been compiled by Gillian KLEIN 'Resources for 
multicultural education: an introduction', Schools Council Programme 4. 
(351) The Swann report on the education of children from ethnic minorities, 
London, 1985. Commenting on the conclusions of this report, 
Sir Keith Joseph, Secretary of State for Education and Science, said. 
'We shall strive to improve the position through three broad lines of 
policy. First, under-achievement is not confined to ethnic minorities 
< ••• ). Our policies for school are designed to raise the performance of 
all pupils and to tackle the obstacles to higher achievement which are 
common to all ( ••• ). Second, we are determined to give ethnic minority 
pupils the same opportunity as all others to profit from what schools 
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can offer them. We are tackling the obstacles to opportunity, notably 
by promoting good practice in the teaching of English as a second 
Language. Third, we want the schools to preserve and transmit our 
national values in a way which accepts Britain's diversity and promotes 
tolerance and racial harmony• (The Times, 15 March 1985). 
See also Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), 
eighth periodic report, 1984, United Kingdom. 
See also Commission for Racial Equality, Annual Report 1984, p. 22-24. 
(352) CERD, sixth periodic report, 1982, France. 
(353) CERD, eighth periodic report, 1984, Federal Germany. The work of the 
Bundeszentrale fQr Politische Bildung, Bonn, is particularly important. 
Among the many publications of this organization, see Die Menschenrechte 
eine Herausforderung der Erziehung, Bonn 1983, Bracher, Funke, Jacobsen 
(ed.); Nationalsozialistische Diktatur 1933-1945, eine Bilanz, Bonn 
1983, 856 pages. 
(354) CERD, sixth periodic report, 1984, The Netherlands. 
(355) CERD, fourth periodic report, 1983, Italy. 
(356) CERD, fourth periodic report, 1982, Belgium. 
(357) See in particular CERD, sixth periodic report, 1983, Denmark; third 
periodic report, 1983, Luxembourg; seventh periodic report, 1984, Greece. 
INFORMATION MEDIA 
(358) See footnote 286 above. 
(359) Yves MICHAUD, Violence et Politique, Paris, Gallimard, 1978, p. 47. 
(360) See footnote 286 above. 
ORGANIZED SOCIAL REACTION 
(361) Among organizations active at the European Level which have submitted 
documentation to the Committee, mention should be made of the Comite 
europeen pour La Defense des Refugies et Immigres <European Committee 
for the Defence of Refugees and Immigrants) with headquarters in Basel. 
The minorities• own organizations deserve more attention. In this 
connection, our Committee has benefited considerably from the expertise 
of the Board of Deputies of British Jews. 
CULTURAL ACTION 
(362) PASCAL, Lettres a un Provincial, Twelfth Letter. 
(363) A good critical review of this Literature will be found in Brian BARRY, 
Sociologists, Economists and Democracy, Princeton University Press, 
1978. The standard work is still Robert A. DAHL, A Preface to 
Democratic Theory, Yale University Press. Most recent comment on 
European literature on this subject will be found in J. LECA and 
M. GRAWITZ (eds), Traite de Science politique, Paris, PUF, 1985, Vol. 1 
(especially the articles by Jean Leca and Georges Lavau). 
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GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 
(364) The problem of illegal immigration is a factor which must be taken into 
account in an overall survey of the phenomenon of migration. However, 
the difficulty of obtaining figures on illegal entries (see COM(85) 48 
final, p. 14) makes it impossible to assess their significance. Cf. the 
Commission's Decision of 85/381/EEC of 8 July 1985 (footnote 324 above> 
Article 1, para. 2 and the European Parliament's Resolution following 
the MARINARO report (cited footnote 322 above), paragraph 7. 
(365) See address by Mr P. SUTHERLAND of 11 April 1985 in Dublin before the 
Irish Episcopal Commission for Emigrants, PE 98.372/Ann. p. 5, Cf • 
footnote 308 abov.~ •. , , .. ~' .. -....... 
(366) For elements of the debate on immigration in the United States today, 
see Time of 8 July 1985, 'Special Immigrants Issue: The Changing Face of 
AmerieiT and readers' letters in subsequent issues. 
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